Cody v. County of San Joaquin

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 11, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-02318
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NICHOLAS CODY, SKYLAR CODY, No. 2:23-cv-02318-TLN-CSK KAYCIE CODY, individually and as 12 guardian ad litem for her minor children K.S.-1 and K.S.-2, 13 ORDER Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, et al., 16 Defendants. 17

18 This matter is before the Court on three separate motions: (1) Defendants Lazaro 19 Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), Charlie Foo (“Foo”), and Rachel Apodaca’s (“Apodaca”) (collectively, 20 “Individual Defendants1”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30); (2) Defendant County of San 21 Joaquin’s (“County”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28); and (3) the County and Individual 22 Defendants’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Strike (ECF No. 29). Each motion has been 23 fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 33–38.) 24 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 25 Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss, and 26

27 1 The Court notes that while Defendant Claudette Butman (“Butman”) was named as a defendant in the instant action, Butman has not been served or made an appearance in the matter 28 and is not a party to the instant motions. 1 GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike. 2 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 On October 13, 2023, Plaintiffs Nicholas Cody (“Nicholas”), Kaycie Cody (“Kaycie”), 4 and Skylar Cody (“Skylar”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced the instant action pro se 5 alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against Defendants for alleged false 6 statements made to San Joaquin County Dependency Court that resulted in the removal and 7 detention of Nicholas’s and Kaycie’s minor children, Skylar, V.C., K.S.-1, and K.S.-2. (ECF No. 8 1.) Individual Defendants were social workers who were involved in various aspects of the 9 investigations into allegations against Nicholas and Kaycie. (See generally ECF No. 24.) 10 On January 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4.) On 11 February 1, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 12.) 12 Thereafter, Plaintiffs retained counsel, and on March 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative 13 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 24.) In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege the following 14 § 1983 claims: 15 1. Claim One alleges violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 16 specifically violations of the right to familial association, against Foo and Gonzalez 17 and arises from the warrantless removal of V.C. (“Claim 1A”) and the detention of 18 Skylar, K.S.-1 and K.S.-2 (“Claim 1B”); 19 2. Claim Two alleges a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, specifically 20 judicial deception, against Foo, Gonzalez, Butman and Apodaca, and arises from 21 alleged falsification of evidence, misrepresentations, and omission of exculpatory 22 evidence; 23 3. Claim Three alleges a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Gonzalez, 24 Butman, and Apodaca, and arises from alleged failures to notify Nicholas of medical 25 and dental examinations of Skylar and provide Nicholas with an opportunity to be 26 present during the examinations; 27 4. Claim Four alleges a violation of the First Amendment against Foo, Gonzalez, 28 Butman, and Apodaca and arises from actions alleged to have been taken in retaliation 1 for Nicholas and Kaycie having obtained a reversal of previously substantiated 2 allegations lodged against them; 3 5. Claim Five alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment against Foo, Gonzalez, 4 Butman and Apodaca and arises from alleged falsification of evidence, 5 misrepresentations, and omission of exculpatory evidence; and 6 6. Claim Six alleges a Monell claim against the County for customs and practices that 7 allegedly violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 24 at 52– 8 85.) 9 On April 20, 2024, Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 30), County 10 filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 28), and Defendants filed a motion to strike (ECF No. 29). 11 The Court will address each motion in turn. 12 II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS 13 A. Standard of Law 14 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 16 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 17 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 19 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 20 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 21 citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 22 discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 23 of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 24 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 25 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 26 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 27 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 28 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 1 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 2 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 3 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 5 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 6 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 7 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 8 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 9 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 10 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 11 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 12 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 13 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 14 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 15 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 16 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 17 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 18 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 19 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 20 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 21 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 22 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 23 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 24 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 25 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 26 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 27 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 28 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 1 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 2 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 3 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 4 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” 5 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 6 Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 7 B. Analysis 8 The two pending motions to dismiss contain distinct arguments. The Court will first 9 address Defendants’ request for judicial notice and then address the arguments from each motion 10 separately. 