IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ELIJAH COFFIELD, § § Defendant Below, § No. 288, 2023 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2105000996 A/B (N) § Appellee. §
Submitted: November 8, 2024 Decided: January 14, 2025
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In May 2021, a grand jury indicted the appellant, Elijah Coffield, and
more than a dozen other alleged members of a street gang known as “NorthPak” for
gang participation and numerous violent crimes. The charges against Coffield in the
operative, November 2021 reindictment included gang participation; two counts of
first-degree murder; five counts of attempted first-degree murder; first-degree
reckless endangering; attempted assault in a detention facility; and multiple
conspiracy and firearm-related offenses. (2) The charges arose from an investigation into NorthPak and its
suspected involvement in a series of violent crimes in the City of Wilmington.
Investigators determined that NorthPak was a “hybrid criminal street gang,”1 with
no “clear code of conduct,”2 that was motivated, as one former member testified, not
by drugs or money but by “revenge” and “rep chasing.”3 In 2020, NorthPak was
engaged in a violent feud with a rival Wilmington gang known as the M-Block
Grimy Savages (“MGS”).4 The gangs used social media platforms such as Instagram
and YouTube to communicate, for self-promotion, and to “intimidate [and] inflict
fear amongst their opposing gangs.”5 Perceived social media slights ignited violence
and turned individuals into targets.6 NorthPak sought to kill those targets, or the
targets’ friends and family members, each killing considered a “score” adding to
their side’s total body count in the ongoing feud.7 The investigation unearthed at
least eighteen key members of NorthPak. Coffield and Gregory Wing were
identified as “leaders” and “shooters” for NorthPak and were tried together.8
(3) By the summer of 2020, NorthPak was “on offense” against MGS,
catalyzed by the 2019 murders of Rajion Dinkins and Christian Coffield, Coffield’s
1 App. to Opening Br. at A657–59. 2 Id. at A657. 3 Id. at A2708. 4 Wing v. State, -- A.3d --, 2024 WL 3763376, at 1 (Del. Aug. 13, 2024). 5 App. to Opening Br. at A647. 6 Wing, 2024 WL 3763376, at *1. 7 Id.; App. to Opening Br. at A683–84, A2584–87, A2603–04, A2728–29. 8 App. to Opening Br. at A258891.
2 brother.9 NorthPak was actively seeking MGS-affiliated targets to kill so NorthPak
could “feel like [they] were winning.”10 To that end, NorthPak gang members often
stole cars to “spin the block,” a slang term meaning to drive around an opposing
gang’s territory, looking for targets.11 If the opportunity arose, NorthPak would do
a “drill,” a slang term for a shooting, including a drive-by shooting.12
(4) Five such attacks resulted in Coffield’s convictions for the crimes at
issue in this appeal. The first three occurred in close succession on the evening of
September 8, 2020. Early that morning, at approximately 4:00 a.m., a Bear,
Delaware resident’s Nissan Altima with tinted windows was stolen from his
driveway while he was sleeping.13 Then, at around 7:00 p.m., seventeen-year-old
Ol-lier Henry and nineteen-year-old Taquan Davis, both associated with MGS, were
walking home from a memorial service along North Pine Street; they were
accompanied by Antoinjsa Williams and another woman. A car with tinted windows
pulled up beside them, and two masked men opened fire on the group, which quickly
dispersed. Henry was struck by gunfire and Williams was grazed; Davis and the
other woman escaped.14 Wilmington police officers responded to the scene and
9 Id. at A742, A1984-85. 10 Id. at A2728. 11 Id. at A682, A706, A2618–19, A2707. 12 Id. at A682. 13 On September 16, 2020, Wing was arrested in that vehicle. Infra ¶ 7. A car consistent with the stolen Altima was involved in the three September 8 shootings. 14 Investigators surmised that Davis was the primary target of the first September 8 shooting. Although he survived that day, he did not survive the week. Following the September 8 shootings,
3 found Henry unconscious, with gunshot wounds to his head and torso; he was later
pronounced dead at Christiana Hospital. The aftermath of the Pine Street shooting
was captured on surveillance cameras, and officers found three .22 caliber shell
casings and one 9mm projectile at the scene.
