Colin Rumpsa, Appellant, vs. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, et al., Respondents.

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: ED113002
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE

COLIN RUMPSA, ) No. ED113002 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Jefferson County vs. ) ) Honorable Joseph A. Rathert JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S ) DEPARTMENT, ET AL., ) ) Respondents. ) FILED: September 2, 2025

Following the termination of his employment as a deputy with the Jefferson County

Sheriff’s Department, Colin Rumpsa filed a lawsuit against the Department, the Sheriff of

Jefferson County, and the individual members of the county’s Merit Commission (collectively,

“Defendants”) seeking judicial enforcement of his rights under section 590.502,1 known as the

Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBOR”). Defendants moved to dismiss the

petition on the ground that Rumpsa’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations in

section 590.502.10. The circuit court granted the motion, and Rumpsa appeals. The judgment is

affirmed.

1 All statutory references are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2022), unless otherwise indicated. Background

Enacted in 2021, the LEOBOR provides law enforcement officers certain rights when they

are undergoing disciplinary proceedings. Section 590.502.2 sets forth the requirements for

conducting “administrative investigation or . . . questioning that the officer reasonably believes

could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, dismissal, transfer, or placement on a status that could

lead to economic loss[.]” Among other things, the officer “shall be” informed of the allegations

in writing and provided a copy of the complaint prior to any interview. Section 590.502.2(1). The

LEOBOR also grants officers who are “suspended without pay, demoted, terminated, transferred,

or placed on a status resulting in economic loss” the right to a “full due process hearing” and seven

days’ notice of the date and time. Section 590.502.3.

On July 11, 2023, Rumpsa filed his petition, the allegations of which we accept as true for

purposes of our review. See McCullen v. O’Grady, 670 S.W.3d 94, 100 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).

Rumpsa alleged that the Department interviewed him on May 21, 2022, as part of an administrative

investigation, without first giving him written notice of the allegations against him or a copy of

the complaint. On June 23, 2022, the Department terminated Rumpsa’s employment. He appealed

the termination decision to the county’s Merit Commission. On July 2, 2022, Rumpsa received

written notice that the Merit Commission had scheduled a due process hearing six days later on

July 8, 2022. At the hearing, the petition averred, the Department “presented the written file

compiled during the investigation,” “called no witnesses and did not afford [Rumpsa] the

opportunity to a full due process hearing.” On July 14, 2022, the Merit Commission notified

Rumpsa of its decision to uphold his termination. Rumpsa’s petition asserted that Defendants

violated the LEOBOR by (1) failing to provide him the complaint prior to his interview, (2) failing

to give him seven days’ notice of the due process hearing, and (3) failing to call witnesses and

2 present evidence. He sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the Department

from enforcing his termination and a judgment declaring that the termination was void, along with

his costs.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the

limitations period set forth in section 590.502.10, which provides that “[a] lawsuit for enforcement

shall be brought within one year from which the violation is ascertainable.” According to

Defendants, each of the specific violations alleged by Rumpsa was ascertainable more than a year

before he filed his petition—the failure to provide Rumpsa the complaint was ascertainable by the

date of his interview, and the alleged failures regarding the due process hearing were ascertainable

by the date of the hearing. Because the latter of those dates was July 8, 2022, Defendants

contended, Rumpsa’s cause of action filed on July 11, 2023 was time-barred. In response, Rumpsa

argued that the violations were not ascertainable until he sustained damage as a result of those

violations, namely when the Merit Commission notified him of its decision upholding his

termination on July 14, 2022. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss and entered a

judgment of dismissal. Rumpsa now appeals.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss on the ground that a cause of

action is barred by the statute of limitations. Laramore v. Jacobsen, 613 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Mo.

App. E.D. 2020).

Discussion

The interpretation of the LEOBOR’s statute of limitations is a matter of first impression.

As with any statute, we must determine the legislature’s intent by considering the plain and

ordinary meaning of its terms. Id. at 470. In doing so, we presume that when the legislature enacts

3 a statute, it does so with knowledge of existing laws, including how the terms it uses in that

enactment have been judicially interpreted. Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Dir. of Dep’t of Revenue, 766

S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 1989); State ex rel. Safety Roofing Sys., Inc. v. Crawford, 86 S.W.3d

488, 492-93 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002). This Court can neither add words to a statute nor adopt an

interpretation that would render the legislature’s chosen statutory language meaningless. Missouri

State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Mo. banc 2020) (per curiam); Pirtle v. Cook,

