Cody Wommack v. City of Lone Star, Texas, Brianna McClain, Cyndi Andrews, Lesa Beard, Carrie McGinnis, Dawn Ferguson, and Keith Reiter

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00095-CV

CODY WOMMACK, Appellant

V.

CITY OF LONE STAR, TEXAS, BRIANNA MCCLAIN, CYNDI ANDREWS, LESA BEARD, CARRIE MCGINNIS, DAWN FERGUSON, AND KEITH REITER, Appellees

On Appeal from the 276th District Court Morris County, Texas

Trial Court No. 28,088

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cody Wommack appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his live petition against the City of Lone Star, Texas, and its officials, Brianna McClain, Cyndi Andrews, Lesa Beard, Carrie McGinnis, Dawn Ferguson, and Keith Reiter. Because we find that Wommack lacked standing to file his lawsuit, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. I. We Examine the Petition to Determine if Wommack Has Standing “Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). “A court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it.” Id. “Thus, if a plaintiff lacks standing to assert one of his claims, the court lacks jurisdiction over that claim and must dismiss it.” Id. “Similarly, if the plaintiff lacks standing to bring any of his claims, the court must dismiss the whole action for want of jurisdiction.” Id. at 150–51. “Whether a trial court possesses jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. 2011).

“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. Texas has “adopted the federal requirements for standing.” Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154–55). Typically, “a plaintiff must show . . . an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” as the first step to demonstrate standing. Id. (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154–55). However, applicable here is a “limited exception to the particularized-injury rule that confers standing on

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taxpayers who seek injunctive relief to prevent the illegal expenditure of public funds.” S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307–08 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court has “called such suits ‘drastic’ and have required a plaintiff pursuing one to ‘bring himself strictly within the established rules.’” Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191, 199 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Osborne v. Keith, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1944)).

“Properly construed, taxpayer standing ‘provides important protection to the public from the illegal expenditure of public funds without hampering too severely the workings of the government.’” Id. (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. 2000)). “Taxpayer standing is generally limited to plaintiffs who can show ‘(1) that the plaintiff is a taxpayer; and (2) that the public funds are being expended on an allegedly illegal activity.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001)). “A taxpayer does not have an interest direct enough to warrant standing unless the activity challenged involves an expenditure of public funds that would not otherwise be made.” Id. (quoting Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 139 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam)).

We do not review the merits of a plaintiff’s claim when reviewing whether the plaintiff has standing. Id. at 198. This is because taxpayer standing “involves not the viability of the pleaded claim but the nature of the injury alleged.” Id. The analysis of whether a plaintiff has standing “requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S 118 (2014)).

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II. A Review of Wommack’s Petition At all times, Wommack has represented himself pro se in his lawsuit against the City and its officials. In his live petition, Wommack complains of an upgrade to a City water pipeline from four inches to six inches. Wommack said that at a March 3, 2025, city council meeting, Jerry Dorough, a City employee, said that a four-inch water pipe “had been sitting out in the sun for four years” and that Beau Daniels with Rafter L Services, a contractor for the City, “spoke extensively saying that it was a safety and public health issue and that the existing 4-inch line would have to be replaced whether it was replaced with a new 4-inch line or a new 6-inch water line due to sun damage.”

Wommack alleged that the City was “in the process of expending over $250,000[.00] in public funds to install a 6-inch water line upgrade for the purpose of serving Serenity,” a gated housing development, which was outside the City’s limits but within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. According to Wommack’s second amended petition, the City had voted to allow Dusty Ansley, the owner of the company developing Serenity, to connect to the City’s 6-inch water line and that Ansley “suggested he might allow annexation” of Serenity by the City. Wommack also said that Ansley had dedicated the utility lines within Serenity to the City, but that this was “liability disguised as generosity.” Wommack alleged that Ansley was the mayor’s stepmother’s first cousin.

In support of his petition, Wommack attached a Water Supply Contract for Serenity between the City and the Water District showing that the City receives treated water from the Northeast Texas Municipal Water District (Water District). Pursuant to the Water Supply

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Contract, which was executed in 2024, the Water District agreed to supply water to Serenity. In exchange, the City agreed to compensate the Water District “regardless of any third party to whom the cost of such service is passed along.” The Water Supply Contract would terminate should the City annex Serenity.