(5) A few minutes after the Pine Street shooting, at around 7:10 p.m.,
fifteen-year-old Javar Curtis, who had a “problem” with a NorthPak member the
week before,15 was walking home from his grandmother’s house. While walking
through Southbridge in Wilmington, Curtis observed masked individuals in a black
Nissan Altima “looking at [him] real hard.”16 Fearing that the car’s occupants were
in NorthPak, Curtis crossed the street. He briefly evaded the Altima, but when he
saw the car a second time, Curtis presumed that it was “looking for [him],” so he
ran.17 Curtis again dodged the car momentarily, but when it came upon him a third
time, two occupants of the vehicle fired multiple shots at him. Curtis ducked and
narrowly avoided being struck in the face. Curtis observed that one of the guns
Davis made several Instagram posts lamenting Henry’s death and taunting NorthPak. On September 12, 2020, outside a store at the corner of Elm and Harrison Streets, Davis was shot and killed. No ballistics evidence was found at the scene, but three 9mm shell casings were recovered in a Hyundai Santa Fe that had been stolen earlier in the afternoon of September 12 and was later found abandoned in a wooded area. Wing, but not Coffield, was charged with Davis’s murder. Wing, 2024 WL 3763376, at *2. 15 App. to Opening Br. at A1221. 16 Id. at A1207-13. 17 Id. at A1210.
4 appeared to be a “9.”18 The shooting was captured on surveillance video, and police
found four .22 caliber shell casings at the scene.
(6) Less than an hour later, around 7:56 p.m., Bryshawn Lecompte and
Jiveer Green were driving in the area of 7th and Jackson Streets. Lecompte was
considered a NorthPak “opp” because he was “best friends” with someone who had
disrespected NorthPak in rap videos; Green was a friend of Lecompte’s.19 A dark-
colored, four-door car pulled up next to them, and two men fired several shots into
their car. The bullets missed Green but struck Lecompte. Lecompte drove quickly
to St. Francis Hospital, where he was treated for gunshot wounds to his left leg and
arm. Investigators recovered three 9mm shell casings and seven .22 caliber shell
casings from the scene.
(7) On September 16, 2020, Delaware State Police officers observed a
dark-colored Nissan Altima pull into a Wawa market on Philadelphia Pike in
Wilmington. The car caught the officers’ attention because it was driving erratically
and at a high rate of speed. Officers conducted a registration check and learned that
the vehicle had been reported stolen. Officers observed Wing exit the Altima and
enter the Wawa. When he returned, officers converged on the vehicle. Wing fled
but was apprehended not far away with a black 9mm Beretta firearm and eleven
18 Id. at 1215. 19 Id. at A2757–58, A813–14. NorthPak members referred to opposing gangs or individuals associated with opposing gangs as “opps.” Wing, 2024 WL 3763376, at *2, n.15.
5 9mm rounds of ammunition in his possession. A search of the Altima recovered
three spent 9mm shell casings.
(8) A firearms-identification expert testified that the projectile recovered at
the scene of the Henry homicide, the 9mm casings recovered at the scene of the
Lecompte shooting, and the 9mm casings recovered from the Nissan Altima had all
been fired from the 9mm Beretta that was seized when Wing was arrested on
September 16.20 The ballistics evidence also showed that the same .22 caliber
firearm was used at all three September 8 shootings, although that gun was never
recovered.21
(9) The fourth shooting with which Coffield was charged occurred on
September 23, 2020, when Wing was in custody following his arrest at the Wawa.
At approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening, a delivery driver went into the pizza shop
where he worked to pick up pizzas, leaving his black Honda SUV outside the shop
with the engine running. When he returned, the vehicle was gone. The vehicle had
two stickers on the back window.
(10) A few hours later, around 11:48 p.m. on September 23, Leland Stanley,
Shareef Hamilton, and two others drove to a Dash In convenience store on Delaware
20 App. to Opening Br. at A1622, A1634, A1641. Ballistics evidence also tied the 9mm Beretta to the September 12 homicide of Taquan Davis, with which Coffield was not charged. Id. at A1651; supra note 14. 21 App. to Opening Br. at A1649.
6 Avenue in Wilmington. While they were inside the store, a dark-colored SUV drove
through the parking lot with its windows down, which seemed to draw the group’s
attention. Hamilton and Stanley eventually exited the Dash In and were standing
outside when two people approached on foot and began shooting at them. Hamilton
was struck by multiple bullets and died; Stanley escaped without being shot. The
shooters fled in a waiting vehicle. Police found six spent 9mm shell casings, one
9mm projectile, and one spent .380 caliber shell casing at the scene; they also
recovered three 9mm projectiles from Hamilton’s body. A ballistics expert
concluded that the 9mm casings and projectiles had all been fired from a 9mm Smith
& Wesson firearm that was later found in Maryland.22 A gun matching the .380
caliber casing was never recovered.23 The incident was captured on surveillance
cameras and observed by two individuals who had been panhandling for money
outside the store. Surveillance footage showed that the dark-colored SUV that had
pulled through the parking lot had two stickers on the back window.
(11) The fifth and final shooting at issue in this case occurred the following
day and culminated in Coffield’s arrest. On the afternoon of September 24, 2020,
Marquise Merchant parked his car behind his mother’s house in Chester,
Pennsylvania while he was buying food from a nearby food truck. Merchant’s
22 Id. at A2497–98. 23 Coffield told former NorthPak member Stanley Jones that he had used a “38” that would fire only one shot at the September 23 shooting at the Dash In. Infra ¶ 22.
