Coleman v. Robin
Opinion
It appears you are using Adblock. Please disable Adblock to best experience our website.
Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
Coleman v Robin
2026 NY Slip Op 04399
July 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Audrey Coleman, appellant,
v
Hubert G. Robin, etc., et al., respondents, et al., defendant.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 15, 2026
2021-08959, (Index No. 70015/19)
Betsy Barros, J.P.
Cheryl E. Chambers
Lillian Wan
Susan Quirk, JJ.
Hasapidis Law Offices, South Salem, NY (Annette G. Hasapidis of counsel), for appellant.
Heidell Pittoni Murphy & Bach LLP, White Plains, NY (Daniel S. Ratner and Greg Freedman of counsel), for respondents.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Damaris E. Torrent, J.), dated October 28, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Hubert G. Robin and Shahram Ahari which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for medical malpractice insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendants Hubert G. Robin and Shahram Ahari which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for medical malpractice insofar as asserted against them is denied.
In December 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice against the defendants Hubert G. Robin and Shahram Ahari (hereinafter together the defendants), among others. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants departed from the standard of care in treating her for an anaphylactic reaction to a bee or wasp sting. In particular, she alleged that the defendants negligently misplaced a central venous catheter into her carotid artery and that this departure proximately caused her injuries.
In June 2021, the defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice cause of action insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated October 28, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the defendants' motion. The plaintiff appeals.
"'The elements of a medical malpractice cause of action are a deviation or departure from accepted community standards of practice, and that such departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries'" (Kielb v Bascara, 217 AD3d 756, 756 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting DiLorenzo v Zaso, 148 AD3d 1111, 1112). "To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, the defendant has the initial burden of establishing either that there was no departure from accepted community standards of practice or that any alleged departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" (id.). "Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as [*2]to the elements on which the defendant met the prima facie burden" (Alao v Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr., 213 AD3d 722, 723 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Chillious v Edouard, 234 AD3d 737, 739). "'Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions'" (Chillious v Edouard, 234 AD3d at 741, quoting Feinberg v Feit, 23 AD3d 517, 519).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the medical malpractice cause of action insofar as asserted against them by submitting, among other things, an affirmation of an expert who opined that the defendants did not deviate from the accepted standard of medical care and that the defendants' treatment did not proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries (see Kielb v Bascara, 217 AD3d at 757).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact by submitting an affidavit of an expert who opined, among other things, that the defendants departed from the standard of care by failing to use ultrasound guidance during guidewire advancement through the needle during the central line placement and to confirm correct positioning of the guidewire in the jugular vein (see Chillious v Edouard, 234 AD3d at 740-741; Kielb v Bascara, 217 AD3d at 757). The plaintiff's expert further opined that this departure proximately caused the plaintiff's subsequent complications and injuries. Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the opinions of the plaintiff's expert were not speculative and conclusory (see Chillious v Edouard, 234 AD3d at 741; Kielb v Bascara, 217 AD3d at 757).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice cause of action insofar as asserted against them.
BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Links to or from other sites do not signify endorsement or relationship with them.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Coleman v. Robin (Coleman v. Robin) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.