Coffield Motor Washer Co. v. Wayne Mfg. Co.

255 F. 558, 166 C.C.A. 626, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1242
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedNovember 11, 1918
DocketNos. 5133, 5134
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 255 F. 558 (Coffield Motor Washer Co. v. Wayne Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coffield Motor Washer Co. v. Wayne Mfg. Co., 255 F. 558, 166 C.C.A. 626, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1242 (8th Cir. 1918).

Opinion

STONE, Circuit Judge.

From overruling of ¡mutual exceptions to report of master in a patent accounting, both parties appeal. The infringing device was a small water-operated motor used upon washtubs. The master’s report recommended recovery of profits of $1,-796.75.

[1] Defendants contend that a statement of account rendered by them under equity rule No. 63, having met no formal exceptions from complainant, must be accepted as final, and, as that account showed no profits, the recovery should be nominal damages. This contention is not well taken. Equity rule No. 63 is as follows:

“Form of Accounts Before 'Master. — All parties accounting before a master shall bring in their respective accounts, in the form, of debtor and creditor; and any of the other parties who shall not bo satisfied with the account so [560]*560brought in shall he at liberty to examine the accounting party viva voce, or upon interrogatories, as the master shall direct.” 198 Fed. xxxvii, 115 C. C. A. xxxvii; Compiled St. 1916, p. 2523; 2 U. S. St. Ann. 534.

The evident and beneficent purpose of this rule was to narrow the scope of the examination before the master. Beckwith v. Range Co. (D. C.) 207 Fed. 848; In re Beckwith, 203 Fed. 45, 121 C. C. A. 381. Often a plaintiff would be willing to accept many items of such an account, thus eliminating them from further controversy or proof. At the same time he is left free to examine the defendant upon any or all of the items if he objects thereto. We do not find in the rule, however, any mandatory requirement that such objections take any particular form. In our judgment, the construction which will make the rule most effective in shortening accountings, and at the same time safeguard the interests of the parties, is as follows: After the account has been filed with the master he may require the plaintiff within a reasonable time to specify the items thereon to which there is objection, and may treat as accepted any items not so specified, confining tire proof to the objectionable items. This we deem in harmony with the purposes of equity rule No. 63, and within the powers of the master as defiped in equity rule No. 62, 198 Fed. xxxvi, 115 C. C. A. xxxvi (Compiled St. 1916, p. 2522; 2 U. S. St. Ann. 533).

Oefendants conducted a large business, of which the tub-motor-fixture portion was but a minor part. As to that portion, the custom was to sell the combined unit of motor, tub, and attaching fixture for a single price, though there were instances of separate sales of the tubs and of the motors.

[2, 3] Defendants contend that the burden of apportionment of profits is on complainant; that such burden has not been sustained, and therefore only nominal damages can be recovered. The contention that the burden of showing apportionment is on complainant is true. This duty is often one of making a prima facie case of profit, casting the real burden upon defendant to make apportionment. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U. S. 604, 32 Sup. Ct. 691, 56 L. Ed. 1222, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 653. But this contention carries no force here, as the apportionment is sufficiently clear. All doubts should be resolved in complainant’s favor, for the infringement has been declared by this court to have been deliberate. Wayne Mfg. Co. v. Coffield Motor Washer Co., 227 Fed. 987, 997, 142 C. C. A. 445.

[4] The next challenge is to the separation of the fixtures or accessories from the motors. As to this the master regarded the ordinary sales unit as composed of three distinct elements: The tub, the motor, and the attaching fixture. Complainant claims that the fixture owed its existence and only use to the infringing motor, was therefore purely accessory thereto, and any profits therefrom should follow the motor.

The evidence discloses that portions of the fixtures, to wit, the dolly parts (dolly dasher, shaft, and collar) could be and were used in connection with any power-operated' tub, whether the infringing motor or some other were used, and that the other portions of the [561]*561fixture were useful only in connection with this style motor. The profit from the latter should go to the complainant; that from the dolly parts should not.

There is no attack upon the master’s finding of $48,707.62, as the total sales of units containing the infringing motors after all proper allowances for returns and collection losses. But both parties claim error as to items included or excluded by the master in arriving at the cost price of the different elements of the unit.

Complainant contends: (1) That the tub cost allowed was too high. (2) That an item ($391.11) for experimental work in connection with the infringing motor should have been rejected. (3) That an item ($958.50) of overhead expense apportioned to the motor business as “capital investment” should have been rejected.

Defendants contend: (1) That the motor labor cost was improperly reduced from $5,391.99 to $3,172.14. (2) That an item ($119.43) for patterns was improperly rejected. (3) That an item ($957.60) for experimental, shop labor was improperly rejected. (4) That an item ($1,041.99) for advertising was improperly rejected.

[5, 6] Regarding these different items in the master’s report to which the parties object: That of the allowance of experimental labor of $391.11, included with patterns in the item, “Cost of tools and patterns (Ferd Messmer & Co.) $973.56,” should have been rejected, as the testimony is not sufficiently clear that this expenditure was made upon the infringing motors alone. The testimony shows experiments with other water motors which defendants were developing, while the infringed motor was a finished, workable article before the infringement began. The infringing motor was manufactured for and not by defendants, who bought the parts and simply put them together and tested them (the labor for which is covered in another allowance). With this reduction the balance of the item is not contested, and is allowed for $582.45. The item of “Capital investment, $958.50,” allowed by the master, is rejected. This item was to cover apportionment of interest at rate of 10 per cent, on capital stock of $30,000, representing what was deemed a fair manufacturing return upon the capital stock. This should be rejected for two reasons: First, it would amount to a species of profit, and the infringer should' be permitted no profit from any source arising out of the infringement; second, a consideration of the amount of money used in connection with the infringing business and a consideration of the interest allowance (from borrowed money) included in the overhead, which was apportioned, show that sufficient allowance has already been made in the interest item.

Based on yearly sales and average yearly prices, motors averaged defendant in cost $2.39. The testimony also is that the average stock of motors carried by defendant was a supply for 2 or 3 months. During the 61 months of the infringement 5,266 motors were bought and sold by defendant. Defendant carried no long accounts thereon, as practically all bills to it were paid within the discount period. It is certainly sufficiently liberal to> allow during the infringing period an average carried supply of 216 motors, or 2% months’ supply. At [562]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co.
58 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. New York, 1944)
Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co.
94 F.2d 567 (Second Circuit, 1938)
Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co.
13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colorado, 1935)
Levin Bros. v. Davis Mfg. Co.
72 F.2d 163 (Eighth Circuit, 1934)
Duro Co. (Of Ohio) v. Duro Co. (Of New Jersey)
56 F.2d 313 (Third Circuit, 1932)
Carson v. American Smelting & Refining Co.
25 F.2d 116 (W.D. Washington, 1928)
Producers' & Refiners' Corp. v. Lehmann
18 F.2d 492 (Eighth Circuit, 1927)
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Deere & Webber Co.
284 F. 331 (Eighth Circuit, 1922)
Armstrong v. Belding Bros. & Co.
280 F. 895 (D. Connecticut, 1922)
W. W. Sly Mfg. Co. v. Pangborn Corp.
276 F. 971 (D. Maryland, 1921)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
255 F. 558, 166 C.C.A. 626, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coffield-motor-washer-co-v-wayne-mfg-co-ca8-1918.