Coleman v. Lee

2014 DNH 124

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 3, 2014
• Docket: 13-cv-299-LM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Richard Coleman

v. Civil No. 13-cv-299-LM Opinion No. 2014 DNH 124 Town of Lee et al.1

O R D E R

Richard Coleman has filed a motion to amend his complaint

(doc. no. 18), which also serves as the proposed amended

complaint in this case. The filing is in response to this

court’s January 16, 2014, order (doc. no. 11) directing Coleman

to assert a plausible claim for relief in this matter, in order

to avoid dismissal of this action.

Discussion

I. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Coleman asserts that his Fourth Amendment right not to be

arrested without probable cause was violated when Lee Police

Officer Annie Cole arrested and detained Coleman pursuant to a

warrant Cole had obtained based on false information and without

probable cause. Coleman asserts that to obtain the warrant from

1 Defendants in this case are the Town of Lee; the Lee Police Department (“LPD”); the Lee Board of Selectmen; the Lee selectmen individually; LPD Chief Chester Murch; and LPD Officer Annie Cole. a neutral magistrate, Cole manufactured inculpatory evidence,

including the existence of a video of Coleman, and failed to

include exculpatory evidence in the warrant application,

including information about what could be seen from the

complaining witness Cormier’s window, and information about

Cormier’s antipathy towards Coleman.

“[A] plaintiff may bring a suit under § 1983 . . . [for a

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim] if he can

establish that: ‘the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the

plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable

cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s

favor.’” Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir.

2013) (citation omitted). Further, a “plaintiff must

demonstrate that law enforcement officers made statements in the

warrant affidavit which amounted to ‘deliberate falsehood or

. . . reckless disregard for the truth,’ and that those

deliberate falsehoods were necessary to the magistrate’s

probable cause determination.” Id. at 102 (citation omitted)

(emphasis in original).

In general, “[a]n arrest is lawful if the police

officer has ‘probable cause.’” Holder v. Town of Sandown,

585 F.3d 500, 504 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

2 A police officer has probable cause when, at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, even if every allegedly false statement was excluded

from the warrant affidavit, the magistrate could have found

probable cause based only on Cole’s statement in the affidavit

concerning what Cormier had reported to the police – that she

had witnessed Coleman exposing his genitals in their common

backyard. See id. at 505 (“‘information furnished by a victim

is generally considered sufficiently reliable to support a

finding of probable cause’” (citation omitted)). Further,

Coleman does not allege that Cole knowingly excluded exculpatory

information from the warrant application, regarding what could

be seen from Cormier’s window, as Coleman alleges that Cole did

not look through Cormier’s window. Once probable cause was

established by Cormier’s accusation, Cole had no duty to

investigate whether any exculpatory evidence existed, prior to

obtaining an arrest warrant. See id. (“‘once a law enforcement

officer unearths sufficient facts to establish probable cause,

he has no constitutional duty either to explore the possibility

3 that exculpatory evidence may exist or to conduct any further

investigation in hope of finding such evidence’” (citation

omitted)). Similarly, Cole’s knowledge of Coleman’s

antagonistic relationship with Cormier was insufficient to

require Cole to conclude that Cormier was lying. See id. at 506

(accusations and recriminations based on immediate circumstances

or parties’ long-term relationship alone do not require officer

to doubt veracity of victim’s statement).

Coleman has thus failed to assert facts to allow the court

to find, or reasonably infer, that the warrant for his arrest

would not have been issued if it failed to include the allegedly

false statements Coleman describes, or if it had included

information he describes as “exculpatory.” Because his arrest

was properly based on probable cause, Coleman cannot assert a

Fourth Amendment claim based on an alleged false arrest or false

imprisonment.

II. Claims Not Addressed in the Amended Complaint

In the order issued January 16, 2014 (doc. no. 11), the

court found that Coleman had failed to state any plausible

claims of an equal protection violation, false arrest, malicious

prosecution, or defamation, and had failed to state any

4 plausible basis for the court to find the municipality or any

supervisory Lee Police Department employee liable on any claim.

The amended complaint (doc. no. 18) does not provide any grounds

for the court to reconsider those findings and rulings.

Conclusion

Coleman has failed to state any claim in this action upon

which relief might be granted. The motion to amend (doc. no.

18) is denied as futile, and the complaint is dismissed. The

clerk is directed to enter judgment and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge

June 3, 2014

cc: Richard Coleman, pro se LM:jba