Coleman, Jerry v. Armstrong Hardwood Flooring

2017 TN WC 212
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedNovember 22, 2017
Docket2015-07-0445
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 TN WC 212 (Coleman, Jerry v. Armstrong Hardwood Flooring) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coleman, Jerry v. Armstrong Hardwood Flooring, 2017 TN WC 212 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2017).

Opinion

FILED

November 27.2017

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS TN COURT OF

AT JACKSON WORKERS’ _ COMPENSATION CLAIMS JERRY COLEMAN, ) Docket No. 2015-07-0445 Employee, ) 7:00 FM. Vv. ) ARMSTRONG HARDWOOD FLOORING, ) State File No. 97922-2015 Employer, ) And ) AGRI GENERAL INS. CO., ) Judge Allen Phillips Insurance Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER

Mr. Coleman claimed noise exposure at Armstrong caused him to suffer hearing loss. Armstrong claimed he did not prove the alleged loss by a preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, it disputed the severity of the loss. The Court heard these disputed issues at a Compensation Hearing on November 2, 2017, and holds Mr. Coleman established a compensable hearing loss that resulted in a permanent partial disability of 14% to the body as a whole.

History of Claim

The Court conducted an Expedited Hearing on May 31, 2016. The Court found Mr. Coleman came forward with sufficient evidence to establish he likely would prevail at a hearing on the merits regarding the provision of medical benefits, and it ordered that Armstrong provide him a panel of physicians.'

Armstrong provided a panel of otolaryngologists from which Mr. Coleman chose

' The Court takes judicial notice of the evidence offered at the Expedited Hearing as set forth in its Expedited Hearing Order. See Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 457 n.1 (Tenn. 2012) (holding a court may take judicial notice of facts established at an earlier proceeding in the same action). The Court did not address permanent disability at the Expedited Hearing and did not address the causation issue under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The parties may obtain an audio recording of the Expedited Hearing upon request of the Clerk. Dr. Christopher Hall. Dr. Hall saw Mr. Coleman on August 30, 2016, and noted both Mr. Coleman’s “exposure to industrial noise [for] 18 years” and his “recurrent middle ear infections on the right.” Audiometric testing revealed Mr. Coleman had a “severe... to moderate” sensorineural hearing loss on the left and a more severe “mixed hearing loss” on the right, characterized by both a sensorineural and “conductive” loss. Dr. Hall stated the sensorineural losses were more likely than not related to “workplace noise exposure” but that the conductive loss was not. He recommended an MRI to evaluate the “asymmetry” of the hearing losses and a trial of hearing aids. Based on the audiometric testing, Dr. Hall assessed a permanent impairment of 80.6% to the right ear and a 41.2% impairment to the left. These ratings combined to a binaural hearing impairment of 47.8% and equaled 17% impairment to the “whole person.”

Dr. Hall saw Mr. Coleman for a second time on March 28, 2017. He noted the MRI revealed age-related changes to Mr. Coleman’s brain but that it provided no explanation for the asymmetrical hearing losses. Dr. Hall again attributed the sensorineural losses to Mr. Coleman’s “noise exposure [at Armstrong]” absent any other such exposure.

In June 2017, Mr. Coleman asked Dr. Hall to complete a “Standard Form Report For Industrial Injuries” (C-32). Dr. Hall noted the history of noise exposure and recurrent right ear infections. He confirmed the 17% whole person impairment rating under the relevant sections of the American Medical Association (AMA) Guidelines and stated the following as to causation: “The left ear loss is more likely than not related to noise exposure. The right ear has mixed loss. It is appropriate to attribute the same percentage of the right ear loss as the left to noise, but the additional right loss is not likely work related.”

Armstrong objected to Mr. Coleman’s proposed use of the C-32 and cross- examined Dr. Hall by deposition.? Armstrong asked Dr. Hall to review Mr. Coleman’s audiometric tests performed over the years of his employment. Dr. Hall noted the tests revealed a “significant change” for the “worse” in Mr. Coleman’s hearing between 2013 and 2015, the period immediately before his retirement. Dr. Hall said “most people” experience hearing loss as they age but, in Mr. Coleman’s case, he “can’t say what his audiogram would be [without exposure to noise].” Dr. Hall confirmed some studies had linked blood pressure and cholesterol medications, like those Mr. Coleman used, to hearing loss but did not attribute any of Mr. Coleman’s hearing loss to medication-use.

Dr. Hall believed Mr. Coleman’s conductive hearing loss occurred sometime

* Dr. Hall would later explain that a conductive loss differs from a sensorineural loss in that it is caused by damage to the eardrum, scarring from infection, and/or degeneration of the hearing bones of the inner ear. > Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(2) (2017) allows a party to object to a C-32 and schedule the physician’s deposition for purposes of cross-examination. Additionally, the Court finds Mr. Coleman’s use of a dated C-32 form is not germane to the outcome.

2 between 1999 and 2009 based upon Armstrong’s testing. He “would call into question” whether the conductive loss was related to noise exposure, instead attributing it to either recurrent ear infections or exposure to carbon monoxide, neither of which were work- related. Nevertheless, when “keeping the conductive” component in the total rating, Mr. Coleman’s overall hearing loss results in a 17% “whole person” impairment. He maintained, as he stated in the C-32, that he could apply the left ear rating of 41.2% for sensorineural loss to the right ear and, if he did so, Mr. Coleman’s total impairment of both ears would equal 14% to the body.

At the hearing, Mr. Coleman’s counsel argued that Dr. Hall cannot “parse or apportion” his impairment rating per the AMA Guides. Thus, this Court should consider that Armstrong “took Mr. Coleman as it found him,” and look to the cumulative “functional damage” to Mr. Coleman’s hearing from both noise exposure and the non- related conductive component. Thus, counsel asserted Mr. Coleman has 17% impairment to the body as a whole and is entitled to increased benefits based upon his not returning to work, his age, and his education level.

Armstrong elicited testimony from its former Human Resources Manager, who disputed the degree of noise exposure. It introduced voluminous records documenting Mr. Coleman’s past treatment for ear infections, sinus issues, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol in support of its position that those issues contributed to, or caused, his hearing loss.* Armstrong further asserted that Dr. Hall’s 17% impairment rating was completely void because he could not “delineate” between the losses attributable to noise and the losses attributable to other causes.

Armstrong proposed an impairment rating of 6.9% to the body as whole, the amount of whole body impairment attributable to Mr. Coleman’s left-ear hearing loss when translating the 41.2% left ear rating to the body. It argued that Dr. Hall cannot use the left ear sensorineural impairment to rate the right ear because he cannot say what part of the left ear loss resulted from noise exposure. Accordingly, the Court should consider that only the left-ear hearing loss is work-related.

“ Prior to the Compensation Hearing, Armstrong requested the Court issue a subpoena for all of Mr. Coleman’s records from The Jackson Clinic. Anticipating production of irrelevant documents “that have nothing to do with [Mr. Coleman’s] injury,” the Court entered an “Order on Filing of Medical Records” on October 13 which provided that the parties “redact any such records having no bearing on the case.” See, Love v. Delta Faucet, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 45 (Sep. 19, 2016).

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Related

R. Douglas Hughes v. New Life Development Corporation
387 S.W.3d 453 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2012)
Lindsey v. Strohs Companies
830 S.W.2d 899 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1992)

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2017 TN WC 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-jerry-v-armstrong-hardwood-flooring-tennworkcompcl-2017.