11 i. Request for Judicial Notice 12 As a threshold matter, Defendants seek judicial notice of summaries of unpublished cases 13 cited in Plaintiff’s SAC and three sets of documents: (1) Exhibit A, which are copies of the two 14 orders and the judgment in Nastic v. County of San Joaquin, et al., No. 2:11-CV-02521-JAM- 15 GGH (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2012); (2) Exhibit B, which is a copy of the docket for County of San 16 Joaquin v. L.J., Third Appellate District Court of Appeal Case No. C095267; and (3) Exhibit C, 17 which is a copy of the unpublished opinion of the Third Appellate District Court of Appeal in San 18 Joaquin County Human Services Agency v. N.C., No. C096684 (2013). (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiffs 19 did not oppose Defendants’ request for judicial notice. 20 The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are “generally known within the trial 21 court’s territorial jurisdiction” or can be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose 22 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “A federal court may ‘take 23 notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 24 proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Schulze v. FBI, No. 1:05–CV–0180- 25 AWI-GSA, 2010 WL 2902518, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (quoting United States v. Black, 26 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). However, Defendants fail to persuade the Court that their 27 summaries of the unpublished cases cited in Plaintiff’s SAC or Exhibits A–C have any bearing on 28 whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged their claims, and the Court has not relied on those 1 documents in its ruling. 2 Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED. 3 ii. Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 4 In their motion, Individual Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiffs’ first, second, fourth, and fifth 5 claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) Plaintiffs’ third claim fails to allege any 6 participation by Individual Defendants; and (3) Plaintiffs’ fifth claim is duplicative of Plaintiffs’ 7 second claim.2 (ECF No. 30 at 2.) The Court will address Individual Defendants’ arguments in 8 turn. 9 a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 10 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in 11 federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeking 12 federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th 13 Cir. 2013). The doctrine only applies if an “action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state 14 court decision.” Id. A de facto appeal exists when “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an 15 allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based 16 on that decision.” Id. (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). In contrast, if 17 “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse 18

19 2 Individual Defendants also argue all claims asserted by Skylar should be dismissed because he lacks capacity to sue. (ECF No. 30 at 14–15.) In opposition, Plaintiffs suggest Skylar 20 is now an adult and assert the reference to him being 10 years old in 2017 was a scrivener error. (ECF No. 35 at 6-7.) Because the Court grants in part Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 21 with leave to amend, the Court finds this error can and should be amended by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to all claims 22 asserted by Skylar with leave to amend. Should Plaintiffs not clarify that Skylar is an adult in any 23 amended complaint or should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint, all claims alleged by Skylar will be dismissed. 24 Similarly, in each motion to dismiss, Defendants argue all claims asserted by Kacie as 25 guardian ad litem should be dismissed because she has not been appointed as guardian ad litem. (ECF No. 28 at 12–13; ECF No. 30 at 14–15.) On January 31, 2025, this Court ordered Plaintiffs 26 to file an application for Kaycie to be appointed guardian ad litem for K.S.-1 and K.S.-2. (ECF 27 No. 39.) On February 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for appointment of Kaycie Cody as guardian ad litem, which was granted by the Court. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument 28 is moot. 1 party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). “Thus, 2 even if a plaintiff seeks relief from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto 3 appeal only if the plaintiff also alleges a legal error by the state court.” Id. (emphasis in original). 4 Individual Defendants argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from 5 adjudicating Plaintiffs’ first, second, fourth, and fifth claims because the claims are inextricably 6 intertwined with issues already decided by the San Joaquin County Dependency Court. (ECF No. 7 30 at 6–13.) Specifically, Individual Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ claims essentially seek review 8 of the dependency court’s decisions by challenging the court’s jurisdictional findings and 9 decisions. (Id. at 6–7.) In support of their argument, Individual Defendants cite to multiple 10 district court cases where claims of judicial deception based on allegations of false evidence by 11 social workers in dependency proceedings were dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 12 (Id. at 7–10 (citing Thomas v. County of San Diego, No. 3:18-cv-924-BTM-DEB, 2021 WL 13 8014326 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2021); Ragan v. County of Humboldt HHS, No. 16-cv-05580-RS, 14 2017 WL 878083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017); Ismail v. County of Orange, No. SACV 10-00901 15 VBF (AJW), 2012 WL 3644170 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012)).) 