956 S.W.2d 235, 245 n.4 (Mo. banc 1997).

As noted, the LEOBOR imposes requirements on both the administrative investigation of

an officer’s alleged misconduct and the due process hearing to which an officer subjected to certain

negative employment actions is entitled. Section 590.502.2-3. The LEOBOR provides that an

“aggrieved law enforcement officer or authorized representative may seek judicial enforcement of

the requirements of this section.” Section 590.502.9. If a preponderance of the evidence shows

that there has been a violation of those requirements, “a court shall void any action taken in

violation of this section” and “may also award the law enforcement officer the costs of bringing

the suit including, but not limited to, attorneys’ fees.” Section 590.502.10. “A lawsuit for

enforcement shall be brought within one year from which the violation is ascertainable.” Id.

Defendants contend the alleged violations in this case were ascertainable, at the latest, on

July 8, 2022, the date of the due process hearing, at which point Rumpsa knew or could have

known that (1) he had not been given a complaint prior to his investigative interview, (2) he had

not received seven days’ notice of the hearing, and (3) he had not been afforded full due process

at the hearing. For his part, Rumpsa does not claim the violations themselves were not

ascertainable by that date; he instead argues that his cause of action did not accrue and start the

limitations period until he sustained damage resulting from those violations. Rumpsa asserts that

4 “the damage” in this case occurred on July 14, 2022, when the Merit Commission upheld his

termination, which is the “action taken in violation” of the LEOBOR that his lawsuit sought to

void. According to Rumpsa, until some disciplinary action is taken against an officer after an

administrative investigation or an officer’s negative employment action is upheld after a due

process hearing, violations of the LEOBOR are “nominal” and can still be “cured” and therefore

the officer is not yet “aggrieved” by those violations.2

Rumpsa’s interpretation of the specific statute of limitations in the LEOBOR incorrectly

relies on the accrual standard for civil actions that are subject to the general statutes of limitations:

“for the purposes of sections 516.100 to 516.370, the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue

when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage

resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment[.]” Section 516.100.3

Section 516.100 clearly does not apply to the LEOBOR’s specific statute of limitations set

forth in section 590.502.10. The accrual standard in section 516.100 “is expressly limited” by its

own terms to sections 516.100 to 516.370, which set the limitations periods for certain civil causes

of action. Richest v. City of Kansas City, 643 S.W.3d 610, 613-14, 617 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022).

Further, section 516.300 provides that “sections 516.010 to 516.370 shall not extend to any action

which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute[.]” (emphasis added). Actions under the

LEOBOR are “otherwise limited” by section 590.502.10 and are therefore outside the reach of

section 516.100. See id. at 617 (holding that section 516.100, and cases decided thereunder, do

not apply to the statute of limitations for whistleblower actions in section 105.055.7 RSMo

(2016)); see also Nolan v. Kolar, 629 S.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (holding that

2 Rumpsa does not claim that the limitations period in section 590.502.10 must be tolled while an officer exhausts the due process hearing remedy afforded by the LEOBOR; rather, he argues only that the period did not begin to run in his case until that hearing resulted in a final termination decision. 3 All references to the sections in Chapter 516 are to RSMo (2016).

5 section 516.100 does not apply to actions governed by the statutes of limitations in sections

516.400 and 516.420).

We presume the legislature was aware of the limiting language in sections 516.100 and

516.300 and understood that the damage-based accrual standard for the general statutes of

limitations would not automatically apply to the specific statute of limitations it was enacting in

the LEOBOR. See Safety Roofing, 86 S.W.3d at 492-93. If the legislature intended for a cause of

action under the LEOBOR to accrue when the damage was sustained and capable of ascertainment,

it would have used language to that effect. See, e.g., section 393.510 RSMo (2016) (employing

the same language as the accrual standard in section 516.100 for actions under that statute).

But instead of using language in the LEOBOR that tracks the damage-based accrual

standard in section 516.100, the legislature chose a violation-based accrual standard—one that is

nearly identical to the Sunshine Law’s statute of limitations. Like the LEOBOR, the Sunshine

Law provides that “[a]ny aggrieved person . . . may seek judicial enforcement” of its requirements,

that the court may “void any action taken in violation” of its requirements, and that the suit for

enforcement “shall be brought within one year from which the violation is ascertainable.”

Compare sections 590.502.9-10 with sections 610.027.1 and 610.027.5 RSMo (2016).4 In

Missouri Landowners All. v. Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC, 561 S.W.3d 39, 46-47 (Mo. App.