7 mother’s house was near NorthPak member Amire Pierce’s residence. The car was
a silver Volvo sedan with tinted windows. Merchant left his keys and a loaded 9mm
Taurus G3 handgun in the car. Within minutes of parking his car, Merchant saw it
“flying down the street.”24 Merchant had Federal and Hornady ammunition for the
Taurus 9mm gun.
(12) Sakai Clark had posted photos and videos paying homage to MGS-
affiliated shooting victims. A few hours after Merchant’s silver Volvo was stolen in
Chester, Clark and another individual were driving on Maryland Avenue in
Wilmington when shots were fired into their car from a silver Volvo with
Pennsylvania tags. Clark was struck by bullets but survived. Officers responded to
a shots-fired report and attempted to apprehend the Volvo in the streets of
Wilmington. When the Volvo was momentarily cornered in a dead-end street, an
officer looked through an open door and observed one of the occupants and a pair of
crutches in the back seat. The Volvo escaped by side-swiping some vehicles, with
officers in pursuit, but the officers gave up the chase for public-safety reasons when
the Volvo exceeded 100 miles per hour on I-95.
(13) Moments later, a police officer was returning home to Lea Boulevard
Apartments after hearing about the car chase over his radio. He saw the silver Volvo
parked in the apartment complex and observed an individual hobble away from the
24 App. to Opening Br. at A2156.
8 vehicle on crutches. The officer followed the individual, who was NorthPak member
Markel Richards, and took him into custody.
(14) Detective Kevin Nolan and additional officers arrived and began
canvassing the area around the apartment complex for surveillance videos. Video
from a nearby Ring camera depicted four individuals walking between two houses
on 39th Street.25 As officers were waiting for a K-9 unit to arrive to search for the
suspects, Detective Nolan received a call informing him that a resident had reported
suspicious individuals outside her house near 36th Street and Washington Street. He
drove to the area and found two people resembling those depicted in the Ring video.
He and another officer arrested those two individuals, who were Coffield and
JShawn Edwards. While Coffield was handcuffed in the back of a police car, an
officer observed him attempting to use a cell phone. The officer seized the phone,
which was later determined to belong to Edwards.
(15) An evidence detective officer collected a Hornady 9mm shell casing
near the area depicted on the Ring video. Upon closer review, the video appeared
to show a shell casing falling to the ground when Coffield fumbled with his
waistband. Ballistics evidence showed that the casing recovered near the scene of
Coffield’s arrest and five of the six 9mm casings recovered at the scene of the
25 The video also recorded one of the individuals yelling something to “Kels,” which was the nickname of Markel Richards, the individual who was arrested as he hobbled away from the Volvo.
9 Maryland Avenue shooting had been fired from the same weapon, which was never
recovered.26 The sixth 9mm casing from Maryland Avenue and the 9mm casings
found at the Dash In shooting had been fired from the 9mm Smith & Wesson that
was later found in Maryland.27
(16) Photos posted to Coffield’s Instagram account on September 24
depicted a Taurus handgun like the one Merchant had in his Volvo when it was
stolen that day. Instagram messages from Coffield’s account indicated that he had
“played ball” and been involved in a “high speed.”28
(17) Coffield’s social media account also incriminated him as to the
September 8 and September 23 shootings. Less than two hours before the September
8 shooting spree began, Wing’s brother sent an Instagram message to Coffield
informing Coffield that “opps” were out “on Pine” and telling Coffield to tell
Wing.29 Coffield asked if police were in the area, to which Wing’s brother responded
that they were not. Coffield responded that he was going to “grab [his] joint,” a
slang term for a firearm.30 Coffield then messaged Wing, informing Wing that opps
were “out,” telling Wing that Coffield had to “grab [his] ball”31—another slang term
26 App. to Opening Br. at A2509–10. 27 Supra ¶ 10; Appendix to Opening Brief at A2511–13. 28 Id. at A2174–75. 29 Id. at A1169-70. 30 Id. at A1171-72. 31 Id. at A1175.