16 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because their 17 claims do not stem from a state court judgment but rather from the conduct of Individual 18 Defendants, such as judicial deception and fabrication of evidence. (ECF No. 35 at 11.) 19 Plaintiffs contend the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow doctrine and is confined to cases 20 where state court losers complain of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the 21 district court proceedings commenced. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiffs further argue their claims are not a 22 de facto appeal of a state court judgment, as there was no adverse judgment entered against them 23 in the juvenile dependency proceedings, which were dismissed. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiffs argue 24 Individual Defendants’ reliance on the cited cases is misplaced, as the cited cases involve claims 25 stemming from adverse state court judgments. (Id. at 15, 21.) 26 The Court agrees with Plaintiffs — the cases cited by Individual Defendants are 27 distinguishable and unpersuasive. In Ismail, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief consisting of, 28 in relevant part, an order reinstating parental rights and/or enforcing visitation rights for plaintiff 1 with her son or, in the alternative, an order granting review of her consolidated appeals 2 challenging the termination of her parental rights. 2012 WL 3644170, at *9. Because the court 3 found that plaintiff was asking to overturn state court orders terminating her parental and 4 visitation rights, it concluded plaintiff’s complaint was a de facto appeal precluded under the 5 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Similarly, in Ragan, plaintiffs filed suit after the state court 6 rendered its judgment and, in their suit, complained of injuries stemming from the judgment. 7 2017 WL 878083, at *4. The court found plaintiffs’ claims — that (1) their due process rights 8 were violated because they were not given a fair opportunity to retain and maintain custody of 9 their child and prevented from receiving a fair and just judicial proceeding and (2) their Fourth 10 Amendment rights were violated because the taking of their child caused the child to be removed 11 from their legal custody — invited review of the juvenile dependency proceeding and was barred 12 by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Finally, in Thomas, plaintiffs alleged that social workers 13 submitted false, fraudulent, and misleading information in support of the jurisdiction/disposition 14 report which resulted in the continued detention of the children from their biological mother. 15 2021 WL 8014326, at *4. The court found plaintiffs’ claims were inextricably intertwined with 16 the juvenile dependency proceedings and findings as the claims were linked to the court’s adverse 17 findings. Id. 18 Here, unlike the plaintiffs in the cases cited by Individual Defendants, Plaintiffs are 19 neither seeking relief from a state court judgment nor alleging a legal error by the state court, and 20 thus, there is no de facto appeal. Bell, 709 F.3d at 897; see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d at 1164. 21 Instead, Plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages for the constitutional violation of removing 22 Nicholas’s minor child V.C. without a warrant and Individual Defendants’ wrongful acts of 23 omitting and fabricating evidence in a juvenile dependency petition, subsequent reports, and in 24 court proceedings. (ECF No. 35 at 11, 16.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Individual 25 Defendants’ unlawful conduct, separate and apart from any actions taken in the juvenile 26 dependency proceedings, and are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 27 Therefore, the Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs 28 1 first, second, fourth, and fifth claims.3 2 b. Lack of Personal Participation 3 Individual Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ third claim for alleged 4 failure to notify Nicholas of medical examinations of Skyler because Plaintiffs fail to allege the 5 Individual Defendants had any personal participation in or even knew about the medical 6 examinations. (ECF No. 30 at 14–15.) Individual Defendants contend the total sum of Plaintiffs’ 7 allegations with respect to Plaintiffs’ third claim is that Skylar was subjected to medical testing at 8 Mary Graham Children’s Shelter, Individual Defendants did not notify Nicholas about the testing, 9 and unidentified “other” County employees performed medical procedures on Skylar. (Id. at 14.) 10 Plaintiffs’ opposition is limited to one paragraph in their introduction, in which Plaintiffs appear 11 to argue because Individual Defendants were named as defendants, it is implicit that they knew 12 about the examinations. (ECF No. 35 at 5.) Plaintiffs’ opposition is otherwise devoid of 13 meaningful analysis on this issue. 14 The Court agrees with Individual Defendants. Plaintiffs must allege facts to support their 15 claims. See Andreyev v. Van, No. 2:23-cv-01403-DJC-CKD, 2024 WL 71695, *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16 5, 2024) (speculation is “insufficient to state a claim”). Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to 17 support the claim that Individual Defendants knew of or participated in the medical examinations 18 of Skylar such that Individual Defendants could be liable for failing to notify Nicholas. Jones v. 19 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[i]n order for a person acting under color of state 20 law to be liable under [§] 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged 21 rights deprivation: there is no respondeat superior liability”); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996) (defendant cannot 23 be liable merely because he is in a group without a showing of individual participation in alleged 24 unlawful act.).

