Coley v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.

19 S.E.2d 124, 221 N.C. 66, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 393

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: March 4, 1942
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Conceding the complaint may be interpreted as alleging arbitrariness or fraud on the part of defendant Lodge and mistake on the part of the Railroad Company in adopting the roster in question, which the defendants say is entirely too liberal, the record is wanting in sufficiency to support the allegation. Without this, it would seem that the plaintiffs are remitted to a pursuit of their protest, through the proper channels, or to an action for- damages against their own spokesman. Ryan v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 267 Mich., 202, 255 N. W., 365. See Reilly v. Hogan, decided by the New York Supreme Court 15 January, 1942, 9 Labor Relations Reporter, 629. Assuming the seniority rights of the plaintiffs were fixed by the “Lauderman Agreement,” as they allege, the subsequent delimitation of this agreement and its modification by the “authorized representatives of the Brotherhood” and the Railroad Company would seem to be within the apparent scope of collective bargaining. Aden v. L. & N. R. Co., 216 S. W., 511.

The allegation of Mala fides is directed only against the local lodge and not against the Railroad Company. The plaintiffs have refrained from charging the latter with any mischief or wrong-doing. The record is barren of any evidence tending to show bad faith on the part of the lodge. The nearest premise suggestive of such a conclusion is the failure to hear the protest filed by the plaintiffs. No facts are stated, however, and none appear of record, which would seem to give to this circumstance the character of willful neglect or maliciousness. Indeed, the plaintiffs brought suit in less than thirty days after filing their protest and before any action was taken thereon.

The plaintiffs have grounded their action on the “Lauderman Agreement.” In this they are well advised. The contract was made for the benefit of the employees in the coach shop and freight car department. James v. Dry Cleaning Co., 208 N. C., 412, 181 S. E., 341. It was arrived at in collective bargaining between the B.R.C. of A. and the Railroad Company. Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass., 167, 188 N. W., 705. The Brotherhood had the power, by agreement with the Railroad Company, to create seniority rights for “the craft or class of carmen, their helpers and apprentices, employees of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.” Hartley v. Brotherhood of R. & S. S. Clerks, 283 Mich., 201, 277 N. W., 885. By the same token, and in like manner, it had the power, in good faith, to modify these rights in the interest of the larger good. Annotation 117, A. L. R., 823. In an action, as here, by individual beneficiaries of the original contract to restrain any such modification, it is necessary to allege and to prove that the Brotherhood acted arbitrarily or in reckless disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights. The present record falls short of the prerequisites in this respect. Franklin v. Penn-Reading Shore Lines, 122 N. J. Eq., 205, 193 Atl., 712.

The argument of the ease covered a wide range of principles thought to be applicable, but the allegations of the complaint and the admitted facts reduce it to a narrow compass. On the record as presented, the correct result seems to have been reached. At least we cannot say that error has been shown. The judgment will be upheld.

Affirmed.

BabNhiix, J., not sitting.