Cohoes Realty Associates v. Lexington Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Cohoes Realty Associates v. Lexington Insurance

250 A.D.2d 420, 673 N.Y.S.2d 4, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5408

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 12, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 250 A.D.2d 420 (Cohoes Realty Associates v. Lexington Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cohoes Realty Associates v. Lexington Insurance, 250 A.D.2d 420, 673 N.Y.S.2d 4, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5408 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered December 1, 1997, which denied plaintiffs’ motion and cross motion for partial summary judgment against both defendants and, upon a search of the record, granted summary judgment in favor of defendant insurer, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the motion court that defendant insurer based its disclaimer of coverage on clear, unmistakable language in the subject policy, subject to no possible interpretation other than that offered by the insurer (see, Tanzer v Health Ins. Plan, [421]*42191 NY2d 850, 853). Were there an ambiguity warranting consideration of extrinsic evidence, that evidence would also favor defendant insurer’s understanding of its obligations under the subject policy as against the reading of the policy proposed by plaintiffs.

Summary judgment, however, was properly withheld respecting plaintiffs’ claims against defendant broker based on allegations that the broker did not exercise the requisite care to ensure that the coverage obtained was adequate (see, e.g., Neil Plumbing & Heating Constr. Corp. v Providence Washington Ins. Co., 125 AD2d 295, 296-297). The record raises relevant issues as to whether the broker knew that the sprinkler system in the subject building was inoperable when the subject coverage was obtained, and as to whether the insured satisfied its duty to read the policy (see, Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815, 816-817, lv denied 79 NY2d 754). We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them to be without merit. Concur — Milonas, J. P., Wallach, Rubin, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered December 1, 1997, which denied plaintiffs’ motion and cross motion for partial summary judgment against both defendants and, upon a search of the record, granted summary judgment in favor of defendant insurer, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the motion court that defendant insurer based its disclaimer of coverage on clear, unmistakable language in the subject policy, subject to no possible interpretation other than that offered by the insurer (see, Tanzer v Health Ins. Plan, [421]*42191 NY2d 850, 853). Were there an ambiguity warranting consideration of extrinsic evidence, that evidence would also favor defendant insurer’s understanding of its obligations under the subject policy as against the reading of the policy proposed by plaintiffs.

Summary judgment, however, was properly withheld respecting plaintiffs’ claims against defendant broker based on allegations that the broker did not exercise the requisite care to ensure that the coverage obtained was adequate (see, e.g., Neil Plumbing & Heating Constr. Corp. v Providence Washington Ins. Co., 125 AD2d 295, 296-297). The record raises relevant issues as to whether the broker knew that the sprinkler system in the subject building was inoperable when the subject coverage was obtained, and as to whether the insured satisfied its duty to read the policy (see, Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815, 816-817, lv denied 79 NY2d 754). We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them to be without merit. Concur — Milonas, J. P., Wallach, Rubin, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

250 A.D.2d 420, 673 N.Y.S.2d 4, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5408, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohoes-realty-associates-v-lexington-insurance-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack