NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 210083-U April 1, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and Carla Bender is not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0083 th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances Court, IL allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CHAD COIT, ) Appeal from Petitioner-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County CHRIS DOENITZ; TOWNSHIP OFFICERS ) No. 21MR70 ELECTORAL BOARD FOR MAHOMET TOWNSHIP; ) AARON WHEELER, in His Official Capacity as Chair; ) DAVID PARSONS, in His Official Capacity as Member; ) GREG MILLER, in His Official Capacity as Member; ) and AARON AMMONS, in His Official Capacity as ) Honorable Champaign County Clerk, ) Benjamin W. Dyer, Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) statutory language did not require petitioner to file proof of service within five days of filing his petition for judicial review in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court, (2) petitioner forfeited his argument he did not participate in a partisan caucus on the basis he did not follow caucus procedures, and (3) petitioner was ineligible to run as an independent candidate after participating in a partisan caucus.
¶2 Petitioner, Chad Coit, seeks to run as an independent candidate for the office of
Mahomet Township highway commissioner in a consolidated election scheduled for April 6,
2021. After Coit filed his statement of candidacy, respondent Chris Doenitz filed an objection
with the Mahomet Township Electoral Board (Board), asserting Coit was ineligible to run as an
independent candidate under section 10-3 of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020)) because he participated in the Republican caucus and was defeated by Doenitz. Following
an evidentiary hearing, the Board entered a written order sustaining Doenitz’s objection and
ordering Coit’s name removed from the ballot.
¶3 Coit filed a petition for judicial review in the Champaign County circuit court.
Doenitz filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because Coit failed to timely file a proof of service. Coit filed a proof of service
shortly thereafter. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered a written order (1) denying
Doenitz’s motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) affirming
the Board’s decision sustaining Doenitz’s objection.
¶4 Coit appeals, arguing the Board’s decision should be reversed because he did not
participate in the Republican caucus for purposes of the lockout provisions set forth in section
10-3 of the Election Code. Id. Doenitz argues this court should dismiss this appeal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, affirm the Board’s decision sustaining Doenitz’s
objection. We conclude this court has jurisdiction and affirm the Board’s decision.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 In November 2020, a notice of caucus was issued by the Republican party in the
Township of Mahomet, Champaign County, Illinois, stating a caucus was to occur on December
1, 2020. The notice further stated any candidate intending to seek office must submit their intent
in writing between November 23, 2020, and November 27, 2020. On November 25, 2020, Coit
mailed a notarized letter to David Parsons, the Republican party committee clerk, stating he
intended to seek the Republican nomination for Mahomet Township highway commissioner.
After mailing his letter but prior to the caucus, Coit posted messages to his Facebook account
stating he was running for highway commissioner and encouraging his supporters to attend the
-2- Republican caucus. Coit also sent letters to registered voters in the community, whose names he
obtained from the Champaign County clerk’s website, asking for support and encouraging them
to attend the Republican caucus.
¶7 The Republican caucus was held on December 1, 2020. At the caucus, it was
announced that two candidates, Coit and Doenitz, had submitted acceptable paperwork
expressing their intent to run for highway commissioner. Although Coit did not attend the
caucus, an individual named James Borders nominated him for the position, and Don Hogan
nominated Doenitz. A woman named Angela Norman volunteered to act as a poll watcher on
Coit’s behalf. Coit received 17 votes and was defeated by Doenitz, who received 50 votes.
¶8 On December 18, 2020, Coit filed a statement of candidacy with the Champaign
County clerk, expressing his intent to run as an independent candidate for the office of Mahomet
Township highway commissioner. On December 28, 2020, Doenitz filed a verified objector’s
petition arguing Coit was not eligible to run as an independent candidate for highway
commissioner because he participated in the Republican caucus and was defeated by Doenitz,
thus triggering the lockout provisions set forth in section 10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS
5/10-3 (West 2020)). Doenitz requested that Mahomet Township convene an Electoral Board,
find Coit’s nomination papers invalid, and strike Coit’s name from the ballot as a candidate for
highway commissioner.
¶9 The Board held a series of public hearings on Doenitz’s objector’s petition in
January 2021, culminating in an evidentiary hearing on January 15, 2021. At the evidentiary
hearing, Angela Norman testified she attended the caucus at Coit’s request but only to observe
and not on his behalf. Coit testified he neither asked James Borders to nominate him nor asked
-3- Norman to act as his poll watcher. Coit admitted that he never withdrew his nomination, and
when asked why he did not attend the caucus, stated he “didn’t want to participate.”