10 for a firearm—and urging Wing to “hurry up.”32 Wing sent Coffield a selfie-style
photo of Wing with a loaded gun magazine.33 About an hour before Henry’s murder,
Coffield told Wing that he was “out back,” to which Wing responded “[h]ere I come
brody.”34
(18) Shortly before noon on September 23, 2020, the day that Hamilton was
murdered at the Dash In, a NorthPak associate sent Coffield an Instagram message
asking Coffield where he was, to which Coffield responded “riding” and “tryin to
ball as usual.”35 That afternoon, at approximately 3:41 p.m., Coffield sent JShawn
Edwards messages asking Edwards where he was, to which Edwards responded that
he was “riding” with his brother. Later in the exchange, Edwards and Coffield
referred to being in stolen cars, and the messages suggested that Coffield was picking
up Edwards in a stolen car at approximately 4:28 p.m. that day. Coffield also
messaged another NorthPak associate that he was in a stolen car at approximately
11:05 p.m. that night, less than an hour before Hamilton’s murder.36 Other messages
32 Id. 33 Id. at A1180–81. During this timeframe, Wing also sent photos to NorthPak associate Caleb Lancaster of Wing with a loaded firearm magazine and Wing holding a firearm that appeared to match the 9mm Beretta that was used in the September 8 shootings, and that was in Wing’s possession when he was arrested at the Wawa on September 16. Id. at A1189. Following the September 8 shootings, Wing made various Instagram posts depicting a Beretta 9mm firearm and made posts and sent messages appearing to take credit for Henry’s murder. Wing, 2024 WL 3763376, at *3. 34 App.to Opening Br. at A118182. 35 Id. at A1790. 36 Moreover, approximately an hour and a half after the black car drove through the Dash In parking lot, Coffield messaged an unidentified woman that he was in a black car.
11 indicated that Coffield was also with Markel Richards at the time of the Dash In
shooting. And approximately eleven hours after the Dash In shooting, Coffield
posted on Instagram: “If ya didn’t retaliate for your guys, STFU.”37
(19) Among the more than 50 witnesses who testified during the fourteen-
day trial was former NorthPak member Stanley Jones. Jones testified that he, Wing,
and Coffield committed the September 8 shootings. Jones said that he stole the
Nissan Altima that day, that Wing was the driver for all three of those shootings, and
that Jones and Coffield were in the front passenger and back seats, respectively.
Describing the Pine Street shooting, Jones testified that they were “spinning” when
they spotted Henry, Taquan Davis, and some females.38 He said that Wing had a
Beretta and Coffield had a .22 caliber gun, both of which Jones had loaded. Wing
stopped next to Henry and Davis, reached over Jones, and fired the Beretta. Jones
was unsure whether Coffield had fired the .22 caliber gun, because the noise of the
Beretta was so loud. Jones testified that they tossed shell casings from the car after
they drove away from the scene of Henry’s murder.
(20) Jones testified that they saw “Var from East,” which was Javar Curtis’s
Instagram name, a few minutes later. Wing positioned the car so that it was clear to
shoot, and Wing and Coffield shot at Curtis.
37 App. to Opening Br. at A3025–26. 38 Id. at A2748.
12 (21) As they continued on, they saw Lecompte and a passenger sitting in a
car at a red light. Jones said that Lecompte was best friends with Sakai Clark, who
was an “opp” because he had disrespected NorthPak in rap videos.39 Jones testified
that when they first saw LeCompte and his passenger, they were in a single lane of
traffic and not in a position to shoot, so Wing followed Lecompte’s car to a second
red light. When they got close enough, Jones stuck his arm out of the window and
fired several shots with the Beretta, and Coffield fired several shots with the .22
caliber gun.40
(22) As to the September 23 shooting at the Dash In, Jones testified that
Coffield told him that Coffield had stolen a car and was with Markel Richards and
JShawn Edwards during the shooting.41 Coffield told Jones that Richards was
driving and that there had been some confusion about whether the people at the Dash
In were opps or not. But Edwards was eager to engage in a shooting in order to
enhance his reputation within NorthPak, so he and Coffield got out of the car and
shot at the people outside the Dash In. Coffield told Jones that he had a .380 caliber
39 Id. at A2757–58. 40 Jones also testified that he had stolen the Hyundai Santa Fe tied to Davis’s murder; he was with Wing when Wing shot Taquan Davis with the 9mm Beretta on September 12; and they then abandoned the Hyundai near Coffield’s house. 41 Like Jones, Amire Pierce also testified that Coffield, Edwards, and Richards were present for the Dash In shooting, and that Richards was driving. Pierce said that Richards often drove when NorthPak engaged in shootings.
13 gun that would only fire one shot and that they ditched the stolen car in a park on the
north side of Wilmington.
(23) Jones testified that Coffield also told him about shooting Clark on
September 24. Jones reported that Coffield said that he was with Edwards and
Richards in a stolen car, and Richards was driving. When they saw Clark in another
car, Coffield shot into the other car. Coffield “rant[ed] and rav[ed]” about how
Richards was a great driver and maneuvered very well during a high-speed chase
with police following the shooting.42 Coffield said that after the chase they left the
car on foot, went to someone’s house, threw the gun in the bushes near a school, and
then were walking nearby when police caught them.43 Jones testified that Coffield
said he was communicating with his mother after his arrest about trying to retrieve
the gun. The State also played prison phone calls in which Coffield seemed to be
giving his mother instructions about how to find the gun. Police searched for, but
did not find, a gun in the area.
