PD-0077-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 7/21/2015 11:02:53 AM July 21, 2015 Accepted 7/21/2015 11:21:57 AM ABEL ACOSTA PD-0077-15 CLERK
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
STEVEN COLE APPELLANT V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE Appeal from Gregg County 124th District Court No. 41,312-A ********
No. 06-13-00179-CR Sixth Court of Appeals 2014 Tex.App.LEXIS 13498, 2014 WL 7183859
******** APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ********
EBB B. MOBLEY State Bar # 14238000 Attorney at Law 422 North Center Street-Lower Level P. O. Box 2309 Longview, TX 75606 Telephone: 903-757-3331 Facsimile: 903-753-8289 ebbmob@aol.com ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-4 The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.
REPLY TO QUESTION THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas Transportation Code §724.012(b) violates the Fourth Amendment has been established in Villarreal v. State, No. PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/26/14, reh’g granted. REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a warrantless blood draw in Texas.
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
1 INDEX OF AUTHORITES
Cases
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, (en banc) (pet. granted). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh’g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, reh’g granted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4 Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Transportation Code §724.012(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2 REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO
The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw. ARGUMENT
In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, the Supreme Court considered and rejected Missouri’s claim that “so long as the officer has probable cause and the blood
test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is categorically reasonable for law
enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a warrant.” 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61. The McNeely Court refused to recognize a per se exigency justifying a warrantless
search and held, “consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1556.
McNeely reaffirmed that a warrantless search of a person for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal investigation can be justified “only if it falls within
a recognized exception” to the warrant requirement, and that this principle applies to compulsory blood collection during a DWI investigation. Id. At 1558; The Court did not hold that dissipation of a substance in the bloodstream creates a per se
exigency . . . in all drunk driving cases. The State called Justin Schwane as a toxicology expert to describe his
analysis performed on a blood sample from Respondent. The substance in question
was only methamphetamine, not alcohol. Schwane’s testimony is replete with
references to “therapeutic” dosages of methamphetamine in the sample. 4 RR 15, 20,
21, 22, 24, 25. He could not say that Steven Cole was intoxicated. 4 RR 22.
Would a significant delay in testing negatively affect the probative value of the
test results? There is no evidence in this case about the dissipation rate of
methamphetamine in the blood or the effect of delay in drawing a sample.
3 REPLY TO QUESTION THREE That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas statutes violates the Fourth
Amendment has been established by State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, reh’g granted.
ARGUMENT
In State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/24/14, reh’g granted, this Court
held the implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutes in the Transportation Code do not create an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
permit a warrantless taking of blood.
The issue in Villarreal focuses on validity of consent as a statutory exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant.
In this case the issue is on the exigent circumstance exception to the search warrant requirement. The State does not challenge the “totality of the circumstances”
balancing test approved in McNeely. The question of exigency comes out of the facts at bar hinges on the substance involved - methamphetamine - and its dissipation rate in the blood of the driver.
There is no evidence of this process in the trial record.
4 REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a
warrantless blood draw in Texas. ARGUMENT
The State seeks to involve the “good-faith reliance” exception to the Fourth
Amendment to avoid suppression of the blood test results in this case. The opinion below discusses both the federal and Texas good-faith exceptions.
The exclusionary rule is not found anywhere in the United State’s Constitution. Rather, it is a court-created remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court held that “all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). “The exclusionary rule was fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overreaching governmental conduct
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969). The exclusionary rule is a “last resort” sanction designed to deter police
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
PD-0077-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 7/21/2015 11:02:53 AM July 21, 2015 Accepted 7/21/2015 11:21:57 AM ABEL ACOSTA PD-0077-15 CLERK
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
STEVEN COLE APPELLANT V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE Appeal from Gregg County 124th District Court No. 41,312-A ********
No. 06-13-00179-CR Sixth Court of Appeals 2014 Tex.App.LEXIS 13498, 2014 WL 7183859
******** APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ********
EBB B. MOBLEY State Bar # 14238000 Attorney at Law 422 North Center Street-Lower Level P. O. Box 2309 Longview, TX 75606 Telephone: 903-757-3331 Facsimile: 903-753-8289 ebbmob@aol.com ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-4 The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.
