Cohan v. Sparkle Two, LLC

309 F.R.D. 665, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106032, 2015 WL 4758027
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 12, 2015
DocketCase No. 6:15-cv-86-Orl-31DAB
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 309 F.R.D. 665 (Cohan v. Sparkle Two, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cohan v. Sparkle Two, LLC, 309 F.R.D. 665, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106032, 2015 WL 4758027 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

Opinion

Order

GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on the Verified Motion for Default Final Judgment (Doc. No. 13) filed July 8, 2015, which was renewed on August 6, 2015 (Doc. No. 15).

On July 28, 2015, the United States Magistrate Judge issued a report (Doc. No. 14) recommending that the motion be denied without prejudice. No objections have been filed. Therefore, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Report and Recommendation is CONFIRMED and ADOPTED.
2. The Motion for Final Default Judgment filed at Doc. No. 13, to the extent it is not otherwise moot, is DENIED without prejudice. The Renewed Motion for Default Judgment filed at Doe. No. 15 remains pending before the Court.

Report And Recommendation

DAVID A BAKER, United States Magistrate Judge.

TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:

MOTION: VERIFIED MOTION FOR DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 13)

FILED: July 8,2015

THEREON it is RECOMMENDED that the motion be DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiff, having obtained a Clerk’s default (Doc. 9), now moves for entry of final default judgment on his claim for injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). As the relief sought is not warranted on this record, the undersigned recommends that the motion be denied, without prejudice to renewal on a more complete showing, as explained herein.

I. Legal Standards

A district court may enter a default judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to defend or otherwise appear pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2); Directv, Inc. v. Griffin, 290 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1343 (M.D.Fla.2003). The effect of the entry of a default is that all of the factual allegations in the Complaint are taken as true, save for the amount of unspecified damages. Thus, if liability is well-pled in the complaint, it is established by the entry of a default. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir.1987). A court may enter a default judgment only if the factual allegations of the complaint, which are assumed to be true, provide a sufficient legal basis for entry of a default judgment. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1975) (“The defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”).

The United States Supreme Court has noted the difference between well-pleaded facts and conclusory allegations. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court explained that a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause [667]*667of action mil not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. at 678,129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not !show[n]’ — ‘that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 679,129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). This analysis is equally applicable to a motion for default judgment. See De Lotta v. Dezenzo’s Italian Restaurant, Inc., No. 6:08— cv-2033-Orl-22KRS, 2009 WL 4349806, *5 (M.D.Fla. November 24, 2009).

Once liability is established, the Court turns to the terms of the judgment. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” If unspecified monetary damages are sought, the party moving for default judgment has the burden to prove the unliquidated sums in a hearing on damages or otherwise. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(l)-(2). Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the Court “may conduct hearings or make referrals — preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial — when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to: A) conduct an accounting; B) determine the amount of damages; C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or D) investigate any other matter.” Thus, in order to enter a default judgment, the Court must find that an adequate showing has been made as to liability and the kind or amount of damages or other relief.

II. The Allegations of the Complaint

For present purposes, the following allegations of the Complaint are relevant. Plaintiff is a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida, and is an individual suffering from a “qualified disability” under the ADA (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3, 6). Plaintiff avers: “Upon information and belief Defendant is the lessee, operator, owner and lessor of the Real Property, which is subject to this suit, and is located at 1614 U.S. 1, Ormond Beach, Florida 3217 4 (“Premises”), and is the owner of the improvements where Premises is located.” Id., ¶ 4 (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges that he visited the Premises with an expert on September 1, 2014, and encountered several barriers to access, which constitute violations of the ADA. Id., ¶ 6, 14, 15, 18. Plaintiff further alleges that “[subsequent to the date of Plaintiffs visit to the Subject Facility, an expert determined that the violations referenced above were still outstanding.” Id., ¶ 20. Plaintiff asserts that all of the violations are readily achievable to modify in order to bring the Premises into compliance with the ADA. Id., ¶ 24. The Complaint seeks declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs, and an injunction compelling that the violations be remedied.

III. Analysis

Although well-pled factual allegations are admitted by virtue of the default, the Complaint here does not adequately set forth facts, as opposed to vague allegations made on “information and belief,” to establish that this Defendant is the proper party responsible for redressing ADA violations at this Property. Indeed, the motion and supporting Affidavits give the Court reason to doubt that the Premises are properly identified and that this Defendant is properly before the Court.

As noted in the case caption, the “premises” seems to be an Econo Lodge in Ormond Beach. The expert report tendered by Plaintiff includes identification of the “property inspected” as the “Econo Lodge” and includes a picture of a sign identifying an Econo Lodge (Doe. 13-2).

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309 F.R.D. 665, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106032, 2015 WL 4758027, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohan-v-sparkle-two-llc-flmd-2015.