(24) A Superior Court jury found Coffield guilty of gang participation and
all the charges against him arising from the five shootings on September 8, 23, and
24, 2020, including the Henry and Hamilton murders; the attempted murders of
Davis, Curtis, Lecompte, Green, and Clark; and first-degree reckless endangering as
42 App. to Opening Br. at A2782. 43 Amire Pierce also testified that Coffield and Edwards claimed that they shot Clark.
14 to Leland Stanley. The jury found Coffield not guilty of an attempted assault in a
detention facility charge and a related conspiracy charge. On August 11, 2023, the
Superior Court sentenced Coffield to life imprisonment for each of the murder
charges and many decades in prison for the other offenses.44
(25) In this direct appeal, Coffield’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion
to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Coffield’s counsel asserts that, based
upon a conscientious review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.
Counsel informed Coffield of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a
copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief. Counsel also informed
Coffield of his right to supplement counsel’s presentation. Coffield responded with
points he wanted to present for the Court’s consideration, which counsel included
with the Rule 26(c) brief. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues
that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.
(26) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made
44 Coffield was charged with five counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”), three of which were for possessing a gun on September 8, 2020. After the jury’s verdict on the other charges, the Superior Court found Coffield guilty of PFBPP but asked for a memorandum addressing whether a defendant may be convicted of separate counts of PFBPP for possessing the same gun on the same day. The State later moved to dismiss two of the September 8 PFBPP charges, and the court granted the motion. At sentencing, however, the court sentenced Coffield for all five PFBPP counts, and the Superior Court record appears to reflect a “guilty” disposition of all five PFBPP counts. Accordingly, the Superior Court record and sentence order must be corrected to reflect the dismissal of two of the PFBPP counts.
15 a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.45 This
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine whether “the
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary
presentation.”46
(27) Coffield challenges the admissibility of evidence obtained from his
Instagram account and the cell phone that was in his possession when he was
arrested, arguing that the search warrants under which the evidence was obtained
were not supported by probable cause and did not satisfy the particularity
requirement. Because Coffield’s counsel did not file a motion to suppress in the
Superior Court as required by Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b), the
Superior Court did not hold a suppression hearing or make any ruling regarding the
constitutionality of warrants. “This Court has held that in the absence of a motion
to suppress and a pretrial suppression hearing, there is not an adequate record upon
which to review [a] suppression claim.”47 The scope of our review is therefore
limited to review for plain error.48 “Plain errors are ‘material defects’ that are
apparent on the face of the record and that ‘are basic, serious and fundamental in
their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which
45 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 46 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82. 47 Loper v. State, 2020 WL 2843516, at *2 (Del. June 1, 2020). 48 Id.
16 clearly show manifest injustice.’”49 For the reasons discussed below, we find no
plain error in this case.
(28) Coffield asserts that the warrants to search his Instagram account and
the phone at issue were not supported by probable cause. He also argues that the
warrants did not satisfy the particularity requirement; specifically, he contends that
the warrants were so overbroad as to the data categories and date ranges to search
that they constituted general warrants.50 The State has provided three search
warrants, and their supporting affidavits, relating to Coffield’s claims. The first was
issued on September 18, 2020, by a United States magistrate judge, based on an
affidavit of probable cause submitted by a federal law enforcement officer (the
“Federal Instagram Warrant”). The Federal Instagram Warrant sought information
maintained by Facebook, Inc., which owned Instagram, LLC, pertaining to
Coffield’s Instagram account for the period July 29 through September 18, 2020.
On February 26, 2021, a Superior Court judge issued a second warrant pertaining to
Coffield’s Instagram account, for the date range September 15 to September 24,
2020 (the “State Instagram Warrant”). On September 30, 2020, a Justice of the
Peace Court magistrate issued a warrant to conduct a forensic examination of the
49 Id. 50 To the extent that Coffield contends that warrants to search other NorthPak members’ Instagram accounts were unconstitutional, Coffield has not established that he has standing to challenge those searches. See United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 333 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding that appellants did not have standing to challenge a warrant to search Facebook accounts belonging to the appellants’ co-conspirators who were not parties to the appeal).
17 Apple iPhone that was in Coffield’s possession when he was arrested on September
24, 2020 (the “iPhone Warrant”), for the period September 1 to 24, 2020.
(29) “The United States and Delaware Constitutions protect the right of
persons to be secure from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”51 The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.52
Thus, a search warrant must “be supported by probable cause and describe the places
and things to be searched with particularity.”53 Coffield asserts both probable cause
and particularity-based challenges to the warrants.
