Cole v. Carmell

112 So. 2d 278, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2924
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 26, 1959
DocketNo. 58-710
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 112 So. 2d 278 (Cole v. Carmell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cole v. Carmell, 112 So. 2d 278, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2924 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

HORTON, Judge.

The appellee owned a house trailer which was.located on space in the Ollie Trout Trailer Park. Before departing the Miami [279]*279area, appellee gave instructions to Sidney ■Olsen, manager of the trailer park, to release the trailer to his brother, Donald, who was due to arrive from the north within the next few days. Approximately a week later, one Louis Levensque appeared at the trailer park, falsely representing himself to he Donald Carmell, and obtained possession of the trailer from Olsen. Levensque was subsequently apprehended and convicted, of the theft. The trailer was returned to appellee, though damaged to some extent.

This suit was brought against the trailer park and Olsen to recover damages for the personal items removed from the trailer, damages to the trailer and transportation costs occasioned by Olsen’s negligently releasing the trailer to the thief. Upon a jury trial, the court refused to instruct the jury, at the request of the appellant, to the effect that damages, if found, should be limited to $100, pursuant to § 509.111(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.1 Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict for the appellee in the amount of $700. Judgment was entered on the verdict and the defendants appealed.

The sole issue presented is the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury pursuant to § 509.111(2) supra. It immediately becomes apparent that house trailers were not under consideration by the legislature when the act was originally passed in 1874 (§ 4, Ch. 1999). It was not until 1947 that motor courts and trailer courts were included along with hotels, apartment houses, rooming houses and boarding houses. However, we feel the intent of the statute was to limit the liability of hotels, etc., for goods deposited for safekeeping when their value could not be ascertained without some disclosure from the tenant. See Lazare Kaplan & Sons Inc. v. Pensacola Hotel Company, D.C., 153 F.Supp. 31, affirmed 5 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 410. If such disclosures were not required, the hotel, motel, boarding house, apartment, etc., managements would have no way to ascertain the value of goods deposited with them that were subsequently lost or stolen.

Conversely, we do not feel the legislature intended to limit the liability of a trailer court operator for his negligent act in releasing to another control over a trailer located on the premises, the value of which is self-evident. In such cases, the trailer owner pays for the space on which the trailer or lodging facility rests, but not for the actual facilities afforded by the-trailer itself. In such circumstances the trailer court operator would have no control over the interior of a trailer such as would the manager of a hotel, motel or boarding house over the interior of their lodging facilities. The facts presented we conclude rendered inapplicable the limited liability provisions of the statute.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and PEARSON, J., concur.

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Related

Howard Johnson Co. v. Fair
575 So. 2d 723 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
112 So. 2d 278, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2924, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cole-v-carmell-fladistctapp-1959.