COLBY III INC. v. CENTENNIAL WESTLAND MALL PARTNERS, LLC

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: September 6, 2023
• Docket: 23-0061
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 6, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D23-61 Lower Tribunal No. 21-8880 ________________

Colby III, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

Centennial Westland Mall Partners, LLC, Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos Lopez, Judge.

Victor K. Rones P.A., Victor K. Rones, and Jeremy Rones, for appellant.

Polsinelli PC, and Henry H. Bolz IV, for appellee.

Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J. In this commercial eviction dispute, appellant, Colby III, Inc.,

challenges a final default judgment awarding damages to appellee,

Centennial Westland Mall Partners, LLC. Colby contends the rendition of a

self-styled final judgment of eviction some four months before the entry of

the order on appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to award damages.

Reiterating the familiar principle that finality is determined not by the title of

a given order but by the content and substance, we affirm. See IndyMac

Fed. Bank FSB v. Hagan, 104 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2021, Centennial’s predecessor in interest, Westland Mall,

LLC, filed a hybrid complaint against Colby. The first count sounded in

eviction, while the second sought the recovery of breach of lease damages.1

Despite an extension of time, Colby failed to respond to the complaint or

deposit monies in the registry of the court.

Centennial was substituted as party plaintiff and filed a Motion for

Default Final Judgment of Commercial Eviction on Count I and for Issuance

of Immediate Writ of Possession. On September 1, 2022, the trial court

executed an order entitled Final Judgment of Eviction and Writ of

Possession. The order reflected a Summary Reporting System (“SRS”)

1 The third count of the complaint sought damages from three guarantors.

2 closure stamp. The stamp bore the initials of the judge and contained the

following language: “The court dismisses this case against any party not

listed in this final order or previous order(s). This case is closed as to all

parties.” Several months later, Centennial moved for a default judgment as

to damages. The trial court granted the motion, and the instant appeal

ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal implicates a purely legal issue. Thus, we conduct a de

novo review. Graves v. State, 331 So. 3d 210, 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

ANALYSIS

“The rule is firmly established in this [s]tate that the trial [c]ourt loses

jurisdiction of a cause after a judgment or final decree has been entered and

the time for filing [a] petition for rehearing or motion for new trial has expired

or same has been denied.” Gen. Cap. Corp. v. Tel Serv. Co., 212 So. 2d

369, 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). There are of course several well-entrenched

exceptions, none of which are applicable to this case. See Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.540 (relief from judgment, decrees, or orders); see also Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.530 (motions for new trial and rehearing; amendments of judgments;

remittitur or additur).

3 In deciding whether an order constitutes a final judgment, we look not

to the title. Instead, we review the content and substance to discern whether

the order fully and finally determines the rights of the parties involved in the

lawsuit. See, e.g., George Vining & Sons, Inc. v. Jones, 498 So. 2d 695, 697

(Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (“We now dismiss this appeal because, notwithstanding

its title, the ‘final judgment on stipulation’ is in fact, in law, and in substance,

not final, not a judgment, and is not valid.”); see also Cordero v. Wash. Mut.

Bank, 241 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“Notwithstanding its title, the

motion was in substance nothing more than a reconstituted attack on the

underlying final judgment.”). In this quest, the inquiry focuses on whether

“the decree disposes of the cause on its merits leaving no questions open

for judicial determination except for execution and enforcement of the decree

if necessary.” Hoffman v. Hall, 817 So. 2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

When further judicial labor remains, an order is nonfinal, and the court retains

jurisdiction to adjudicate the unresolved issues. See S. L. T. Warehouse Co.

v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).

Here, while perhaps more suitably labeled a partial final judgment, the

Final Judgment of Eviction and Writ of Possession did not purport to

adjudicate the complaint in its entirety. As evidenced by both the initial

motion for default and the content of the ensuing judgment, the court only

4 disposed of the first count of the complaint. This left the second count, the

claim for damages, ripe for further judicial labor. See Almacenes El Globo

De Quito, S.A. v. Dalbeta L.C., 181 So. 3d 559, 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015);

Irvine v. T. Southwood 1295, Inc., 948 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

The inclusion of the SRS stamp on the face of the judgment does not

alter this conclusion. We recently explained in Coral Gables Imports, Inc. v.

Suarez, 306 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), that affixing the SRS stamp to

an order is a purely ministerial function. Id. at 351. Consequently, “the

clerical designation of the document . . . and the closure stamp [do] not

operate to convert [an] otherwise nonfinal order into a final order.” Id.

Accordingly, we conclude there was no jurisdictional impediment to awarding

damages, and we affirm the final judgment under review.

Affirmed.