Cohen v. City of Atlanta

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Cohen v. City of Atlanta

70 S.E. 140, 8 Ga. App. 851, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 174

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 24, 1911

Docket2690

StatusPublished

This text of 70 S.E. 140 (Cohen v. City of Atlanta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cohen v. City of Atlanta, 70 S.E. 140, 8 Ga. App. 851, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911).

Pincite

Opinion

Russell, J.

1. The fact that one has been convicted of violating an ordinance forbidding the keeping open of doors on the Sabbath day, for the purpose of trade and traffic is no bar to a prosecution for violating an ordinance against doing a “near beer” business without a license. The offenses are essentially distinct. Each requires a provable ingredient [852]*852not necessary to complete the other. The fact that the State alone had jurisdiction of the offense for which the accused had been already tried in a municipal court would not alter the case or constitute a bar to prosecution for a violation of the municipal offense of doing a “near beer” business without a license.

Decided January 24, — Rehearing denied, February 22, 1911.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court — Judge Bell. April 19, 1910.

F. M. Hughes, Morris Machs, for plaintiff in error. J. L. Mayson, W. D. Ellis Jr., contra.

2. The evidence authorized the conviction of the offense of doing a “near beer” business without‘a license. There was no error in overruling the certiorari. _ Judgment affirmed.

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Russell, J.

1. The fact that one has been convicted of violating an ordinance forbidding the keeping open of doors on the Sabbath day, for the purpose of trade and traffic is no bar to a prosecution for violating an ordinance against doing a “near beer” business without a license. The offenses are essentially distinct. Each requires a provable ingredient [852]*852not necessary to complete the other. The fact that the State alone had jurisdiction of the offense for which the accused had been already tried in a municipal court would not alter the case or constitute a bar to prosecution for a violation of the municipal offense of doing a “near beer” business without a license.

Decided January 24, — Rehearing denied, February 22, 1911.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court — Judge Bell. April 19, 1910.

F. M. Hughes, Morris Machs, for plaintiff in error. J. L. Mayson, W. D. Ellis Jr., contra.

2. The evidence authorized the conviction of the offense of doing a “near beer” business without‘a license. There was no error in overruling the certiorari. _ Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

70 S.E. 140, 8 Ga. App. 851, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 174, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohen-v-city-of-atlanta-gactapp-1911.