Coleman v. Stanford

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMarch 25, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-00696
StatusUnknown

This text of Coleman v. Stanford (Coleman v. Stanford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coleman v. Stanford, (D. Del. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE DEVIN L. COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. : Civ. No. 19-696-CFC OFFICER MICHAEL Q. STANFORD: and OFFICER KRISTENE M. BRADY-_ : DOWNES, :

Defendants.

Devin L. Coleman, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff. Stuart B. Drowos, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March 25, 2020 Wilmington, Delaware

□□ CONNOLLY, U.S. Distéict Judge: I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Devin L. Coleman (“Plaintiff’), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“JTVCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' (D.I. 3) He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.|. 5) Pending are numerous motions and requests filed by Plaintiff. (D.I. 30, 33, 40, 55, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67, 72, 87, 88) II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff has a painful light sensitivity eye condition that requires darkening glasses. His allegations are fully set forth in the Court’s June 28, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See D.I. 19, 20) The matter proceeds on an Eighth Amendment medical needs claim. Plaintiff claims that he was punished for wearing medically authorized glasses, the glasses were taken from him, and Defendants were aware there were medical memos authorizing the use of the glasses at issue. Plaintiff alleges that he received disciplinary write-ups for the possession of health-related objects (/e., sunglasses) that were prescribed by the medical provider. Plaintiff previously sought, and was denied, injunctive relief. (See D.I. 7, 19, 20) On October 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second motion for injunctive relief and an additional request for injunctive relief. (D.1. 30, 67) He has also filed a request for counsel (D.!. 33), a motion and request regarding depositions and subpoenas (D.I. 40,

1 When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). _

87), motions for orders to show cause (D.I. 58, 59), requests for hearings (D.| 63, 64), and a motion to compel (D.I. 72). lll. MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF On October 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second motion for injunctive relief regarding a medical memo and authorization to allow him to wear medically prescribed and issued solar shields or ordinary sunglasses. (D.!. 30) While not clear, Plaintiff seems to indicate the current medical memo has expired or will be expiring in April 2020. Plaintiff also complains about disciplinary reports issued him in September 2018, March 2019, and Apri! 2019 for wearing sunglasses indoors even though a medical memo authorized the wearing of the glasses. (/d.) In supplemental filings, Plaintiff complains that his sunglasses were taken by unnamed prison staff on January 21, 2020, even though they were medically authorized and that he was without his glasses for two weeks. (D.I. 65, 67) Plaintiff does not indicate who took his glasses. (/d.) He asserts taking glasses could have caused him harm and permanent injury. (D.1. 67) A. Legal Standards A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only if: (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public interest.” NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (“NutraSweet II”). The elements also apply to temporary restraining orders. See NutriSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises., Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1997) (‘NutraSweet |”) (a temporary restraining order continued beyond the time permissible under Rule 65 must be treated

as a preliminary injunction, and must conform to the standards applicable to preliminary injunctions). “[FJailure to establish any element in [a plaintiff's] favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.” NutraSweet //, 176 F.3d at 153. Furthermore, because of the intractable problems of prison administration, a request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with considerable caution. Rush v. Correctional Med. Services, Inc.., 287 F. App’x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)). B. Discussion Plaintiff has lagophthalmos, a condition that prevents both eyes from fully closing and has been treated for this condition which causes extreme sensitivity to light. (D.1. 15-2 at ] 4) As discussed above, Plaintiff has been issued several disciplinary reports for wearing sunglasses and/or solar shields indoors. Plaintiff contends the sunglasses are medically necessary and that the medical service provider has authorized the indoor use of sunglasses. Defendants respond that Plaintiff provides little new information in his motion for injunctive relief. Defendants provided documentation that a medical memo issued on October 14, 2019 that was approved on November 18, 2019, and that provides for indoor and outdoor wear of solar eye shields and commissary sunglasses until October 14, 2020. (D.!. 52-1 at 2) Inasmuch as the current medical memo allows Plaintiff to wear solar shields or commissary sunglasses for indoor and outdoor use through October 14, 2020, injunctive relief may not issue. “The relevant inquiry is whether the movant is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued.” S/

Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264 (3d Cir. 1985). Because there are currently no restrictions on the type of glasses or locations where they may be worn, it is unlikely that Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm. The Court takes note that Plaintiffs glasses were recently confiscated. However, the individuals who took the glasses are not named and the glasses were returned. In addition, Plaintiff merely speculates that injury could have occurred. The Court finds it unfortunate that prison employees are not recognizing the medical memo issued to Plaintiff. Nonetheless, the unnamed prison employees are not parties to this action and the record does not reflect that there is the likelihood of success on the merits with regard to the instant motion. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiffs second motion for injunctive relief. (D.I. 30) lV. REQUEST FOR COUNSEL Plaintiff appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. He requests counsel on the grounds that the case is complex, expert testimony may be required, discovery will be extensive and witness depositions will be necessary, the prison does not allow inmates to possess medical files, Plaintiff has limited law library access, his ability to investigate the matter is impeded by his incarceration, and his eye condition makes it difficult to read documents and books. (D.I. 33) A pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis has no constitutional or statutory right to representation by counsel.2 See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 192 (3d

2See Mallard v.

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Bluebook (online)
Coleman v. Stanford, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-stanford-ded-2020.