¶ 10 On January 21, 2021, the Board entered a written order finding Coit participated
in and was defeated by Doenitz at the Republican caucus and was therefore not eligible to run as
an independent candidate for highway commissioner. Accordingly, the Board sustained
Doenitz’s objection and directed the Champaign County clerk to strike Coit’s name from the
ballot as an independent candidate for highway commissioner.
¶ 11 On January 22, 2021, Coit filed a petition for judicial review in the Champaign
County circuit court, arguing the Board’s decision should be reversed because he did not
“participate” in the Republican caucus and therefore the lockout provisions set forth in section
10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020)) did not foreclose his eligibility to run as
an independent candidate. On February 1, 2021, Doenitz filed a motion to dismiss under section
2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)), arguing the circuit court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Coit failed to file a proof of service with the circuit
clerk within five days after service of the decision of the Board, citing section 10-10.1(a) of the
Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1(a) (West 2020)). On February 2, 2021, Coit filed a proof of
service with the circuit clerk. Coit additionally filed a response to Doenitz’s motion to dismiss,
arguing he was not required by statute to file the proof of service within five days of service of
the Board’s decision and any jurisdictional defect was cured when he filed the proof of service.
¶ 12 On February 5, 2021, the circuit court held a combined hearing on Doenitz’s
motion to dismiss and Coit’s petition for judicial review. On February 8, 2021, the circuit court
entered a written order finding it had jurisdiction and affirming the Board’s decision, concluding
-4- Coit participated in the Republican caucus and therefore was not eligible to run as an
independent candidate.
¶ 13 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, Coit argues this court should reverse the decision of the Board because
he was not a “participant” in the Republican caucus and therefore the lockout provisions set forth
in section 10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020)) do not prohibit him from
running as an independent candidate. Specifically, Coit argues he was not a participant because
(1) he did not sign an affidavit stating he was a registered voter and member of the Republican
party as required by the Township Code (60 ILCS 1/45-50(c)(3) (West 2020)) and (2) he did not
attend or vote at the caucus. Doenitz asserts this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and this
appeal should be dismissed, or alternatively, this court should affirm the Board’s decision. We
conclude this court has subject matter jurisdiction and affirm the Board’s decision.
¶ 16 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 17 We first address Doenitz’s argument this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because Coit failed to file a proof of service with the circuit clerk within five days of service of
the Board’s decision and therefore failed to comply with the special jurisdictional requirements
set forth in section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2020)). Coit does not
dispute he did not file a proof of service within five days of service of the Electoral Board’s
decision but argues he was not required to do so.
¶ 18 Section 10-10.1 sets forth four jurisdictional requirements for a party seeking
judicial review of the Board’s decision. The party seeking review “must file a petition with the
clerk of the court and must serve a copy of the petition upon the electoral board and other parties
-5- to the proceeding by registered or certified mail within 5 days after service of the decision of the
electoral board as provided in Section 10-10 [of the Election Code].” Id. The petition for judicial
review must set forth the basis for reversing the Board’s decision. Id. Finally, the party seeking
judicial review “shall file proof of service with the clerk of court.” Id. Strict compliance with the
requirements of section 10-10.1 is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
reviewing court. Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 16, 23 N.E.3d 351.
¶ 19 Doenitz asserts Coit was required to file a proof of service with the clerk of court
within five days of service of the Board’s decision in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the circuit court. We disagree. In Kowalski McDonald v. Cook County Officers Electoral
Board, 2018 IL App (1st) 180406, ¶ 30, 117 N.E.3d 218, the First District held that the “plain
language of section 10-10.1 requires service within five days of the Board’s final order and the
filing of a proof of service; it does not require that a proof of service be filed within the same
five-day period.” (Emphasis in original.) See also Carlasare v. Will County Officers Electoral
Board, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 17, 977 N.E.2d 298 (“[A]lthough [section 10-10.1] requires
that proof of service be filed, it does not require that the filing take place within five days.”).
When construing a statute, we give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary
meaning. Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 181, 874 N.E.2d 1, 8
(2007). Although the statute should be construed as a whole (id.), courts may not add to the
requirements listed in the statute. Bettis, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 32. Because there is no time period
referenced in section 10-10.1 for the filing of proof of service, we conclude Coit was not
required to file proof of service within five days of the Board’s decision in order to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the reviewing court.