W.D. 2018), the court held that a Sunshine Law violation is ascertainable when it “could have been

discovered or was made known, or when a reasonable person would have been put on notice that

a violation may have occurred and would have undertaken to ascertain the extent of the violation.”

Id. at 47. Although the court formulated this test with guidance from case law holding that the

“capable of ascertainment” standard under section 516.100 is an objective one, it did not apply a

4 Section 610.027.5 adds that a lawsuit shall “in no event” be brought “later than two years after the violation.”

6 damage-based accrual test. Id. at 46-47. The plaintiffs in Missouri Landowners sought to void an

action taken at a meeting because the agenda and minutes did not comply with the Sunshine Law’s

requirements. Id. at 42-43. While the action sought to be voided and the violations at issue

“happened to be” ascertainable at the same time, the court made it clear that “the event that

triggered the running of the statute was when the . . . Sunshine Law violation became

ascertainable,” not when the action taken at the meeting became ascertainable. Id. at 47.

Ultimately, the court concluded the claims were time-barred because “both Sunshine Law

violations could have been discovered” more than a year before the plaintiffs filed suit. Id.

We presume the legislature was aware of the Missouri Landowners court’s interpretation

of the phrase “violation is ascertainable.” See Citizens Elec. Corp., 766 S.W.2d at 452. By using

that phrase in section 590.502.10, the legislature indicated its intent that, as with the Sunshine Law,

the limitations period in the LEOBOR is triggered when the violation itself is ascertainable, not

when the action sought to be voided or any other resulting damage is ascertainable. Rumpsa’s

proffered interpretation—that the limitations period does not begin unless and until the officer is

damaged by a negative employment action taken after the violation occurred during the

investigation or at the due process hearing—is contrary to the legislature’s intent. Adopting such

an interpretation would also render the phrase “one year from which the violation is ascertainable”

meaningless, which we cannot do. See Pirtle, 956 S.W.2d at 245 n.4. Nor can we add words to

section 590.502.10 so that it reads the way Rumpsa posits: that the lawsuit must be brought within

one year from when “the damage resulting from the violation” or “the action taken in violation”

is ascertainable. See Missouri State Conf. of NAACP, 607 S.W.3d at 733.5

5 In his reply brief, Rumpsa raises a new argument: his termination deprived him of his property right in continued public employment. Citing to federal case law, he contends the deprivation was not complete until the Merit Commission made its final termination decision. Only at that point, Rumpsa asserts, was he not provided a suitable post-deprivation remedy commensurate with the requirements of procedural due process. We do not consider

7 We conclude that the standard set forth in Missouri Landowners for when a Sunshine Law

violation is ascertainable is the proper test for determining when a violation of the LEOBOR is

ascertainable: “when the violation could have been discovered or was made known, or when a

reasonable person would have been put on notice that a violation may have occurred and would

have undertaken to ascertain the extent of the violation.”6 561 S.W.3d at 47. Applying this

standard, we determine that the violations Rumpsa alleged were all ascertainable more than one

year before he filed his petition on July 11, 2023: on the date of his interview, May 21, 2022,

Rumpsa knew or could have discovered that he had not been provided a copy of the complaint

against him; on the date he received the notice of his due process hearing, July 2, 2022, Rumpsa

knew or could have discovered that the hearing was only six days later; and by the conclusion of

that hearing on July 8, 2022, Rumpsa knew or could have discovered that Defendants had not

presented any evidence or witnesses. A reasonable person would have been on notice on each of

those dates that a violation of the LEOBOR might have occurred and would have undertaken to

determine the extent of the violation. Rumpsa’s cause of action is barred by the statute of

limitations in section 590.502.10, and the circuit court properly dismissed his petition. Point

denied.

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Kline v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 662 S.W.3d 158, 161 n.2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). In any event, this argument fails for the same reason the others do: by the plain language of section 590.502.10, the limitations period does not begin when the termination is final—or when the deprivation is complete— but when the violation is ascertainable. 6 Under this standard, it is possible that an officer’s cause of action could accrue the moment the violation occurs, which may entitle the officer to immediately file an action to judicially enforce the LEOBOR requirement that was violated. See section 590.502.9. We do not believe this possibility is an absurd or illogical result, such that we should ignore our obligation to give effect to the plain language of the statute. See Yount v. Keller Motors, Inc., 639 S.W.3d 458, 464-65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). If the legislature did not intend such a result, it has the power to amend that language. But this Court does not.

8 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

_______________________________ MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Robert M. Clayton III, P.J., concurs. Angela T. Quigless, J., concurs.