Wommack also attached an Equipment and Line Dedication Agreement between Serenity’s developer, AnsleyD, LLC, and the City showing that (1) the “Developer ha[d] designed, installed, and paid for the construction of certain water lines, mains, and related infrastructure (collectively, the “Water Facilities” or “Facilities”) located within the subdivision known as Serenity”; (2) “the Developer desire[d] to transfer and dedicate ownership, control, and responsibility for the Water Facilities to the City”; and (3) the “Developer wishe[d] to dedicate, deliver, transfer, and assign such water infrastructure to the City, and the City wishe[d] to take title to such infrastructure.” In exchange for the Water Facilities, the City agreed to “integrate the Water Facilities into its municipal water utility and provide water service to the residents and businesses within the subdivision in accordance with its established rates, rules, and regulations.”

Even though Wommack’s petition said that “the 6-inch line that [was] being ‘donated’ by Serenity or Dusty Ansley,” Wommack alleged that the $250,000.00 expenditure “serve[d] no legitimate public purpose.”1 According to Wommack, the City awarded a contract without a bidding process and did not lawfully authorize anyone to execute the contract, but Wommack did not specify which contract he alleged was unlawful. The live petition said Wommack was

1 Wommack also alleged a future injury in that the Serenity project “would use up most of the remaining capacity of the City’s above ground water tower” and the City would “have to begin planning for a new tower after the addition of Serenity.”

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bringing his suit “to halt these illegal acts and to obtain declaratory relief confirming that the City has no legal obligation to provide water to Serenity, and that the use of public funds for [that] purpose is unconstitutional” because the City could not “grant public money or thing[s] of value in aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever.” III. Wommack’s Petition Shows That He Lacks Standing Here, we assume that Wommack is a taxpayer and focus our inquiry on whether his pleadings show “that public funds are being expended on the allegedly illegal activity.” Andrade, 372 S.W.3d at 137 (quoting Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179). The Texas Supreme Court has stated that “to establish taxpayer standing a plaintiff must plead facts showing that the government is actually spending money on the allegedly illegal activity—not on a related legal activity.” Id. at 138 (citing Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 182–83). “This must be a measurable, added expenditure—not one that would have been made in spite of the allegedly illegal activity.” Id. (citing Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 182). “The plaintiff must be able to allege that the challenged activity ‘is supported by any separate tax or paid for from any particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the [challenged activity].’” Id. (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952)). “Unless a plaintiff can meet these requirements, there has not been a pecuniary injury to the taxpayers generally and the taxpayer’s interest is not direct enough for his suit to proceed.” Id.

Here, Wommack alleged in his petition that the City was in the process of expending over $250,000.00 in public funds to install a 6-inch water line upgrade. Wommack’s petition does not show that the funds were supported by a tax or any particular appropriation that was allegedly

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illegal. Rather, Wommack alleged that fixing the City’s pipeline was illegal because it would benefit Serenity. However, Wommack’s petition also shows that the City would pass along the cost of the water supplied by the Water District to the owners of the Serenity lots and that the City had an existing contract to provide water to Serenity in exchange for Serenity’s dedication of its Water Facilities. Wommack did not allege in his petition that the City did not follow the necessary procedures to enter into either the Water Supply Contract or the Equipment and Line Dedication Agreement. Most importantly, Wommack’s petition itself established that the upgrade was to a City pipeline that was damaged and was in need of repair because not doing so would pose a public health danger.

To meet the narrow taxpayer standing exception, “a taxpayer must demonstrate that the expenditure is illegal rather than merely ‘unwise or indiscreet.’” Lomas, 223 S.W.3d at 308 (quoting Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 180). The Texas Supreme Court has expressly stated that “[a] taxpayer does not have an interest direct enough to warrant standing unless the activity challenged involves an expenditure of public funds that would not otherwise be made.” Perez, 653 S.W.3d at 199 (quoting Andrade, 372 S.W.3d at 139). It is not sufficient for a taxpayer to simply “point to costs that would have been incurred regardless of the allegedly illegal activity,” but this is exactly what Wommack’s petition does. Andrade, 372 S.W.3d at 139. Because Wommack’s petition shows that the City had to expend the funds to repair its own damaged City water pipe as a matter of public health, Wommack has not shown that the expenditure would not have otherwise been made. As a result, Wommack has not established that he has standing to sue the City or its officials in this case.

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For this reason, we find the trial court’s dismissal of Wommack’s claims proper.

IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Scott E. Stevens

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: August 18, 2026 Date Decided: August 27, 2026