COLLAGAN v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY JAIL

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedDecember 21, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00362
StatusUnknown

This text of COLLAGAN v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY JAIL (COLLAGAN v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY JAIL) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COLLAGAN v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY JAIL, (D. Me. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

LESLIE COLLAGAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:22-cv-00362-JAW ) AROOSTOOK COUNTY JAIL, et al., ) ) Defendants ) RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Plaintiff, who is in custody at the Aroostook County Jail, has filed a complaint against the jail and various county officials regarding the conditions of her confinement. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) In addition to her complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 7.) In accordance with the in forma pauperis statute, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening “before docketing, if feasible or … as soon as practicable after docketing,” because she is “a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss the matter unless Plaintiff amends the complaint to address the deficiencies identified herein. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff complains about the food at the jail (i.e., no vegetarian diet), the jail’s failure to provide the necessary items for her to maintain proper hygiene, the quality of the

bathroom facilities, and the lack of writing utensils and access to her lawyer. DISCUSSION The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for individuals unable to pay the cost of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding in forma pauperis, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or

malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under § 1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). In addition to the review contemplated by § 1915, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to

screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because Plaintiff currently is incarcerated and seeks redress from governmental entities and officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The § 1915A screening requires courts to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim …; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

2 When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640

F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A self-represented plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must construe his complaint ‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Waterman v. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-cv-00032-JDL, 2019 WL 5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980). The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and usual punishments, governs the

jail’s obligation regarding the conditions of confinement for sentenced inmates, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes similar obligations while individuals are in pre-trial custody. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 (1983). “Prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Giroux v. Somerset Cnty., 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Conditions that might be deemed cruel and unusual if they 3 were permanent features of a prisoner’s life, may not offend the Constitution if they are imposed only temporarily.” Cookish v. Commissioner, N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 980 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1992).

While Plaintiff has referenced conditions that could potentially provide a basis for liability, Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts to support a claim. For instance, although the lack of a particular diet could constitute a constitutional deprivation under certain circumstances, see McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 n. 7 (2nd Cir. 2004) (citing cases establishing that a prison must consider an inmate’s religious beliefs in providing

diets), Plaintiff’s allegation that she is a vegetarian for “spiritual/religious reasons” lacks “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also, Campbell v. Cornell Corr. of Rhode Island, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103–04 (D.R.I. 2008) (“the dearth of facts presented thus far makes it difficult to assess the burden that preparing the “vegetarian” diet requested by Campbell would have imposed on Wyatt;

the effect that doing so might have had on operation of the prison; or the extent to which the failure to provide such a diet may have impermissibly infringed on Campbell’s First Amendment rights”). In addition, although unsanitary conditions of confinement can constitute cruel and unusual punishment, actionable cases have involved prolonged exposure to unsanitary

conditions, which exposure at a minimum consisted of multiple days. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 – 87 (1978) (“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored .... A filthy, overcrowded cell ... might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or 4 months.”); See, e.g., McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hutto v. Finney
437 U.S. 678 (Supreme Court, 1979)
City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital
463 U.S. 239 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
McBride v. Deer
240 F.3d 1287 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
Giroux v. Somerset County
178 F.3d 28 (First Circuit, 1999)
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset
640 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2011)
David R. Ferranti v. John J. Moran
618 F.2d 888 (First Circuit, 1980)
Campbell v. Cornell Corrections of Rhode Island, Inc.
564 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D. Rhode Island, 2008)
Felix D. Smith v. Norman Copeland
87 F.3d 265 (Eighth Circuit, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
COLLAGAN v. AROOSTOOK COUNTY JAIL, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collagan-v-aroostook-county-jail-med-2022.