Coleman v. Hillsborough County Animal Services

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 13, 2019
Docket8:18-cv-01678
StatusUnknown

This text of Coleman v. Hillsborough County Animal Services (Coleman v. Hillsborough County Animal Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coleman v. Hillsborough County Animal Services, (M.D. Fla. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

AARON COLEMAN

Plaintiff, v. Case No.: 8:18-cv-1678-T-35AAS

CITY OF TAMPA, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________________/

ORDER Aaron Coleman moves to compel better discovery by filing four separate motions against different defendants, the City of Tampa, Hillsborough County, Paris Dunkley, and Officer Stephen Gady. (Docs. 44, 45, 46, 47). Each defendant opposes their respective motion. (Docs. 48, 49, 50, 51). Attached to each motion to compel are two one-page letters purporting to be Mr. Coleman’s unsuccessful attempts to meet and confer about the discovery disputes before filing his motions to compel. (Docs. 44-1, pp. 30–31; 45-1, pp. 24–25; 46-1, pp. 24–25; 47-1, pp. 23–24). These one-page ultimatums do not comply with the letter or spirit of Local Rule 3.01(g). Compliance requires plaintiff to have a substantive discussion with defense counsel. Any future failure to comply with Local Rule 3.01(g)’s meet and confer obligation will lead to the denial of the motion without further consideration. I. BACKGROUND Previously, the court detailed the events leading to Mr. Coleman filing his complaint against the defendants. (Doc. 38). Because of those events, Mr. Coleman

sued Hillsborough County, the City of Tampa, Ms. Dunkley, Officers John Riccardo, James Valentino, William Fair, and Stephen Gady.1 (Doc. 10). The defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Coleman’s third amended complaint. (Docs. 16, 17, 25). The undersigned recommended the motions to dismiss be denied. (Doc. 38). The district court adopted the report and recommendation but also issued an order with modifications. (Doc. 41). The order specifically granted in part the City of Tampa’s

motion to dismiss as to the false imprisonment and false arrest claims against Mr. Fair, but the remaining claims survived dismissal. (Id. at p. 14). In July 2019, Mr. Coleman served the City of Tampa with interrogatories and request for production. (Docs. 44-1, Ex. A, C). In August 2019, the City of Tampa answered those interrogatories and request for production and provided some documents but also raised objections. (Docs. 44-1, Ex. B, D). Mr. Coleman seeks better responses from the City of Tampa. (Doc. 44).

In July 2019, Mr. Coleman served Hillsborough County with interrogatories and request for production. (Docs. 45-1, Ex. A, C). In August 2019, Hillsborough County answered those interrogatories and request for production and provided some

1 In total, Mr. Coleman brought twenty-one claims in his third amended complaint. (Doc. 10). For brevity, the court will not list each claim against each defendant but refers to Mr. Coleman’s complaint and this court’s prior orders for reference. documents but also raised objections. (Docs. 45-1, Ex. B, D). Mr. Coleman seeks better responses from Hillsborough County. (Doc. 45). In July 2019, Mr. Coleman served Ms. Dunkley with interrogatories and

request for production. (Docs. 46-1, Ex. A, C). In August 2019, Ms. Dunkley answered those interrogatories and request for production and provided some documents but also raised objections. (Docs. 46-1, Ex. B, D). Mr. Coleman seeks better responses from Ms. Dunkley. (Doc. 46). In July 2019, Mr. Coleman served Officer Gady with interrogatories and request for production. (Docs. 47-1, Ex. A, C). In August 2019, Officer Gady answered

those interrogatories and request for production but also raised objections. (Docs. 47- 1, Ex. B, D). Mr. Coleman seeks better responses from Officer Gady. (Doc. 47). II. LEGAL STANDARD A party may obtain discovery about any nonprivileged matter relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery helps parties ascertain facts that bear on issues in the case. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 859 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations

omitted). However, requests for production should be clear, concise, and reasonably particularized. Middle District Discovery (2015) at III(A)(1). A party may move for an order compelling discovery from the opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The party moving to compel discovery has the initial burden of proving the requested discovery is relevant. Douglas v. Kohl’s Dep’t. Stores, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-1185-Orl-22TBS, 2016 WL 1637277, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). The responding party must then specifically show how the requested discovery is unreasonable or unduly burdensome. Panola Land Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1559–60 (11th Cir. 1985).

III. MOTIONS TO COMPEL As an initial matter, the court must address two issues: the scope of discovery Mr. Coleman seeks and the defendants’ general, boilerplate objections. First, Mr. Coleman’s requests fail to meet the requirements of Rule 26(b). Rather, Mr. Coleman’s requests are generally overbroad and seek information not relevant or proportional to the needs of the case. The discovery rules allow for a broad

search of information, but “the scope of permissible discovery is not unbounded. Requested discovery must be relevant, and it must not impose undue burden, under the tests described in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).” Bank of Magnolia v. M&P Global Fin. Serv., 258 F.R.D. 514, 518 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Second, the defendants use boilerplate objections when the rules require specificity. The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clarify boilerplate objections are improper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 34(b)(2)(B) now requires the responding party “state with specificity the grounds for objection to the request, including the reasons.” Boilerplate or general objections constitute a waiver of the discovery sought. See Spencer v. City of Orlando, Florida, No. 6:15-cv-345-Orl-37TBS, 2016 WL 397935, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2016) (concluding that objections that are “are too vague and nonspecific” fail to “preserve any objection to the requested discovery”). With that, the court will address each motion to compel in turn. A. City of Tampa (Mot. at Doc. 44; Resp. at Doc. 51) Mr. Coleman requests the court overrule the City of Tampa’s objections and

require more complete responses to Request for Production Numbers 4, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, and 35 and Interrogatories 4, 5, and 7. (Doc. 44). For Request for Production Numbers 4, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, and 35, the City of Tampa states it will amend its responses to clarify that it does not have additional non-objectionable documents. (Doc. 51, pp. 3–10). For the categories of documents the City of Tampa has not produced, it maintains its claims of attorney-client

privilege and work-product doctrine protection plus further explains why the additional documents sought by Mr. Coleman are not even relevant. (Id.). The request for production and corresponding original written objections are: Request for Production No. 4: Copies of any all correspondence, memoranda, report, written notes, diagrams, charts or other similar documents, which relate to the incident described in Plaintiff’s Complaint or any of Plaintiff’s claims or your defenses in this action.

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Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman
762 F.2d 1550 (Eleventh Circuit, 1985)

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Coleman v. Hillsborough County Animal Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-hillsborough-county-animal-services-flmd-2019.