(30) To satisfy the probable cause requirement, a “warrant application must
contain sufficient facts—viewed under the totality of the circumstances—to allow a
neutral magistrate to conclude that there is a ‘fair probability’ both that a crime has
been committed and that evidence of that crime will be found in the particular place
51 Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 1060, 1063 (Del. 2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 6)). 52 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Del. Const. art. I, § 6 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”). 53 Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651, 661 (Del. 2024) (emphasis omitted).
18 identified in the warrant.”54 That is, in addition to facts sufficient to allow a judicial
officer to conclude that a crime occurred, the affidavit must articulate sufficient
probable cause to conclude that evidence will be found in a particular location—in
other words, the affidavit must “identif[y] a nexus between the evidence sought and
the place to be searched.”55
(31) A search warrant must also satisfy the particularity requirement, “which
is fundamental and performs its own work in protecting against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”56 To pass constitutional muster, the warrant itself must
describe the things to be seized and the places to be searched with as much
particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow.57 The warrant must authorize a
search that is no broader than the probable cause on which the warrant is based.58
(32) Turning to Coffield’s arguments in this case, we conclude that Coffield
has not demonstrated that he has standing to challenge the search of the cell phone.
“Only persons with standing may challenge the legality of a search or seizure.”59 “A
defendant bears the burden of proof of showing that he has standing to contest an
54 Id. at 661-62 (citations omitted); see also Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 16 (Del. 2018) (stating that the affidavit supporting a warrant application must contain facts adequate for a judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the property to be seized will be found in a particular place). 55 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662. 56 Id. 57 Id.; Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18; Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 305 (Del. 2016). 58 Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18; Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 299. 59 Cooper v. State, 2013 WL 5874813, at *2 (Del. Oct. 30, 2013).
19 unlawful search, and to have standing he must show that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the [property] searched.”60 In determining whether a
defendant has made such a showing as to a cell phone, courts have considered factors
such as ownership, possession, use, or an otherwise legitimate privacy interest in the
phone.61 Although Coffield had the iPhone at issue in his possession when he was
in the police car after he and Edwards were arrested together, the phone apparently
belonged to Edwards.62 On the record before the Court, we find no plain error as to
the cell phone search, based on Coffield’s failure to establish facts suggesting that
he has standing to challenge that search.
60 Washington v. State, 1994 WL 716044, at *2 (Del. Dec. 20, 1994). Cf. also State v. Mills, 2022 WL 17248930, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2022) (holding that defendant relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone that he abandoned in another person’s backyard and therefore would not have had standing to challenge a search of the phone, had his counsel filed a motion to suppress), aff’d, 2023 WL 5424824 (Del. Aug. 23, 2023). 61 See United States v. Gatson 744 F. App’x 97, 99-100 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that defendant lacked standing to seek suppression of information obtained from two cell phones—one that belonged to another person and a “burner phone not associated with any subscriber information but attributed to [the defendant by the government]”—because he did not establish that he personally held a legitimate expectation of privacy in either phone; did not claim that he ever possessed, used, or had any privacy interest in the burner phone; and the government’s attribution of the phone to the defendant did not meet the defendant’s burden to demonstrate his expectation of privacy in the phone); see also United States v. Beaudion, 979 F.3d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that defendant did not establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s cell phone and its location data, even though he purchased the phone, had permission to use it, accessed his Facebook account from the phone, and used the phone to capture intimate videos of himself and his girlfriend); United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 382 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that defendant had not met his burden to establish standing to challenge searches of phones belonging to others because he did not “assert that he owned, possessed, or used either of these cell phones; nor does he describe any other legitimate expectation of privacy in these phones or the [location information] obtained from them”). 62 See Appendix to Opening Brief at A2137.
20 (33) We also find no plain error as to the Instagram warrants. We address
Coffield’s probable cause and particularity arguments in turn.
(34) This Court gives great deference to the probable cause determination
made by the judicial officer who issued a warrant.63 The applications for both the
Federal Instagram Warrant and the State Instagram Warrant contained facts
sufficient to allow a judicial officer to conclude both that crimes had occurred and
that evidence of the crimes would be found in the targeted Instagram account. The
applications detailed the investigation of NorthPak and its deadly feud with rival
gangs; provided facts showing Coffield’s involvement; and explained in detail, with
specific examples and photos, how gang members including Coffield used Instagram
to promote NorthPak, communicate with other NorthPak members about criminal
activities, and taunt and disrespect rival gang members, leading to violence. The
factual details in these warrants create a much tighter nexus between the crimes and
Coffield’s Instagram account than did the “generalized suspicions” connecting the
defendant’s phone to the crime in Buckham.64 Coffield has not shown that the
63 Cooper v. State, 228 A.3d 399, 404 (Del. 2020); Buckham, 185 A.3d at 16. 64 See Buckham, 185 A.3d at 17 (holding that statement that “criminals often communicate through cellular phones” and allegation that, after an arrest warrant had been issued for Buckham’s arrest, he posted on social media about getting arrested did not provide a substantial basis to support a probable cause finding). In contrast, and much more akin to the circumstances here, see United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2024), in which the affidavits supporting the search warrants at issue showed a gang’s use of Facebook in the criminal enterprise.