25 3 Individual Defendants also argue the Court should dismiss Gonzalez from Claim 1A because it is based on warrantless removal of V.C., but Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges only Foo 26 removed V.C. (ECF No. 30 at 13 (citing ECF No. 24 at 18.)) For the same reasons as discussed 27 in § (B)(ii)(b), infra, the Court agrees with Individual Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ Claim 1A with respect to 28 Gonzalez. 1 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ 2 third claim with leave to amend. 3 c. Duplicative Claim 4 Individual Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for judicial 5 deception because it is duplicative of Plaintiffs’ second claim for judicial deception. (ECF No. 30 6 at 15.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the claims are not duplicative — Plaintiffs’ second claim is 7 by all Plaintiffs against Individual Defendants for violations of their substantive due process 8 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on alleged falsification of evidence, 9 misrepresentations, and omission of exculpatory evidence (ECF No. 24 at 65–68), while 10 Plaintiffs’ fifth claim is by Skylar, K.S.-1 and K.S.-2 against Individual Defendants for violations 11 of their Fourth Amendment rights based on actions which resulted in the alleged unreasonable 12 seizure of Skylar, K.S.-1 and K.S.-2 (id. at 70–71). (ECF No. 35 at 23–24.) 13 The Court finds the briefing on this issue to be underdeveloped. Defendants state in 14 conclusory fashion that Plaintiffs’ claims are duplicative without meaningful discussion or 15 analysis. Absent more, the Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to 16 Plaintiffs’ fifth claim. 17 In sum, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as follows: 18 • All claims asserted by Skylar are DISMISSED with leave to amend; 19 • Plaintiffs’ Claim 1A with respect to Gonzalez is DISMISSED with leave to 20 amend; 21 • Plaintiffs’ third claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 22 The Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in all other respects. 23 iii. County’s Motion to Dismiss 24 Plaintiffs allege the County has multiple constitutionally deficient customs and practices 25 which cause harm to the constitutional rights of many families. (ECF No. 24 at 71–85.) 26 The Ninth Circuit recognizes four theories for establishing municipal liability under 27 Monell: “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, 28 or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa 1 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). To state a Monell claim against a municipality 2 under a pervasive practice or custom theory, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “that an 3 ‘official policy, custom, or pattern’ on the part of [the municipality] was ‘the actionable cause of 4 the claimed injury.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper 5 v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Mendiola-Martinez v. 6 Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that to establish municipal liability under 7 § 1983, a plaintiff must show a direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom and the 8 alleged constitutional violation). A “custom” for purposes of municipal liability is a “widespread 9 practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent 10 and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 11 458 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). 12 The County argues Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the customs and practices of the 13 County are conclusory, boilerplate, and lack the factual support required to survive a motion to 14 dismiss.4 (ECF No. 28 at 7.) The County specifically argues Plaintiffs fail to identify anyone 15 other than themselves who have experienced the same or similar circumstances. (Id. at 8.) The 16 County contends Plaintiffs’ only effort in this regard is their citation to seven prior lawsuits filed 17 over the course of the last 18 years to support their claim that County employees regularly engage 18 in judicial deception and warrantless removals. (Id.) The County argues the seven prior lawsuits 19 are unhelpful because each lawsuit was either settled or dismissed with no admission of 20 wrongdoing by the County. (Id. (citing Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 16-CV-02250-LHK, 21 2017 WL 344998, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017)).) 22 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue they have sufficiently specified the deficient and 23 constitutionally violative practices of the County. (ECF No. 34 at 5.) As an example, Plaintiffs 24 provide they allege that County social workers had a practice of misquoting or fabricating 25 statements by witness and parents. (Id.) Plaintiffs also contend that they allege specifically how 26 4 The County also argues Plaintiffs cannot proceed on the three other Monell theories of 27 liability. (ECF No. 28.) In opposition, Plaintiffs only addressed the County’s arguments as to the pervasive customs or practices theory of liability. (ECF No. 34.) Therefore, the Court only 28 addresses the parties’ arguments regarding that theory. 1 County social works go about removing children without warrants and exigency and allege how 2 those social workers lie and omit exculpatory information. (Id. at 6.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue 3 they allege reoccurring conduct by County social workers by referring to multiple other lawsuits 4 filed against the County and note that the reference to the previously filed lawsuits were not 5 intended to prove that the County had constitutionally deficient practices but rather, as evidence 6 that the County plausibly has unconstitutional practices. (Id. at 8.) 7 Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged constitutionally deficient customs 8 and practices to plausibly state a claim for relief against the County. Although Plaintiffs’ SAC is 9 at times difficult to follow, it does include enough factual allegations that make it plausible that 10 the County did indeed have constitutionally deficient policies that were the proximate cause of 11 Plaintiffs’ injuries. (ECF No. 24 at 73–85.) 