Coleman v. State

256 S.E.2d 452, 243 Ga. 715, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1044
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedMay 31, 1979
Docket34687
StatusPublished

This text of 256 S.E.2d 452 (Coleman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coleman v. State, 256 S.E.2d 452, 243 Ga. 715, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1044 (Ga. 1979).

Opinion

Hill, Justice.

Raymond Lee Coleman was indicted for two counts of murder and one count of aggravated assault as a result of an incident in a bar in Augusta, Georgia, on August 11, 1978. Coleman admitted that he shot the three victims; he argued, however, that he did so in self-defense. The jury found him not guilty of aggravated assault upon the survivor but guilty of the two counts of murder.

1. .Coleman’s first enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a recorded statement he gave to the police on August 12, 1978, because he was not given his full Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). We have reviewed the transcript and find no reversible error.

2. Coleman’s second enumeration is that the trial court should have declared a mistrial upon his objection to the part of the prosecutor’s closing argument. The record shows that defense counsel made the following objections:

"Your Honor, I would like to object to the remarks by the prosecution to the effect that the jury would be giving the defendant his gun back so he could go out and do some more. That is improper argument and I object to it.” The trial court sustained the objection and fully instructed the jury to disregard those remarks. No motion for mistrial was made. In Lenear v. State, 239 Ga. 617 (12, 13) (238 [716]*716SE2d 407) (1977), we held that where defense counsel objects to remarks made by the district attorney in closing argument but does not move for mistrial, and where the trial court sustains the objection and admonishes the jury to disregard the improper remarks, it is not error for the trial court not to have granted a mistrial, sua sponte. That rule is applicable here and we find no error.
Submitted March 9, 1979 Decided May 31, 1979. Brown & Paschall, Carl C. Brown, Jr., for appellant. Richard E. Allen, District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Nicholas G. Dumich, Staff Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

3. Coleman’s final enumeration is that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence and strongly against the weight of the evidence. In essence, he argues that the jury was required by the evidence to find him not guilty because his actions were justified. On the evidence presented here, however, the jury was authorized to reject the defense of justification, to accept the testimony of those witnesses whose testimony showed that Coleman was the aggressor as to the two decedents, and to return the verdict of guilty. Ridley v. State, 236 Ga. 147 (1) (223 SE2d 131) (1976).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Ridley v. State
223 S.E.2d 131 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1976)
Lenear v. State
238 S.E.2d 407 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
256 S.E.2d 452, 243 Ga. 715, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1044, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-state-ga-1979.