Colby v. Kombouzis, No. 526617 (Aug. 4, 1994)

1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7855
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedAugust 4, 1994
DocketNo. 526617
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7855 (Colby v. Kombouzis, No. 526617 (Aug. 4, 1994)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Colby v. Kombouzis, No. 526617 (Aug. 4, 1994), 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

No appearance for plaintiff.

Faulkner Boyce for defendant. ISSUE

Whether the court should enter a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff is entitled to $200,000.00 worth of uninsured motorist coverage under his automobile insurance policy.

FACTS CT Page 7856

By amended complaint filed November 22, 1993, the plaintiff, David P. Colby brought a two-count negligence action against the defendants, Christine L. Kombouzis ("Kombouzis") and Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident in Waterford, Connecticut on January 8, 1992. The plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries, medical expenses, and loss of earning capacity.

Said motor vehicle accident occurred when the motor vehicle driven by the plaintiff collided with the motor vehicle driven by defendant Kombouzis. Count one contains allegations of negligence against defendant Kombouzis.

Count two contains the following allegations. On January 8, 1992, the plaintiff had a contract for automobile insurance with defendant Metropolitan under Policy No. 0403647250 ("policy"). The plaintiff's policy was in force on said date and provided coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits in the amount of $200,000.00 per person. At the time of said accident, defendant Kombouzis was an uninsured motorist and has been unable to compensate the plaintiff for his sustained damages. The plaintiff further alleges that the "injuries and losses sustained by the plaintiff . . . are the legal responsibility of [defendant Metropolitan], pursuant to the terms of its contract for insurance and in accordance with § 38a-336 of the Connecticut General Statutes."

On January 3, 1994, defendant Metropolitan filed an answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint along with the following special defenses: (1) comparative negligence; (2) set off or reduction for sums paid by anyone responsible for the plaintiff's alleged injuries; (3) set off or reduction for sums paid as basic or added reparations payments; and (4) the plaintiff's recovery cannot exceed the uninsured motorist limits of said policy, which is $100,000.00, less applicable set offs or reductions. On January 7, 1994, the plaintiff filed a reply to defendant Metropolitan's special defenses in which he denies the first and fourth special defense.

On April 22, 1994, the plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory judgment on the issue of uninsured motorist insurance coverage. The plaintiff filed a supporting memorandum of law. On June 7, 1994, defendant Metropolitan CT Page 7857 filed a cross-motion for declaratory judgment on this issue. Defendant Metropolitan also filed an supporting memorandum of law.

DISCUSSION

"The superior court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment." General Statutes § 52-29 (a). "`The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties.'" (Citations omitted.) St. Paul Fire Marine Ins.Co. v. Shernow, 22 Conn. App. 377, 380-81, 577 A.2d 1093 (1990). "There is no question that a declaratory judgment action is a suitable vehicle to test the rights and liabilities under an insurance policy." Id., 380, citingShelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 152 Conn. 178-79,205 A.2d 372 (1964).

Uninsured motorist coverage applies where the legally responsible party to a motor vehicle accident has no automobile liability insurance. Simonette v. Great AmericanIns. Co., 165 Conn. 466, 472, 338 A.2d 453 (1973). "`Intra-policy stacking [of uninsured motorist coverage] is the aggregation of the limits of liability for uninsured-motorist coverage of each car covered in one policy. . . .'" AllstateIns. Co. v. Lenda, 34 Conn. App. 444, 448 n. 5, ___ A.2d ___ (1994), quoting Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386,389 n. 2, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982). There is a "`strong and unequivocal policy in favor of stacking' as reflected in [the Connecticut Supreme Court] decisions upholding the right of insureds to aggregate coverage."1 (Citations omitted.) Kentv. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 226 Conn. 427, 438-39,627 A.2d 1319 (1993).

Intra-policy stacking is "available when the insured has paid separate premiums for the [un]insured motorist coverage afforded to each vehicle." (Citations omitted.) Id., 432. The reason for this is that an insured who pays a double premium has a reasonable expectation of double coverage. Id.

[The Connecticut Supreme Court has] noted that CT Page 7858 `[t]his is particularly true when each of the insured vehicles is separately described, the coverage granted under the policy is separately listed for each vehicle, and a separate premium is charged for the coverage to each of the described vehicles.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohn v. Aetna Ins. Co., [213 Conn. 525, 530, 569 A.2d 541 (1990)], quoting Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, supra, 395. Moreover, once it has been established that an insurer is obligated to stack the [un]insured motorist coverage in the policy, as it is when separate, additional premiums have been paid for coverage on two vehicles, the insurer may not reduce its liability for such aggregated coverage even through explicit policy language, except within the narrow context of the exceptions permitted under the . . . Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Kent v. MiddlesexMutual Assurance Co., supra, 433-34. Conversely, "a policyholder who insures two passenger vehicles under one policy but who pays a single premium for [un]insured motorist coverage [is not necessarily] entitled to aggregate coverage." Id., 437.

Thus, the right to aggregate uninsured motorist coverage, "is based upon the reasonable expectation of the parties." Id. The reasonable expectation of the parties to the insurance contract is "to be gleaned from the facts and circumstances of each case." Id.

Separate Premiums

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Related

Nationwide Insurance v. Gode
446 A.2d 1059 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Shelby Mutual Insurance v. Williams
205 A.2d 372 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1964)
Simonette v. Great American Insurance
338 A.2d 453 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1973)
Cohn v. Aetna Insurance
569 A.2d 541 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990)
Kent v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.
627 A.2d 1319 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Shernow
577 A.2d 1093 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1990)
Allstate Insurance v. Lenda
642 A.2d 22 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colby-v-kombouzis-no-526617-aug-4-1994-connsuperct-1994.