REPLY TO QUESTION THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas Transportation Code §724.012(b) violates the Fourth Amendment has been established in Villarreal v. State, No. PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/26/14, reh’g granted. REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a warrantless blood draw in Texas.
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
1 INDEX OF AUTHORITES
Cases
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, (en banc) (pet. granted). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh’g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, reh’g granted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4 Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Transportation Code §724.012(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2 REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO
The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw. ARGUMENT
In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, the Supreme Court considered and rejected Missouri’s claim that “so long as the officer has probable cause and the blood
test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is categorically reasonable for law
enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a warrant.” 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61. The McNeely Court refused to recognize a per se exigency justifying a warrantless
search and held, “consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1556.
McNeely reaffirmed that a warrantless search of a person for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal investigation can be justified “only if it falls within
a recognized exception” to the warrant requirement, and that this principle applies to compulsory blood collection during a DWI investigation. Id. At 1558; The Court did not hold that dissipation of a substance in the bloodstream creates a per se
exigency . . . in all drunk driving cases. The State called Justin Schwane as a toxicology expert to describe his
analysis performed on a blood sample from Respondent. The substance in question
was only methamphetamine, not alcohol. Schwane’s testimony is replete with
references to “therapeutic” dosages of methamphetamine in the sample. 4 RR 15, 20,
21, 22, 24, 25. He could not say that Steven Cole was intoxicated. 4 RR 22.
Would a significant delay in testing negatively affect the probative value of the
test results? There is no evidence in this case about the dissipation rate of
methamphetamine in the blood or the effect of delay in drawing a sample.
3 REPLY TO QUESTION THREE That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas statutes violates the Fourth
Amendment has been established by State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, reh’g granted.
ARGUMENT
In State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/24/14, reh’g granted, this Court
held the implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutes in the Transportation Code do not create an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
permit a warrantless taking of blood.
The issue in Villarreal focuses on validity of consent as a statutory exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant.
In this case the issue is on the exigent circumstance exception to the search warrant requirement. The State does not challenge the “totality of the circumstances”
balancing test approved in McNeely. The question of exigency comes out of the facts at bar hinges on the substance involved - methamphetamine - and its dissipation rate in the blood of the driver.
There is no evidence of this process in the trial record.
4 REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a
warrantless blood draw in Texas. ARGUMENT
The State seeks to involve the “good-faith reliance” exception to the Fourth
Amendment to avoid suppression of the blood test results in this case. The opinion below discusses both the federal and Texas good-faith exceptions.
The exclusionary rule is not found anywhere in the United State’s Constitution. Rather, it is a court-created remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court held that “all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). “The exclusionary rule was fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overreaching governmental conduct
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969). The exclusionary rule is a “last resort” sanction designed to deter police
misconduct. Davis v. United States, 131, S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). Unlike the federal rule, the Texas good-faith exception is a statutory rule that provides an exception to the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence only if the law enforcement officer was “acting in objective good faith reliance upon a
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.” CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 38.23(b); see Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, (en banc) ( pet. granted). The Texas “Court of Criminal Appeals
has previously rejected an effort to broaden the [Texas] good-faith exception using
federal precedent . . .” Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861-62 (citing Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh’g) (declining to apply federal
good-faith doctrine to Texas statutory good-faith exception)). Since “the Texas good
5 faith exception is more limited than the scope of its federal counterpart . . . an
officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an
exception to the Texas exclusionary rule.”
The State seeks a harm analysis in the event that the warrantless blood draw at bar is found wanting. Such an analysis was performed by the majority opinion below
at pp. 21.22.
6 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Respondent respectfully requests this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
EBB B. MOBLEY Attorney at Law 422 North Center Street-Lower Level P. O. Box 2309 Longview, TX 75606 Telephone 903-757-3331 Facsimile 903-753-8289 ebbmob@aol.com
/s/ EBB B. MOBLEY EBB B. MOBLEY Attorney for Appellant State Bar License # 14238000
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this reply brief contains 6083 words according to the computer program used to prepare the document.
/s/ EBB B. MOBLEY EBB B. MOBLEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of this reply brief was provided to Gregg County Assistant District Attorney Zan Brown, 101 East Methvin, Suite 333, Longview, Texas 75601, and to the Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas 78711 on the 21st day of July, 2015, by efile.
/s/ EBB B. MOBLEY EBB B. MOBLEY, Counsel for Appellant Steven Cole