12 First, Plaintiffs detail a series of actions taken against them by the County, including (1) 13 engaging in warrantless removals without exigency as exemplified when County officials “took 14 V.C. without a warrant” and “did not inquire about a less intrusive means” (ECF No. 24 ¶ 15 319(a)); (2) not notifying Skylar’s parents of Skylar’s medical appointments on numerous 16 occasions while she was in the custody or care of the County (id. at ¶ 319(b)); and (3) County 17 officials lying and misrepresenting facts to the juvenile court on multiple occasions (id. at ¶ 18 319(c)). 19 In addition, Plaintiff allege actions taken against them by the County are part of 20 specifically identified customs and practices of the County. (See, e.g., ECF No. 24 at 73–75 21 (alleging the County had a custom or practice of (1) removing children from their families 22 without a warrant, (2) providing false, inaccurate, exaggerated, misleading, and/or untrue factual 23 statements in court documents, and (3) suppressing and/or omitting known exculpatory evidence 24 from court-filed documents)). Thus, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint are distinct from 25 those in Bagley, where the court found plaintiff did not demonstrate that the alleged customs or 26 practices extended beyond their personal situation where the allegations were limited to plaintiff’s 27 individual experience. Bagley, 2017 WL 344998, at *15. 28 Finally, the Court finds that while Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding previously filed 1 lawsuits against the County is not conclusive, the allegations of prior incidents help illuminate the 2 plausibility of the continued existence of the alleged unconstitutional customs or practices. See 3 Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 4 2020) (“Prior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even those which do not result in a finding or 5 admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell liability purposes in the face of a motion to 6 dismiss.”); see also McCoy v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:19-cv-001191-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 374356, 7 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020)) (finding unsubstantiated allegations in lawsuits were sufficient to 8 establish pattern of failure to discipline and ratification at the motion to dismiss stage.) Plaintiffs’ 9 allegations regarding previously filed lawsuits sufficiently advance Plaintiffs’ claims beyond the 10 threshold of “possibility” to “plausibility,” demonstrating that these customs and practices are not 11 isolated incidents, but rather part of a longstanding pattern of behavior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 12 678. 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES County’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28.) 14 III. MOTION TO STRIKE 15 A. Standard of Law 16 Rule 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 17 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A court will 18 only consider striking a defense or allegation if it fits within one of these five categories. Yursik 19 v. Inland Crop Dusters Inc., No. CV-F-11-01602-LJO-JLT, 2011 WL 5592888, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 20 Nov. 16, 2011) (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 21 2010)). The term “scandalous” within the meaning of Rule 12(f) refers to “matter [that] 22 improperly casts a derogatory light on someone, usually a party,” and it “may be stricken if it 23 ‘bears no possible relation to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.’” 24 American River AG, Inc. v. Vestis Group, No. 2:19-cv-02203-TLN-DB, 2021 WL 3857796, at *4 25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2021) (citations omitted); see Schultz v. Braga, 290 F. Supp. 2d 637, 655 (D. 26 Md. 2003) (striking allegations that contained improper “inflammatory language”). 27 B. Analysis 28 Defendants move to strike the phrase, “by FOO ling the Superior Court,” in paragraph 316 1 of Plaintiffs’ SAC. (ECF No. 29.) Defendant argues the quoted languages seeks to make fun of 2 Foo based on his race. (Id. at 4.) In opposition, Plaintiffs deny the quoted language was intended 3 to disparage Foo’s Asian heritage but rather, was meant to be a private pun between Kaycie and 4 Plaintiffs’ counsel that was inadvertently left in the pleading. (ECF No. 33 at 2.) 5 As Plaintiffs acknowledge, a pun made upon a party’s name does not belong in a publicly 6 filed pleading. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ ill-received “joke” has no relevance to the issues at hand and is 7 insulting to Defendant Foo. The Court finds the quoted language to be scandalous under Rule 8 12(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); see also American River AG, Inc., 2021 WL 3857796, at *4 (striking 9 allegation that contained improper “inflammatory language”). 10 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike and strikes paragraph 316 11 from the SAC. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 14 • The Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) with 15 respect to all claims asserted by Skylar with leave to amend, Plaintiffs’ Claim 1A 16 with respect to Gonzalez with leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ third claim with 17 leave to amend. The Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in 18 all other respects; 19 • The Court DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.28) in its entirety; 20 and 21 • The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 29) and strikes 22 paragraph 316 from the Second Amended Complaint. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint — only to cure the deficiencies addressed herein 2 | —not later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Defendants shall file a responsive 3 | pleading not later than twenty-one (21) days from the filing of the amended complaint. If 4 | Plaintiffs opt not to file an amended complaint, the case will proceed on the remaining claims in 5 || the Second Amended Complaint, and Defendants’ responsive pleading will be due not later than 6 | twenty-one (21) days from Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing an amended complaint. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Date: March 10, 2025 9

11 TROY L. NUNLEY 12 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15