-6- ¶ 20 In support of his claim that section 10-10.1 imposes a deadline for filing proof of
service, Doenitz relies on Nelson v. Qualkinbush, 389 Ill. App. 3d 79, 89 (2009), abrogated on
other grounds by Bettis, 2014 IL 117050. In Qualkinbush, the First District was called upon to
construe an earlier version of section 10-10.1. That version of the statute read:
“The party seeking judicial review must file a petition with the clerk of the court
within 10 days after the decision of the electoral board. The petition shall contain
a brief statement of the reasons why the decision of the board should be reversed.
The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition upon the electoral board and other
parties to the proceeding by registered or certified mail and shall file proof of
service with the clerk of the court. No answer to the petition need be filed, but any
answer must be filed within 10 days after the filing of the petition.” 10 ILCS
5/10-10.1 (West 2008).
The Qualkinbush court held that a petitioner’s failure to file proof of service within 10 days after
filing the petition for judicial review supported a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Qualkinbush,
389 Ill. App. 3d at 90.
¶ 21 Like the First and Third Districts, we decline to follow Qualkinbush. See
McDonald, 2018 IL App (1st) 180406, ¶ 30; see also Carlasare, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 17.
We agree with the McDonald court that the plain language of section 10-10.1 does not require
that proof of service be filed within the five days after service of the Board’s final
order. McDonald, 2018 IL App (1st) 180406, ¶ 30. The statute does not impose any deadline for
the filing of proof of service—it only requires that one be filed. We decline to impose a
jurisdictional requirement not found in the statute.
-7- ¶ 22 Here, the Board served its decision on Coit on January 21, 2021, and Coit filed a
proof of service on February 2, 2021. We conclude Coit fulfilled the special jurisdictional
requirements of section 10-10.1 when he filed the proof of service. Accordingly, the circuit court
correctly denied Doenitz’s motion to dismiss, and this court has subject matter jurisdiction. See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 23 B. Participation in Republican Caucus
¶ 24 We turn next to the merits of this case. Coit claims he was not a participant in the
Republican caucus for two reasons: (1) he did not follow caucus procedures as required by the
Township Code (60 ILCS 1/45-50(c)(3) (West 2020)) and (2) he did not attend the caucus or
vote.
¶ 25 1. Applicable Law
¶ 26 “Where *** an electoral board’s decision is challenged in court pursuant to
section 10-10.1 of the Election Code [citation], the proceeding is in the nature of administrative
review.” Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL
118929, ¶ 19, 28 N.E.3d 170. “On appeal, we review the Board’s decision rather than that of the
circuit court.” Schmidt v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL App (4th) 160189, ¶ 10, 68
N.E.3d 950. “Additionally, where the ‘facts are admitted or established and the only dispute
concerns whether the governing legal provisions were interpreted correctly,’ we apply a de novo
standard of review.” Id. (quoting Jackson-Hicks, 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 20).
¶ 27 At issue in this case is section 10-3 of the Election Code, which states the
following: “A candidate seeking election to an office for which candidates of political parties are
nominated by caucus who is a participant in the caucus and who is defeated for his or her
nomination at such caucus, is ineligible to be listed on the ballot at that general or consolidated
-8- election as an independent candidate.” 10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2020). The Election Code does not
define “participation” in a partisan caucus. The parties agree that whether Coit is eligible to run
as an independent candidate hinges on whether he “participated” in the December 1, 2020,
Republican caucus and thus triggered the lockout provision set forth in section 10-3.
¶ 28 In asking this court to construe whether Coit “participated” in the Republican
caucus, the parties turn to one of the few cases to address this issue, McCarthy v. Streit, 182 Ill.
App. 3d 1026, 538 N.E.2d 873 (1989). In McCarthy, a slate of Republican candidates attended a
caucus wherein an election judge determined they were defeated by the “Streit” slate. Id. at 1029.
The defeated “McCarthy” slate attempted to reorganize and run as a new party. Id. at 1030. The
Streit slate filed objections, arguing the McCarthy candidates were precluded from running as a
new party because they participated in and were defeated at the caucus. Id. at 1031. Several of
the McCarthy candidates appealed, arguing they did not participate in the caucus because they
did not (1) sign an affidavit confirming their participation, (2) sign in at the caucus, (3) actively
seek nomination, (4) make nominations, or (5) vote. Id. at 1030.
