Cole v. Commissioner
This text of 1975 T.C. Memo. 144 (Cole v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WILES,
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some facts were stipulated and are found accordingly.
Petitioner timely filed her 1970 individual income tax return with the district director of internal revenue, *231 Baltimore, Maryland. She resided in Kensington, Maryland, at the time her petition was filed.
Petitioner was divorced from William R. Cole, III (hereinafter Cole), by decree of the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia (hereinafter Municipal Court) during 1962. Prior thereto, that court issued a Support Order on February 21, 1962, which ordered that the children of petitioner and Cole, Bruce Leppard Cole and Wendy Ruth Cole (hereinafter children), temporarily remain under the supervision and control of Cole. Petitioner was granted visitation rights of two days per week with her children.
Petitioner and Cole were divorced on April 19, 1962. Cole was awarded permanent custody of the children pursuant to the divorce decree.
Pursuant to petitioner's divorce action, the Municipal Court issued an order on October 23, 1962, which provided that the children would visit petitioner seven days during the Christmas season and the month of July of each year; Cole assumed only the cost of the children's transportation for these visits. There were no substantial modifications of that order affecting 1970.
During 1970, the children lived with petitioner a total of 40 days, during which*232 petitioner provided their support. During the rest of the year, the children lived with and were supported by Cole.
Petitioner and Cole did not have any written agreement for 1970 providing that petitioner would be entitled to claim the children as dependents, and the divorce decree contained no agreement providing that petitioner would be entitled to claim the children as dependents.
Petitioner testified that she could not prove that she spent $600 or more for each child or $1,200 or more for the support of both her children in 1970.
The only time petitioner had custody of her children during 1970 was during the 40 days that they stayed with her.
ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT
1. There was no "multiple support agreement," as defined in section 152(c), operative between petitioner and Cole for 1970.
2. Cole had custody of the children for a greater portion of 1970 than did petitioner.
3. Petitioner could not prove she provided $600 or more in support for each child or $1,200 in total support for the children during 1970.
OPINION
The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to deductions for dependency exemptions for two minor children in 1970 under sections 151 and 152. *233 Since petitioner is divorced, she must meet the requirements of section 152(c) or (e) to deduct her two children as dependents. 2
*234 No multiple support agreement existed for 1970, and petitioner did not contend that section 152(c) was complied with.
Petitioner also does not qualify under section 152(e)(1), as she did not have custody of her two children during more of 1970 than did her ex-husband, Cole. Petitioner contends in this regard that she should be allowed to aggregate periods of 38 to 40 days each year during the nine or ten years preceding 1970, the sum of which is over 365 days, in support of her claim that she is entitled to a deduction in 1970. She notes that she did not claim deductions for the children for any year subsequent to the divorce and prior to 1970. Section 152(e) makes no such test, however, each year is considered on its own. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to satisfy the requirements of section 152(e)(1).
There was no written agreement or anything in the divorce decree evidencing an understanding that petitioner, the noncustodial parent, would be entitled to deduct the children as dependents; furthermore, petitioner cannot prove that she provided at least $600 for the support of each of her children. Petitioner accordingly does not satisfy section 152(e)(2)(A). Since petitioner*235 also could not prove that she contributed $1,200 or more for the support of her children during 1970, she also did not satisfy the requirements of section 152(e)(2)(B).
Petitioner attacks sections 151 and 152 on the ground that those sections deny her equal protection under the laws under the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
1975 T.C. Memo. 144, 34 T.C.M. 680, 1975 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cole-v-commissioner-tax-1975.