Cole v. United States

10 Cl. Ct. 529, 1986 U.S. Claims LEXIS 827
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 31, 1986
DocketNo. 259-81C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 10 Cl. Ct. 529 (Cole v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cole v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 529, 1986 U.S. Claims LEXIS 827 (cc 1986).

Opinion

OPINION

WHITE, Senior Judge.

In this military pay case, the plaintiff, Peter C. Cole, a former officer in the Regular Army, complains that he was wrongfully separated from the Regular Army. The plaintiff seeks restoration to active duty in the Regular Army, and reimbursement for the pay, allowances, and other benefits that he would have received if he had continued to serve on active duty in the Regular Army after the date of his separation.

Discussion

The really crucial facts in this case, reduced to their essence, can be summarized in a single paragraph, as follows:

On June 15, 1976, Captain Cole, while in a state of emotional turmoil over what he regarded as unfair treatment by his battal[530]*530ion commander, submitted to the battalion commander his unqualified resignation as a captain in the Regular Army. By July 26, 1976, however, the plaintiff had changed his mind, and had decided that he did not wish to resign from the Army. On that same day, the plaintiff orally informed the commanding general of the division to which his battalion was attached that he (Captain Cole) wished to withdraw his resignation. Captain Cole’s desire to withdraw his resignation was confirmed in writing by means of a communication which he submitted to the division commander on July 27, 1976. It continued to be Captain Cole’s desire, at all relevant times after July 26, 1976, to withdraw his resignation and not to resign from the Army. However, officers in the chain of command above Captain Cole successively refused to permit him to withdraw his resignation. On March 10, 1977, Captain Cole was separated from the Regular Army, when the Army accepted the resignation which Captain Cole had endeavored unsuccessfully for more than 7 months to withdraw.

The four successive refusals to permit Captain Cole to withdraw his resignation were based largely upon the views of the officers involved in the several refusals that, all factors considered, Captain Cole’s performance of duty had not been satisfactory.

The plaintiff’s performance was considered as of the time when he was serving as S-4 of the 2nd Battalion of the 50th Infantry (the 2/50th), 2nd Armored Division. As Battalion S-4, Captain Cole was responsible for the supply and maintenance of equipment, and for accounting for all battalion property. The 2/50th was regularly stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, but, during part of the time involved in this case, it was temporarily deployed to Germany with other battalions from the 2nd Armored Division for the purpose of engaging in a training exercise. While in Germany, the 2/50th and the other battalions from the 2nd Armored Division constituted the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division, and the 3rd Brigade was attached to the 1st Armored Division for operational purposes.

In the performance of his duties as Battalion S-4, Captain Cole was highly competent from the technical standpoint, being very knowledgeable, extremely hard-working, very zealous and conscientious, and motivated by a high sense of duty. During his tenure as S-4 of the 2/50th, Captain Cole greatly improved the battalion’s situation as regards the supply and maintenance of equipment and accountability for property. It was generally considered that, from the standpoint of ability, Captain Cole had the potential for a brilliant career in the Army.

On the other hand, Captain Cole’s manner of dealing with battalion personnel militated against his being able to maintain cooperative relationships with other officers and the enlisted personnel of the 2/50th. Captain Cole was very intolerant of views that differed from his own; he was prompt to criticize others; and he was inclined to use harsh and abusive language in speaking to, or about, anyone with whom he disagreed. For example, there were occasions when, in staff meetings with the battalion commander and the company commanders in the 2/50th, company commanders would make factual statements with which Captain Cole disagreed, and Captain Cole would openly charge the particular officers with lying. Captain Cole’s abrasive personality caused dissension and bad feelings in the battalion.

As the plaintiff, at all times on and after July 26, 1976, did not wish to resign from the Regular Army, and as all the Army officials involved in the processing of the plaintiff’s case on and after July 26, 1976, were aware that the plaintiff did not wish to resign from the Army, one cannot escape the conclusion that, in reality, the plaintiff was separated involuntarily from the' Regular Army.

As a matter of first impression and from the standpoint of fundamental fairness, it would seem that, since the plaintiff’s resignation was submitted voluntarily, and not in lieu of facing an adverse proceeding looking toward his being separated involuntarily from the Regular Army for unsatis[531]*531factory performance of duty, it should have been the plaintiff’s prerogative to withdraw the resignation at any time before its acceptance. Then, if any of the superior officers in the chain of command regarded the plaintiff’s performance of duty as being sufficiently unsatisfactory to warrant his being separated involuntarily from the service, the proper proceeding to effect such involuntary separation could have been instituted under 10 U.S.C. §§ 3781-87 (1976). This would have required advance notice to Captain Cole, a formal hearing before a Board of Inquiry, with Captain Cole being afforded a full opportunity to defend himself, and, in the event of a decision by the Board of Inquiry adverse to Captain Cole, a review of the case by a Board of Review.

However, this is not a matter of first impression. In 1981, when the present case was pending before this court’s predecessor, the United States Court of Claims, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Captain Cole’s response in opposition to the motion contended that “resignations are nullities until their effective date,” and that Captain Cole’s “involuntary separation without due process procedures is void.” The Court of Claims did not grant the defendant’s 1981 motion for summary judgment. However, the Court of Claims, in holding that it was legally permissible for the Army to process Captain Cole’s case under Army Regulation 635-120, necessarily rejected Captain Cole’s contentions. See Cole v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 702, 705, 689 F.2d 1040, 1042 (1982).

The decision of the Court of Claims in the Cole case is binding on this court. See General Order No. 1 (1 CLCt. XXI).

Army Regulation 635-120 deals with the subject of “Officer Resignations and Discharges.” Section 2-4 of Chapter 2 of AR 635-120 provides in part as follows:

2-4. Withdrawal of Resignation, a. An officer may request withdrawal of his resignation * * * at any time prior to commencing travel pursuant to orders issued for the purpose of separating him. The request, stating reasons therefor, will be forwarded through channels. Each forwarding endorsement will include recommendation for approval or disapproval. Reasons for disapproval will be stated.
b. A resignation or request for discharge may be withdrawn only with the approval of Headquarters, Department of the Army, except that—
1.

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Related

Petrick v. United States
12 Cl. Ct. 700 (Court of Claims, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
10 Cl. Ct. 529, 1986 U.S. Claims LEXIS 827, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cole-v-united-states-cc-1986.