Coleman v. Timbs
This text of Coleman v. Timbs (Coleman v. Timbs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
William Theoplas Coleman, ) C/A No.: 0:23-2221-JFA-SVH ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ORDER AND NOTICE Officer Steven Timbs; Tega Cay ) Police Department; and Unknown ) Defendants, ) ) Defendants. )
William Theoplas Coleman (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against Officer Steven Timbs, Tega Cay Police Department (“TCPD”), and Unknown Defendants (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff alleges Timbs unlawfully violated his “Ramsey Right” in November 2022. [ECF No. 1]. He further claims Timbs “began a slew of malicious prosecution efforts including the stacking of charges and unlawful enhancements without valid merits to enhance such charges. He seeks 30 million dollars, for Timbs to be barred from working in law enforcement, and for Timbs to be prosecuted. . II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss
a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim
based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se
complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. , 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. ., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction
afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. ., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally
construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. B. Analysis
1. Insufficient Allegations
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only
accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. Here, although Plaintiff vaguely alleges his constitutional rights have been violated, he has provided no facts to support these claims. Plaintiff’s claims of “stacking of charges” and “unlawful
enhancements without valid merits to enhance such merits” are insufficient to demonstrate a constitutional violation. 2. TCPD To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 an aggrieved
party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any
1 Plaintiff’s complaint is before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983; 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.”
Plaintiff has not stated a valid § 1983 claim against TCPD as it does not qualify as a “person.” A sheriff’s department, detention center, or task force is a group of officers or buildings that is not considered a legal entity subject to suit , 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that
the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); , 750 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not “person” under the statute); , 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Therefore, TCPD is subject to summary dismissal.
civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Coleman v. Timbs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-timbs-scd-2023.