Coleman v. Brucker

257 F.2d 661, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 283
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJune 19, 1958
DocketNos. 14314-14319
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 257 F.2d 661 (Coleman v. Brucker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coleman v. Brucker, 257 F.2d 661, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 283 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

Opinion

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

These are consolidated appeals by six former employees of the Department of the Army who were discharged as “security risks”, purportedly under the authority of the Act of August 26, 1950. [662]*66264 Stat. 476, 5 U.S.C.A. § 22-1, as implemented by Executive Order 10450, 18 Fed.Reg. 2489 (1953), 5 U.S.C.A. § 631 note, and Army Special Regulation No. 620-220-1, dated December 18, 1953. Each employee sued in the District Court to have his discharge declared invalid. As to each employee the District Court granted the Government’s cross motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. Appeals by the employees followed.

These cases present, inter alia,, “serious and far-reaching problems in reconciling fundamental constitutional guarantees with the procedures used to determine the loyalty of government personnel.” Peters v. Hobby, 1955, 349 U.S. 331, 338, 75 S.Ct. 790, 794, 99 L.Ed. 1129. The Supreme Court, in the Peters case, commented further: “From a very early date, this Court has declined to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. * * * ” Ibid. That precept, of course, applies to this court as well as to the Supreme Court. The Court continued: “Applying this rule to the instant case, we must at the outset determine whether petitioner’s removal and debarment were effected in accord with Executive , Order 9835 [5 U.S.C.A. § 631 note],” the regulation there applicable. Ibid. And in Service v. Dulles, 1957, 354 U.S. 363, 372, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1157, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403, the Court sustained Service’s contention “that the Secretary’s action is subject to attack under the principles established by this Court’s decision in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 [74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681], namely, that regulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and that this principle holds even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in nature.”

The regulation applicable to the instant cases is SR No. 620-220-1, dated December 18, 1953, which requires in paragraph 40 that if the Security Review Board reaches an adverse conclusion as to an employee — after either a favorable or an unfavorable determination by the Security Hearing Board — “a, letter of notification will be sent to the employee, with copies to all interested offices, advising him of the findings of the Security Hearing Board * * *.” (Emphasis added.) 1 In five of these cases, the employee was advised, purportedly in accord with paragraph 40d, only that, “your continued employment * * * would not be clearly consistent with the interests of national security under the-provisions of Executive Order 10450.”' The sixth appellant was advised, purportedly in accord with paragraph 40c, that the Security Hearing Board had found that his continued employment “would be clearly consistent with the-interest of national security,” but that, the Security Review Board had tentatively concluded that his continued employment “would not be clearly consistent, with the interests of national security. On the basis of that review and conclusion it is proposed to recommend to the Secretary of the Army that your removal be effected * * * because such action is deemed necessary and advisable-in the interests of national security.”

The Government argues to us2 that, the quoted statements are “the findings, of the Security Hearing Board” required by the applicable regulation, and that such statements constitute “substantial compliance” with that regulation. We cannot agree. It is clear to us that the. use of the word “findings,” in the context, of paragraph 40, contemplates something, more than a mere conclusory statement notifying the employee that he is a “security risk.” These “findings” — sought by each appellant and denied to each ap[663]*663pellant — are intended to give the employee information that he may use in seeking further consideration by the Security Review Board or by the Secretary of the Army. Whether the “findings” required by paragraph 40 to be transmitted to the employee are necessarily the same “findings” required by paragraph 39 to be transmitted to the Secretary is a question we do not reach.3 However, in the context of paragraph 39, “findings” would also seem to mean something more than the conclusory statement of a result such as was afforded to each of the appellants here.

Therefore, in accordance with the judicial policy restated in Peters v. Hobby, supra, and applying the rule laid down in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra, and Service v. Dulles, supra, the orders of the District Court are reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

APPENDIX

Excerpts from Army Special Regulation No. 620-220-1, dated December 18, 1953:

“Civilian Personnel
Security Investigations And Adjudications
*■*•»#**
“Section VII “Hearings
* * * * *
“39. The Hearing Board’s findings.— Immediately following the hearing it is advisable for the Security Hearing Board to meet in executive session to define the issues in the case, arrive at a tentative decision, if possible, and to decide who is to prepare the Board’s findings. Final decision should be delayed until the transcript of the hearing is available. The Board’s findings and the transcript, each in quadruplicate, should be submitted to the Administrative Assistant, Office, Secretary of the Army, not later than 30 days after the hearing. The transcript must be prepared without delay. The function of the Security Hearing Board is to advise and recommend to the Secretary of the Army the action which should be taken. The findings and the accompanying memorandum of reasons should be a complete résumé of the case in detail. Complete instructions on preparation of the Board’s findings and the memorandum of reasons will be provided in other media.
“Section VIII
“Action After Hearing
“40. Review after hearing. — When a case is received from a Security Hearing Board it will be reviewed in the Office of the Administrative Assistant to assure that the record is complete. The case then will be processed as follows:
“a. When the Security Hearing Board has found employment clearly consistent with the interests of the national security and has made a favorable recommendation, the case will be referred to the Security Review Board for consideration.
“b. If the Security Review Board agrees with the favorable findings and recommendations of the Security Hearing Board, the Review Board will submit the entire case file, together with the Board’s findings and recommendations, to the Secretary of the Army for final decision.
“c.

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257 F.2d 661, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 283, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-brucker-cadc-1958.