Cogswell v. Town of Logansport

321 So. 2d 774, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3355
Louisiana Court of Appeal·Decided October 1, 1975·No. 12691·Published·Cited by 55 cases

Opinion

321 So.2d 774 (1975)

Harold COGSWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOWN OF LOGANSPORT et al., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12691.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

October 1, 1975.

*777 W. Charles Brown, Mansfield, for defendant-appellant.

Gamble & Sledge by Jack R. Gamble, Jr., Mansfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BOLIN, HALL and MARVIN, JJ.

MARVIN, Judge.

The mayor and board of aldermen of Logansport appeal from a judgment enjoining the enforcement of a recently adopted ordinance which attempted to define and require among other things, "additional duties" of the Marshal and Chief of Police of Logansport, Harold Cogswell, appellee herein who successfully sought the injunction.

Logansport is classified as a town under the Lawrason Act, Act 136 of 1898, as amended, now R.S. 33:321 et seq. This is the general municipal incorporation law of Louisiana which classifies and bestows powers and privileges upon municipalities according to population, of which the Court is required to take judicial notice.[1] See R.S. 33:341, 345.

The court below held that the ordinance "strips" the chief of police of the inherent power over and general responsibility for law enforcement to which he is entitled as the elected marshal and chief of police.

The mayor and aldermen contend that the law generally empowers them to prescribe the duties of all officers; that such an ordinance is specifically authorized by R.S. 33:423, which provides that the marshal and chief of police ". . . shall also perform all other duties required of him by ordinance."; and that the ordinance in question speaks only of "additional" duties and does not limit or infringe upon the inherent powers afforded the marshal and chief of police as an elected official.

One section of the statute which we are called on to construe is the former section 25 of the Lawrason Act which was incorporated into the Revised Statutes as R.S. 33:423, and amended by Act 120 of 1970. As originally enacted in 1898, this section read:

"The marshal shall be ex-officio a constable. He shall be the chief of police thereof, and shall perform all other duties required of him by ordinance." Acts 1898, No. 136, § 25.

*778 Since the 1970 amendment, the statute reads as follows:

"The marshal shall be the chief of police and shall be ex officio a constable. He shall have general responsibility for law enforcement in the municipality, and shall be charged with the enforcement of all ordinances within the municipality and all applicable state laws. He shall also perform all other duties required of him by ordinance." R.S. 33:423.

Between 1898 and 1970, there were several cases[2] and numerous published opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana[3] wherein there was considered the respective rights, powers, duties and responsibilities of the mayor, the aldermen and the marshal-chief of police of municipalities which were incorporated under the Lawrason Act.

In a 1968 decision, the Supreme Court noted that the duties and powers of the chief of police of a Lawrason Act municipality were not defined by statute or by jurisprudence, but observed:

"Because of the nature of his office, however, he is the chief law enforcement officer of the City and, as such, has supervision of the police department."Lentini v. City of Kenner, 252 La. 413, 211 So.2d 311, 312 (La.1968).

These powers and duties are often referred to as "inherent powers" and it is an established principle that the mayor and aldermen may not revoke the "inherent powers" of an elected chief of police of a Lawrason Act municipality. See Lentini, supra, page 314. Except for the above quoted language from Lentini and in Act 120 of 1970, now R.S. 33:423, the inherent powers of an elected chief of police have not been defined in Louisiana insofar as we are able to determine. Act 120 of 1970, in language similar to that used by our Supreme Court in Lentini, states in part that the chief of police

". . . shall have general responsibility for law enforcement in the municipality, and shall be charged with the enforcement of all ordinances within the municipality and all applicable state laws. . ." R.S. 33:423.

This act was one of five acts of the 1970 Legislature which amended parts of the Lawrason Act of Title 33.[4] Act 120 of 1970 in its last sentence, reiterates the language of former section 25 of the Lawrason Act in expressly providing that the chief of police:

". . . shall also perform all other duties required of him by ordinance." R.S. 33:423.

Other sections of the Lawrason Act, as amended and contained in Title 33, are pertinent here. Section 401 grants to the mayor and aldermen the power

". . . (6) To make all police regulations necessary for the preservation of good order and peace of the municipality. . .
". . . (30) . . . to prescribe the duties . . . of all officers and employees . . .
*779 ". . . (31) To provide for the removal of officers and discharge of employees for misconduct or neglect of duty . . ."

Section 402 grants "additional powers" to the mayor and aldermen

". . . (2) To adopt measures which are deemed necessary or proper for the protection of . . . the traveling public . . . .
". . . (4) To establish, regulate, and support . . . police and define the duties thereof . . ."

Section 404 states that the mayor

". . . shall have the superintending control of all offices and affairs of the municipality; shall actively and vigilantly see that all the laws and ordinances are properly executed and enforced. . . He may require any officer of the municipality to exhibit his accounts or other papers, and to make report to the board of aldermen, in writing, on any matter pertaining to his office. He shall cause all other officers to be dealt with promptly for any neglect or violation of duty . . ."

Section 401(A) vests in the mayor and aldermen the "care, management, and control of the municipality and its property and finances."

We apply here

". . . [the] recognized rule of statutory construction that the act as a whole ought to be interpreted so that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, or meaningless, if that result can be avoided." Bartley, Incorporated v. Town of Westlake, 237 La. 413, 111 So.2d 328, 333 (1959).

In Lentini, the City of Kenner adopted an ordinance which imposed certain duties on its chief of police and other duties on the senior police captain. The chief of police there sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that his duties were restricted or exclusively limited to those enumerated in the ordinance and that the duties assigned to the senior police captain divested the chief of police of his general and inherent power of supervising the police department. The Supreme Court agreed in this language:

"[1] Section IV of the ordinance enumerates nine specific duties of the Marshal, including the duty of personally investigating all felonies. Nowhere in the ordinance do we find language indicating these prescribed duties are nonexclusive or additional. Hence, as we construe it, the section is restrictive.
"[2] Section V specifically ves

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Cogswell v. Town of Logansport, 321 So. 2d 774, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3355 (La. Ct. App. 1975).

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