Coe v. Johnson

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 10, 1993
• Docket: CV-92-500-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Coe v. Johnson CV-92-500-B 05/10/93

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Cathy R. Coe

v. Civil No. 92-500-B

Peter A. Johnson, et al.

O R D E R

This Bankruptcy Court appeal arises from a December 16, 1987

state court Order issued in connection with the parties' divorce.

Among other things, this Order obligated the debtor to make

certain monthly payments to his former wife. When the debtor

later filed for bankruptcy, his former wife commenced a

proceeding in Bankruptcy Court seeking a determination that the

debtor's obligation to make the payments was a non-dischargeable

obligation for "maintenance" or "support" within the meaning of

11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) .1 The parties filed cross motions for

111 U.S.C. § 523(a) states in pertinent part: A discharge under Section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b) or 1328 (b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with summary judgment on the issue and the debtor appealed when the

Bankruptcy Court granted his former wife's motion.

I. Discussion

Bankruptcy Rule 7056, upon which the court's summary

judgment ruling was based, incorporates Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, in accordance with Rule 56(c),

the Bankruptcy Court may not make determinations as to genuinely

disputed material facts in a summary judgment motion. See

generally Clay v. EquiFax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 956 (11th Cir.

1985) ("the phrase 'findings of fact' is often loosely used in

connection with Rule 56. It is, however, a phrase singularly

inappropriate because a premise of Rule 56 is that there is no

genuine issue as to material facts. . . ."). Because the

Bankruptcy Court must rule on a motion for summary judgment based

on issues of law only, the District Court's review of a ruling on

such a motion is plenary. See In re G .S .F . Corp., 938 F.2d 1467,

state or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that . . . such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. . . .

2 1474 (1st Cir. 1991) .

In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment in the

present case, the Bankruptcy Court correctly applied federal law

to the guestion of whether the debtor's obligation to his former

wife was dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d

759, 762 (3rd Cir. 1990); Adams v. Zentz, 963 F.2d 197, 199 (8th

Cir. 1992). The court also correctly concluded that the

dischargeability of a debt incurred in a divorce proceeding will

depend in the first instance upon "whether the state court or the

parties to the divorce intended to create an obligation to

provide support through the assumption of the joint debts." Coe

v. Johnson, Bk. No. 89-1125, slip op. at 12, (Bankr. D.N.H. July

24, 1992) (guoting In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir.

1983) (emphasis in original); see also Gianakas, 917 F.2d at 762;

Adams, 963 F.2d at 200; Palm v. Palm, 1992 U.S. Ap p . LEXIS 18025

*4 (10th Cir. 1992); Matter of Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1296-97

(5th Cir. 1991) .

The sole error in the Bankruptcy Court's carefully reasoned

opinion is that it treated its inguiry into the intention of the

state divorce court and the parties as raising a guestion of law

rather than an issue of fact. As cases in other jurisdictions

have recognized, the intention of the state court and the parties

3 in claims based upon 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) is a fact to be found

rather than a legal conclusion to be drawn. Adams, 963 F.2d at

200 ("In deciding whether to characterize an award as maintenance

or support, 'the crucial issue is the function the award was

intended to serve.' This is a guestion of fact to be decided by

the bankruptcy court." (citation omitted)); In re Troup, 730 F.2d

464, 466 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Gianakas, 917 F.2d at 762.

Although the parties do not characterize their disagreement

as a factual dispute, their arguments turn on the inferences that

the Bankruptcy Court should draw from the evidence regarding the

state divorce court's intentions. Thus, their arguments concern

a disputed material fact which cannot be resolved through motions

for summary judgment. Moreover, although I agree with the

Bankruptcy Court's analysis of the issue, the conclusion it

reached is not the only one which a rational finder of fact could

reach from the evidence in this case. Accordingly, because the

facts would reasonably permit a finder of fact to reach different

conclusions with respect to the inferences which may reasonably

be drawn from the evidence on the issue of intention, the court

could not properly grant summary judgment to either party. See,

e.g., Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. Dept, of Housing, 768

F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1985).

4 II. Conclusion

The Bankruptcy Court's order granting summary judgment to

the appellee is vacated and the case is remanded to the

Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this

order.2

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

May 10, 1993

cc: Clerk, US Bankruptcy Court-NH John Rachel, Esg. Joseph Foster, Esg. Dennis Bezanson, Esg. Kenneth Churbuck, Esg. Edwinna Vanderzanden, Esg.

2In the interest of preventing unnecessary litigation on the subject, I note that if the case had been before me on the same record after appeal from a decision on the merits, I would not find that the Bankruptcy Court's findings on the issue of intention were clearly erroneous.