21 judicial officers who issued the warrants erred in finding probable cause to issue the
warrants.
(35) We also find no plain error as to the requirements that a warrant
describe the items to be searched for and seized with as much particularity as the
circumstances reasonably allow and be no broader than the probable cause on which
it is based.65 This Court’s case law addressing particularity and overbreadth in the
context of digital searches has centered on warrants to search electronic devices,
such as smartphones and computers,66 rather than on online platforms such as social
media accounts. As we observed in Buckham and Taylor, echoing the United States
Supreme Court’s observations in Riley v. California,67 smartphones store an
unprecedented volume of private information, and a top-to-bottom search of a
smartphone can permit the government access to far more than the most exhaustive
search of a house.68 Smartphones “collect in one place many distinct types of
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.”69 For purposes of our
65 See Buckham, 185 A.3d at 16 (“As for Buckham’s challenge to the warrant’s particularity and breadth, we review those questions de novo. But because he did not raise this challenge in the Superior Court, we will take notice of an error only if it is plain.” (citation omitted)). 66 E.g., Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651, 655 (Del. 2024), Thomas v. State, 305 A.3d 683, 687 (Del. 2023); Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 604 (Del. 2021); Buckham, 185 A.3d at 4; Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 284. 67 573 U.S. 373, 396-97 (2014). 68 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 613; Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18. 69 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 613 (alteration and internal quotation to Riley, 573 U.S. at 394, omitted)).
22 analysis, we have considered our precedents addressing warrants as to electronic
devices and case law from other jurisdictions addressing warrants as to social media
accounts.
(36) The Instagram warrants at issue here differ in important respects from
those in the cases in which we have found that warrants to search smartphones lacked
particularity or, more specifically, were so overbroad as to constitute general
warrants. Of those precedents, we focus on three recent decisions: Taylor, Terreros,
and Thomas.
(37) Taylor is the most factually similar to this case—among other crimes,
Taylor was convicted of the gang-related murder of Brandon Wingo, in an earlier
phase of the gang war underlying Coffield’s convictions.70 We reversed Taylor’s
conviction, holding that a warrant to search two smartphones was an unconstitutional
general warrant, and the Superior Court therefore erred by denying Taylor’s motion
to suppress evidence collected from the smartphones.71 We determined that the
warrant could have limited the search to the categories of data “tied specifically to
70 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 605-06. Hand gestures signifying disrespect to Wingo were among the signs that NorthPak members used to communicate their alliance with NorthPak and taunt MGS, and MGS similarly used hand gestures paying homage to Wingo to represent their gang and taunt NorthPak. 71 Id. at 604.
23 the probable cause supporting the warrant” and to a relevant time frame, but failed
to do so.72
(38) In Terreros, this Court held that a warrant to search the defendant’s cell
phone was an unconstitutional general warrant and reversed his conviction for sexual
offenses against a child.73 We observed that, “[a]lthough the only nexus between
the alleged crime and the phone was Terreros’s internet history,” the warrant
authorized police to search his “messages, messaging apps, photos, videos, internet
search history, GPS coordinates, and incoming and outgoing calls.”74 Moreover, the
“warrant did not identify any dates limiting the scope of the search,” even though
the application sought authorization to search data from only a five-day period.75
(39) In Thomas, the Court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that a warrant obtained in a stalking investigation was
overbroad but not general because it identified the specific types of data to be
searched and those categories were supported by probable cause.76 As we stated in
Terreros about Thomas, “[c]ritically, we also held that the phone was an
72 Id. at 616; see also id. (“Although the record is not entirely clear, investigators apparently extracted almost all data from Taylor’s smartphones from an eleven-year time span, and then searched without restriction for evidence of criminal conduct.”). 73 312 A.3d at 655. Like Taylor, Terreros sought suppression in the Superior Court. Id. at 657- 58. 74 Id. at 655. 75 Id. 76 305 A.3d at 702.
