Coglan v. Beard

2 P. 737, 65 Cal. 58, 1884 Cal. LEXIS 441
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 12, 1884
DocketNo. 9,240
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 2 P. 737 (Coglan v. Beard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coglan v. Beard, 2 P. 737, 65 Cal. 58, 1884 Cal. LEXIS 441 (Cal. 1884).

Opinion

McKinstry, J.

This was an action under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to contest the right of defendant to the office of county clerk of Sacramento, to which he was [59]*59declared elected by the board of supervisors. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff the defendant has appealed.

Any elector may contest the right of a person declared elected to an office, “ for malconduct on the part of the board of judges, or any member thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1111, subd. 1.) And in his written statement or complaint the contestant is required to set forth specifically “the particular grounds of such contest.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1115.)

In the case at bar the ground of contest alleged in the plainiff’s statement or complaint is, that in the several election precincts the boards of election “were guilty of malconduct, committed as follows: That said board of election counted and tallied ballots for the said M. it. Beard for the office of county clerk, upon which the said Beard’s name did not appear, and that said board failed, neglected, and refused to count and tally ballots for C. M. Cogían, for the office of county clerk, upon which the name of said Cogían did appear.” The averments of the complaint are specifically denied.

The ballots supposed to have been cast by the voters were recounted in the presence of the court. In nearly every precinct tiie recount resulted in a gain to the contestant and a loss to the defendant.

The results reached by the recount as to two of the precincts were rejected by the court below, the learned judge saying in the findings: “While there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy my mind that the ballots have been tampered with, or fraudulently manipulated in any way, still from the circumstance of the package having been opened, and a very considerable variance being found between the returns and the actual count of the ballots, I think it unsafe to adopt the recount, and therefore in this precinct I take the returns.

The packages of ballots which the court below considered it “ unsafe ” to treat as not having been tampered with or “ fraudulently manipulated,” — although the evidence was not sufficient to satisfy the mind of the judge that there had been such tampering or fraud—had been in the same custody as the packages assumed to have been sent from the other precincts. As to some of these, the names of the election officers were not written across the seals fastening the packages, nor were the [60]*60packages clearly identified. The packages were placed in a vault in the Hall of Records, of which the clerk retained the keys in his possession. The janitor of the court house, his assistant, and several members of the board of supervisors, each had a key to the room in which was the vault. The locks on the doors of the vault were ordinary tumbler locks, which could be unlocked by any person having a key to match the locks.

If the evidence on the part of the contestant satisfied the mind of the judge that the ballots from the two precincts had not been tampered with, he should have adopted the result of the recount, and not the returns from those two precincts. The action of the court below could be justified only because the evidence failed to overcome the presumption created by the returns—failed to satisfy the court that the ballots had not been tampered with. But if the evidence failed to prove that the ballots claimed to have been cast in two of the precincts had not been changed, how did the court reach the conclusion that the ballots from other precincts had remained unaltered—it appearing that those who had tampered with some might have tampered with all?

It is evident, however, the court did not base its rejection of the recount as to the two precincts upon the failure of contestant to establish affirmatively that the ballots had not been tampered with, but that they were rejected out of abundant caution, because it was “safer,” the judge saying “there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy my mind that the ballots had been tampered with, or fraudulently manipulated in any way.”

Thus the court below in effect held that as the ballots had been in charge' of the county clerk, the presumption was that they had not been changed, and it was for the defendant to prove that fraud had been committed with reference to them. This idea appears throughout the findings. Thus the court finds that the package containing the ballots supposed to have been cast in precinct four, Sacramento City, “ was brought into court intact,” and that the package supposed to contain the ballots cast at precinct four and one half, Sacramento City, “ was likewise in good order.” And again: “ From all the other precincts in the county the ballots are returned in good shape— [61]*61not in every case complying strictly with the law, but there is not evidence indicating to my mind any tampering with the ballots.”

The court below erred in assuming that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to prove that the ballots had been disturbed or fraudulently interfered with. Mr. Justice Cooley says: The returns of the canvassing boards are prima fade evidence in the courts. .... If, however, the ballots have not been kept as required by law, and surrounded by such securities as the law has prescribed, with a view to their safe preservation as the best evidence of the election, it would seem that they should not be received as evidence at all, or if received, it should be left for the jury to determine upon all the circumstances of the case, whether they constitute more reliable evidence than the inspector’s certificate, which is usually prepared immediately on the close of the election, and upon actual count of the ballots as then made by the officers whose duty it is to do so.” (Const. Lim. side p. 625.)

McCreary in his work on “Contested Elections” (p. 209), lays down the rule: - “Before the ballot boxes should be allowed in evidence to overturn the official count and return, it should appear affirmatively that they have been safely kept by the proper custodian of the law; that they have not been exposed to the public or handled by unauthorized persons, and that no opportunity has been given for tampering with them. If this is believed to be a rule founded upon a presumption that a fraud or crime has been committed, the answer is that the rule does no more than make choice between two presumptions of law, which in this instance come in conflict and cannot both prevail.”

In People v. Livingston, 79 N. Y. 290, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred in charging the jury that, to justify the rejection of the ballots as proof, it must appear affirmatively by direct evidence or from circumstances, that the ballot boxes had been interfered with and fraud committed, Church, C. J., saying: The error is in putting upon the party against whom the ballot boxes are introduced the onus of proving that they had in fact been tampered with.....The burden was upon the relator to satisfy the jury that the boxes had remained [62]*62inviolate; the returns are the primary evidence of the result of the election.....The returns may be impeached for fraud or mistake, but in attempting to remedy one evil we should be cautious not to open the door to another and far greater evil.

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Bluebook (online)
2 P. 737, 65 Cal. 58, 1884 Cal. LEXIS 441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coglan-v-beard-cal-1884.