Coleman v. Faith Community United Credit Union

Opinion

[Cite as Coleman v. Faith Community United Credit Union, 2026-Ohio-2466.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY

NICHOLE J. COLEMAN, CASE NO. 2025-L-140

Plaintiff-Appellant, Civil Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas

FAITH COMMUNITY UNITED CREDIT UNION, Trial Court No. 2025 CV 001483

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: June 29, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed

Nichole J. Coleman, pro se, 38241 Lakeshore Boulevard, No. 612, Willoughby, OH 44094 (Plaintiff-Appellant).

Roy J. Schechter, Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., 5990 West Creek Road, Suite 200, Independence, OH 44131 (For Defendant-Appellee).

MATT LYNCH, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Nichole J. Coleman, appeals the judgment of the Lake County

Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss filed by appellee, Faith Community

United Credit Union (“Faith Credit Union”), and dismissing Coleman’s third amended

complaint. After a careful review of Coleman’s assignments of error, the record, and the

pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

{¶2} This case has a tortured and convoluted, albeit short, procedural history, in

which Coleman was given several opportunities to amend her prior complaints (first filed

on August 15, 2025) because she improperly filed as an agent for herself instead of pro se and failed to attach exhibits to her subsequent filings. This matter came before the

trial court on Coleman’s third amended complaint, filed against Faith Credit Union on

October 16, 2025, in which she brought claims of breach of fiduciary duty, dishonor and

bad faith in commerce, estoppel by silence and acquiescence, and unjust enrichment.

Coleman’s claims arise from the alleged refusal of Fath Credit Union to accept her “tender

of payment” as payment on the amount outstanding on her credit account.

{¶3} Coleman, who appears to subscribe to a sovereign citizen theory of

negotiable instruments, alleged that on May 10, 2025, she hand delivered to Faith Credit

Union’s chief financial officer a “tender of payment,” “remittance coupon,” and power of

attorney for her credit account. On May 27, 2025, Coleman mailed to Faith Credit Union

an “opportunity to cure” letter, which included a response to Faith Credit Union’s voicemail

rejecting her “tender of payment,” a notarized “affidavit of performance,” a copy of the

“tender of payment,” and a “remittance coupon.” On June 6, 2025, Coleman mailed a

rebuttal to Faith Credit Union’s voicemail rejection of her “legal tender.” On June 21,

2025, Coleman mailed a “notice of default” to Faith Credit Union. On July 2, 2025,

Coleman mailed a “notice of estoppel” to Faith Credit Union, which included a timeline of

events, a “fee schedule,” a “tender of payment,” delivery receipts, and a power of attorney

form. On July 12, 2025, Coleman visited Faith Credit Union, where she requested a copy

of the credit account agreement. Faith Credit Union referred her to the credit card

corporation.

{¶4} As part of the exhibits filed with Coleman’s third amended complaint, she

filed a copy of the “legal tender” that she submitted to, and that was rejected by, Faith

Credit Union. The alleged “legal tender” was the payment stub on her credit card account

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Case No. 2025-L-140 statement. On it, Coleman noted the amount she was paying, $1,854.01, and handwrote

“accepted for deposit,” “pay to bearer,” and “Restricted Endorsement By: Coleman,

Nichole J./Agent for: Nichole Coleman/principal (Without Recourse).” She also filed

copies of the documents she sent to Faith Credit Union, which included citations to

sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, and a durable power of attorney naming

herself as “authorized agent for principal.”

{¶5} As relevant among the various motions, replies, and sur-replies the parties

filed in the trial court, Faith Credit Union filed a motion to dismiss Coleman’s third

amended complaint, which the trial court granted on November 13, 2025. In dismissing

Coleman’s third amended complaint, the trial court found that after taking all of Coleman’s

allegations as true and drawing all inferences in her favor, there was no set of facts that

would entitle her to relief on her claims as a matter of law. The court noted the document

Coleman had submitted as “legal tender” to pay the outstanding amount due on her credit

account was not a negotiable instrument or other form of legally recognized payment.

{¶6} Coleman timely appealed and raises four assignments of error for our

review:

{¶7} “[1.] The trial court improperly resolved disputed legal characterizations of

Appellant’s tender.

{¶8} “[2.] The trial court denied due process by dismissing all claims without

adjudicating them.

{¶9} “[3.] The trial court abused its discretion by excusing Appellee’s untimely

filings without findings.

{¶10} “[4.] Negotiability could not be dispositive of all claims.”

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Case No. 2025-L-140 Motion to Dismiss

{¶11} Ohio is a notice-pleading state. See Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,

2002-Ohio-2480, ¶ 29. “A pleading that sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1)

a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2)

a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.” Civ.R. 8(A).

“Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct,” and “[n]o technical

forms of pleading or motions are required.” Civ.R. 8(E)(1). Further, “[a]ll pleadings shall

be so construed as to do substantial justice.” Civ.R. 8(F). “The spirit of the Civil Rules is

the resolution of cases upon their merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.” Peterson v.

Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175 (1973).

{¶12} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v.

Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548 (1992). In resolving a Civ.R.

12(B)(6) motion, courts are confined to the allegations in the complaint and cannot

consider outside materials. See State ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst, 55 Ohio St.3d 94, 97

(1990). In construing the complaint, a court must presume all factual allegations are true

and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson

Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). “However, unsupported legal conclusions, even

when cast as factual assertions, are not presumed true for purposes of a motion to

dismiss.” State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2020-Ohio-4777, ¶ 12, citing Mitchell at 193. A

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond

doubt from the complaint the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him or her to

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Case No. 2025-L-140 recovery. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 76 Ohio St.3d

521, 524 (1996).

{¶13} A judgment granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to de

novo review. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5.

{¶14} The trial court did not err in dismissing Coleman’s third amended complaint

because she did not present a payment to Faith Credit Union on the outstanding amount

due on her credit card account. Handwritten notations on the payment stub of a credit

account billing statement do not magically transform the payment stub into a negotiable

instrument (e.g., a check, money order, certificate of deposit, promissory note, traveler’s

check) that can be used to pay the amount due on an account.

{¶15} We are mindful that Coleman is sensitive to the term “sovereign citizen”;

however, it appears she is attempting to make arguments based on a certain sovereign

citizen theory known as “vapor money.” “The essence of the ‘vapor money’ theory is that

promissory notes (and similar instruments) are the equivalent of ‘money’ that citizens

literally ‘create’ with their signatures.” McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d

201, 212 (D. Conn. 2010). See also Enlo, Sovereign Citizens and the Raging War of

Paper Terrorism, 78 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 250, 256 (2025) (the premise behind these

theories is that “lenders have been creating unenforceable debts because they are

lending credit rather than legal tender” and that “citizens” can literally create, by use of

their signatures, the equivalent of money that the consumer can then use to “pay off” their

debt obligations).

{¶16} In a similar case, which was also dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6),

Mitchell v. Atha, Dir. of Pub. Utils., 2025-Ohio-3247 (10th Dist.), the plaintiff-appellant

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Case No. 2025-L-140 attempted to “tender” a “payment” by “scrawling language on top of an electric bill,

apparently in an attempt to convert that bill into a check that would satisfy the debt.” Id.

at ¶ 3. The appellate court determined “the trial court correctly concluded that there is no

conceivable way for [the appellant] to prove the elements of the claims he asserts, since

he has not alleged and cannot show that any legitimate and legal form of payment was

proffered or tendered on the outstanding electric bill.” Id. at ¶ 9. “The modified bill he

presented to the City does not meet the definition of a negotiable instrument. (. . . R.C.

1303.03(A) defin[es] ‘negotiable instrument’ as ‘an unconditional promise or order to pay

a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the

promise or order, if . . . it is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued . . . is

payable on demand or at a definite time, [and] it does not state any other undertaking or

instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the

payment of money . . . .’).” Id. “And [the appellant] has neither alleged nor shown that

any other form of payment was offered and wrongly rejected.” Id. The Tenth District

concluded by summarily overruling all of the appellant’s assigned errors and affirming the

judgment of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶17} We agree with the Tenth District in Mitchell, and in accordance with

numerous state and federal precedents, including this court’s, we summarily reject

Coleman’s arguments. “Sovereign citizen and other adjacent arguments, as the one in

the case at bar, have been repeatedly dismissed as ‘frivolous’ and undeserving of

significant discussion by numerous Ohio and federal courts.” SoFi Lending Corp. v.

Williams, 2024-Ohio-1166, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) (citing a collection of cases). “These theories

should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.” United States v. Benabe,

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Case No. 2025-L-140 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011). See, e.g., State v. Graham, 2023-Ohio-2728, ¶ 64

(11th Dist.) (“Courts have consistently rejected these assertions and deemed them

baseless or frivolous.”); State v. Thigpen, 2014-Ohio-207, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.) (appellant’s

arguments are “frivolous and have been held to be delay tactics”); State v. Few, 2015-

Ohio-2292, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.) (finding a “sovereign citizen” argument “wholly frivolous”); United

States ex rel. Goldsmith v. Schreier, 2012 WL 4088858, *4 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 2012) (the

sovereign citizen theory has been “consistently rejected,” found “meritless and patently

frivolous,” and referred to as “nonsensical, gibberish, and having no conceivable validity

in American Law”); United States v. Cook, 2019 WL 2721305, *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28,

2019) (“[s]overeign citizen pleadings are ‘dense, complex, and virtually unreadable’”);

Cleveland v. Long, 2021-Ohio-941, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.) (collecting cases); Wilmington Savs.

Fund Soc., FSB v. Cordelia, 2025-Ohio-5765, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.); accord Sec. Credit Servs.,

LLC v. Miller, 2024-Ohio-3371, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.).

{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, we find Coleman’s assignments of error lack

merit.

{¶19} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2025-L-140 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error

are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to be taxed against appellant.

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH

JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-L-140