Cohen v. Atlas Assurance Co. of London

163 A.D. 381, 148 N.Y.S. 563, 1914 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6950
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 10, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 163 A.D. 381 (Cohen v. Atlas Assurance Co. of London) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cohen v. Atlas Assurance Co. of London, 163 A.D. 381, 148 N.Y.S. 563, 1914 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6950 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

Dowling, J.:

This action was brought to set aside an award made in pursuance of the provisions of the standard fire insurance policy, and for recovery of the amount of the damage claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of a fire occurring in his cigar factory on May 18, 1909.

After the fire, in order to determine the amount of plaintiff’s damage, an amicable settlement not having been arrived at, an appraisal agreement was made on May 28, 1909, under which Bernhard Bosenbluth was named as appraiser by the plaintiff and Simon Buppin by defendants. These appraisers undertook to determine the sound value and damage to the stock in accordance with the policies of insurance, and finally agreed upon John H. Duys as umpire, he having been suggested by the plaintiff’s appraiser. Mr. Duys was thereupon duly appointed as umpire by a written instrument dated June 16, 1909. On June twenty-first the appraisers commenced the work of determining the sound value and damage done to plaintiff’s property. They received schedules based on plaintiff’s inventory Of his stock, with appropriate columns to note the result of their labors. Being unable to agree, the umpire was called upon to perform his functions. The number of hours which he spent with the appraisers in the work of examination and appraising is given by the different witnesses as from five and one-fourth to three and one-half hours. During this time the appraisers and the umpire examined the stock of tobacco and cigars in the plaintiff’s place of business. There were over 800,000 cigars therein, inclosed in ordinary boxes ready for sale, of which 550,000 were stored in a store[383]*383room, or so-called humidor, and the balance were outside in the packing room. There were also some unpacked cigars included in the total number. The work of examining the tobacco occupied until about five o’clock, the remaining two hours being devoted almost entirely to the examination of the cigars and the reaching of a conclusion. It is admitted by the plaintiff’s appraiser that every lot appearing in tho schedules obtained from the plaintiff had been examined when the work was completed. The real controvérsy herein arises solely from the damage to the cigars, for the trial court has found that the sound value of the property was properly determined, it being in fact the value placed upon it by the plaintiff himself; nor has the trial court interfered with the damage determined to have been done to the tobacco, save to reduce the amount of damage awarded to plaintiff by the sum of $920.40, that being the amount of an error due to the computation of the damage based on market weight instead of actual weight. The sole ground of attack upon the conclusions reached under the appraisal is the amount awarded for the damage done to the cigars. This was fixed at $7,723.19, being thirty-five per cent of the sound value, which has been increased by the trial court to $15,446.39, or seventy per cent of the sound value. It is quite apparent that the mere failure of the trial court to coincide with the view taken by the appraiser and umpire who signed the award as to the amount of the damage done would not be ground for setting aside the award, but the court has acted upon the theory that the amount of time devoted to the appraisement of the cigars was insufficient, so that the work was superficially done. It has found that the examination of the tobacco was fairly thorough, and did not interfere with the conclusions reached upon that phase of the matter. It seems to us upon this record that what was done was sufficient to enable the appraisers and umpire to reach a fair conclusion as to the damage done the cigar stock. The question was one of smoke damage; that is, the extent to which the cigars had been impaired, if at all, by the presence and penetration of smoke during and after the fire, so that the cigars were impregnated with its odor, and thus their marketability affected or destroyed. The cigars in question for [384]*384the greater part retailed at five cents and were of the brand established by plaintiff known as “ Keystone.” The appraisers and umpire first examined the cigars outside the humidor, a considerable part of which were in cases lined with zinc, provided with locks and nearly air-tight. Packages of these were taken from different places and brought to the front of the building. The plaintiff’s appraiser says that a half dozen cases were opened and ten or twelve boxes of cigars taken therefrom, and the appraisers, after examination, having disagreed as to the damages, the umpire determined the same. Before this was done, cigars were taken out of these boxes, the labels were examined and the cigars were smoked, eighty or one hundred in all being examined and many of them smoked. As to the cigars in the humidors, boxes were selected by the two appraisers at random, and the foreman for the plaintiff was directed to bring out the worst damaged boxes, which he did,, and all the boxes thus selected were brought to the front of the loft where the light was best and there examined. The boxes were opened, the labels examined and the cigars smoked. The smoking was done by all three of the parties, and sometimes as many as five or six cigars were being consecutively smoked by the umpire with the particular purpose of detecting,if possible, any smoke damage, which both the defendant’s appraiser and the umpire were unable to find. However, ten per cent was allowed on the humidor stock to cover repacking where the labels had been affected, although the contents were not. Finally, the umpire took away several boxes with him and smoked them away from the factory, still finding no evidence of smoke damage apparent to the taste or smell, but as the result of averaging and calculation an allowance was finally made to the plaintiff of thirty-five per cent for whatever damage was done the stock of cigars. Of course, all that was necessary for the appraisers and umpire to do was to determine the damage done these cigars, for their quantity was not in dispute, the plaintiff and his employees having spent some four days preparing the schedules of the entire stock which were accepted by the appraisers without question. The plaintiff’s appraiser estimated the damage to these cigars at eighty per cent and does not deny that he made a sufficient examination [385]*385at the time upon which to base that estimate of damage. With similar opportunities for examination the other appraiser and the umpire agreed upon a damage figure of thirty-five per cent. The plaintiff himself claims that the cigars had been so affected by smoke that they were no longer marketable as Keystone cigars. Neither he nor any one else suggests a method of testing the smoke damage save by smelling and smoking, which was done by the appraisers and umpire. The plaintiff has produced expert witnesses to testify that the cigars were damaged to a great extent by the smoke, and the only method followed by them was that pursued by the appraisers and umpire, namely, to select boxes of cigars at random, to smoke cigars taken therefrom and to ascertain whether or not they were affected by the smoke. None of these experts undertook to fix the exact percentage of damage which had been done by the smoke, but all agreed that they were no longer merchantable as branded “Keystone” cigars. The plaintiff estimated the damage on the cigars at eighty-five per cent. No one has sworn that the damage was seventy per cent, the amount allowed by the trial court, emphasizing the fact that such damage is purely a matter of opinion, for the court itself felt called upon to award a percentage which is not sustained by the direct testimony of any witness produced.

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Bluebook (online)
163 A.D. 381, 148 N.Y.S. 563, 1914 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6950, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohen-v-atlas-assurance-co-of-london-nyappdiv-1914.