¶ 29 The McCarthy court held that “in the context of a caucus, the individuals claimed
to have participated must either have voted or done something more active than simply being
present and observing.” Id. at 1035. Furthermore, a candidate’s mere failure to withdraw his
name from nomination is not enough to find he participated in the caucus under section 10-3. Id.
Rather, the lockout provisions set forth in section 10-3 “should only be implemented where there
are specific, provable, documented actions of a candidate which would be fatal to a third-party
candidacy.” Id. at 1036. Under this framework, the court concluded the McCarthy candidates, by
taking no affirmative actions to share in the caucus process, did not participate in the caucus and
were not foreclosed from seeking third-party candidacy. Id. at 1035.
-9- ¶ 30 2. This Case
¶ 31 a. Caucus Procedures
¶ 32 As stated above, Coit first argues he was not a “participant” under section 10-3
because he did not file an affidavit stating he was a registered voter and a member of the
Republican party as required by statutory caucus procedures. See 60 ILCS 1/45-50(c)(3) (West
2020) (“Individuals participating at an established political party township or multi-township
caucus shall *** sign an affidavit that he or she is a registered voter and affiliated with the
established political party holding the caucus.”). Coit argues this section of the Township Code
defines caucus participation for purposes of section 10-3 of the Election Code.
¶ 33 Here, Coit has forfeited this argument because he failed to raise it before the
Board. “[I]ssues or defenses not presented to the administrative agency will not be considered for
the first time on administrative review.” Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers
Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 214, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1020 (2008); see also Let Forest Park
Vote on Video Gaming v. Village of Forest Park Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 2018 IL
App (1st) 180391, ¶ 25, 101 N.E.3d 152 (stating objector to a referendum petition forfeited
argument petitioner failed to comply with Election Code by failing to raise it before the Board).
In response to Doenitz’s forfeiture argument, Coit does not offer any reason why this court
should excuse his forfeiture, arguing only that this argument is a “red herring” because “[t]he one
and only argument in front of the Electoral Board, the Trial Court and this Appellate Court
revolves around the definition and interpretation of ‘participant.’ ” While Coit is correct that the
Board’s interpretation of “participant” is the central issue in this case, he fails to acknowledge
that the Board was never presented with any argument based on the Township Code. We
reiterate that our review in this case is limited to the record before the Board. See Cinkus, 228 Ill.
- 10 - 2d at 214 (“[A]dministrative review is confined to the evidence offered before the agency.”).
Because this argument was never before the Board and Coit provides no compelling reason why
his forfeiture should be excused, we honor his forfeiture. See id. at 214-15.
¶ 34 b. Coit’s Participation in the Republican Caucus
¶ 35 Finally, Coit argues he was not a participant in the Republican caucus because he
did not attend the caucus or vote. He additionally argues that sending a letter of intent to seek the
Republican nomination and campaigning via Facebook and mail did not rise to the level of
“participation.” We disagree.
¶ 36 Here, we agree with the Board and circuit court that Coit was a participant in the
Republican caucus. Unlike the third-party candidates in McCarthy, Coit took “specific, provable,
documented actions” towards seeking the Republican nomination which were “more active than
simply being present and observing.” See McCarthy, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 1035-36. We agree with
the circuit court that the moment Coit submitted his letter of intent, an action which was required
by Mahomet Township to seek candidacy, his participation in the caucus commenced. Although
his failure to withdraw his name alone is not dispositive of his participation, it undermines his
argument when coupled with the fact he actively campaigned for the nomination in the days
leading up to the caucus. In other words, not only did he never withdraw; he did the exact
opposite by campaigning. The exhibits admitted at the Board’s evidentiary hearing showed Coit
sought votes from his connections on Facebook and sent out letters to Mahomet Township
registered voters, whose names he obtained from the county clerk’s website. It appears that Coit
wished to run for the Republican nomination risk-free by abiding by all of the requirements
necessary to secure it, but by merely not attending, ensure he could still run as an independent in
- 11 - the event of his defeat. Unfortunately for Coit, the legislature decided to prohibit this behavior
when it enacted the lockout provisions set forth in section 10-3 of the Election Code.
¶ 37 In conclusion, Coit participated in the Republican caucus and was defeated by
Doenitz. Due to his defeat, he is ineligible to run as an independent candidate. We affirm the
Board’s decision.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment affirming the
¶ 40 Affirmed.
- 12 -