24 instrumentality in the stalking crime.”77 Specifically as to this point, in Thomas we
distinguished Wheeler, Buckham, and Taylor and wrote:
We invalidated the warrants in Wheeler, Buckham, and Taylor because investigators had a more precise description of the places to be searched than was provided in the warrant, and there was nothing in those cases to support an inference that evidence would have been found in the less precise locations which the warrants authorized law enforcement to search. Therefore, the warrants in those cases authorized unconstitutional exploratory rummaging. Here, the basis for searching Thomas’s Pink iPhone, and certain sections of the device, is apparent from Detective Herrera-Cortes’s affidavit. The Pink iPhone was believed to be the instrument of the crime of Stalking. In other words, law enforcement had reason to believe that the phone number associated with the Pink iPhone belonged to Thomas and had been used to contact the victims via phone calls, text messages, and messaging on social media applications.78
We also distinguished Wheeler, Buckham, and Taylor on the basis that the Thomas
warrant contained an eleven-month temporal limitation, concluding that “[a]lthough
this time frame surpassed that supported by probable cause in [the supporting]
affidavit, it was not unmoored from the facts of the case.”79
(40) So, were the Federal Instagram Warrant and the State Instagram
Warrant so overbroad and lacking in particularity that the admission of evidence
from Coffield’s Instagram account constitutes plain error? They were not.
77 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 667. 78 Thomas, 305 A.3d at 702-03 (citations omitted). 79 Id. at 703. As other courts have observed, a broader criminal enterprise may support a search of broader scope. E.g., United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 338-340 (4th Cir. 2024).
25 (41) First, both warrants included temporal limitations that were well
supported by the probable cause on which the warrants were based. The Federal
Instagram Warrant, which the magistrate judge issued on September 18, 2020,
directed Facebook Inc. to disclose to the government information for the period July
29 to September 18, 2020.80 The supporting affidavit included specific examples—
involving Coffield’s Instagram account, and within the date range authorized by the
search warrant, indicating that Coffield’s Instagram data from that period contained
evidence of criminal activity.81 The State Instagram Warrant, which a Superior
Court judge issued on February 26, 2021, authorized Wilmington police to seize the
“entire contents” of Coffield’s Instagram account from September 15 to 24, 2020.82
Like the affidavit supporting the Federal Instagram Warrant, the affidavit supporting
the State Instagram Warrant included specific examples—involving Coffield’s
Instagram account, and within the date range authorized by the search warrant—
indicating that Coffield’s Instagram data from that period contained evidence of
illegal gang participation and possession of guns and stolen cars. 83 The temporal
80 App. to State Response at B28, B32. 81 Id. at B14–15 (example from July 29, 2020); id. at B16-19 (examples from August 7-September 2, 2020); see also id. at B19-21 (providing examples of use of the Instagram account between September 14 and 18, 2020, and how additional data might assist law enforcement in apprehending Coffield). 82 Id. at B41–42. 83 Id. at B60–62.
26 limitations in both warrants are significant and are well tailored to the probable cause
supporting the warrants.
(42) As to the breadth of the categories of data to be seized from
Facebook/Instagram and searched, it is not clear that the warrants imposed any
limitations. As noted above, the State Instagram Warrant applied to the “entire
contents” of the account. The Federal Instagram Warrant lists seventeen categories
of information that Facebook Inc. was required to disclose—the categories cover a
vast range of data types, and it is not clear what data from the account would be
beyond the warrant’s scope, if any.84 But as compared to Wheeler, Buckham, Taylor,
and Terreros, the facts in the probable-cause affidavits here support a search of a
much broader range of data categories within the Instagram account. The affidavits
detailed how NorthPak and Coffield used Instagram Live, location tagging, the
posting of pictures and videos, comments, direct messaging, and account naming
(and the changing of account names) to further their illegal gang activities and other
crimes. Indeed, the facts here arguably support the conclusion that Coffield’s
Instagram account was an instrumentality of Coffield’s gang participation.85
Coffield has not identified which categories of data within the Instagram account
were purportedly beyond the scope of the probable cause established by the warrant
84 Id. at B28–30. 85 See supra ¶ 39 (discussing use of phone as instrumentality of stalking in Thomas).
27 applications. In the circumstances of this case, we find no plain error as to the
Instagram warrants.86
(43) We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that, with the
exception of the PFBPP issue addressed on page 15 of this order, Coffield’s appeal
is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. We also are
satisfied that Coffield’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the
record and has properly determined that Coffield could not raise another meritorious
claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the matter is REMANDED to
the Superior Court for correction of the record and sentencing order to reflect
dismissal of two of the counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited; the
judgment of the Superior Court is otherwise AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw
is moot. Jurisdiction is not retained.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice
86 Cf. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th at 338-39 (holding that warrants to search gang members’ Facebook accounts were not insufficiently particularized, and stating that the “wide-ranging nature of the sex trafficking conspiracy under investigation further mitigates any concern that the scope of the warrant was impermissibly broad” and “the affidavit showed how the conspirators were using Facebook extensively to communicate with co-conspirators, victims, and customers in furtherance of the conspiracy”); State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 598-99, 601-02 (Minn. 2024) (holding that warrant authorizing search of “all content” of defendant’s Facebook account from April 1, 2019 to June 24, 2019 was sufficiently particularized, although it “approache[d] the outer edge of the particularity requirement”).