Cody v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-3837
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN J. CODY, No. 25-3837 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-05294-SKV v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2026** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Brian Cody appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner

of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review de novo the district court’s decision, Miskey v. Kijakazi, 33 F.4th 565, 570

(9th Cir. 2022), and affirm as we determine that the administrative law judge’s

(“ALJ”) decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error, Shaibi

v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).

1. Cody first contends that the ALJ erred in assessing the medical

evidence and numerous medical opinions. Under the regulations applicable to

Cody’s application, the ALJ was required to give clear and convincing reasons for

discounting the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician; if the

opinion was contradicted, the ALJ could reject the opinion for “specific and

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.”

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

The ALJ gave adequate reasons supported by substantial evidence for the

weight assigned to each challenged opinion. The ALJ permissibly discounted the

opinions of Dr. Sylwester, Dr. Deem, and nurse practitioner Nancy Armstrong

regarding Cody’s exertional limitations as inconsistent with their largely

unremarkable clinical findings and the other medical evidence demonstrating that

Cody pursued minimal treatment for his back, at times reported no back pain, and

regularly presented with normal gait and motor function. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d

1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020).

2 25-3837 Cody also challenges the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to the

functional limitations assessed by Dr. Davenport. He fails, however, to address the

ALJ’s primary reason for doing so: that Dr. Davenport attributed the limitations in

his opinion to left Achilles tendonitis—a condition which Cody did not consistently

report and which did not persist for the requisite 12-month period. Therefore, we

need not consider Cody’s remaining contentions regarding Dr. Davenport’s opinion.

See Nadon v. Bisignano, 145 F.4th 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2025) (claimant “forfeited

the argument that the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for discounting the

opinions of the healthcare professionals” by failing to acknowledge the ALJ’s

reliance on additional reasons for discounting opinions).

Cody’s challenges to the medical opinions regarding his non-exertional

limitations similarly fail. The ALJ gave several “specific and legitimate” reasons

for assigning less weight to the opinions of Drs. Bowes, Wingate, and Stamschror,

see Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citation omitted), including identifying ways in which the

opinions conflicted with the doctors’ own clinical observations, other objective

medical evidence, and Cody’s daily activities. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1155–56. The

ALJ also permissibly discounted the opinions of Drs. Wingate and Stamschror to the

extent they were based on Cody’s self-reports, which the ALJ found to be unreliable.

See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999). And

the ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting the opinion of Cody’s counselor,

3 25-3837 Nathaniel Richards, including the conflict between Richards’ opinion and Cody’s

daily activities. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).

Cody argues that the record could be interpreted to support the discounted

portions of the opinions, but we must uphold the ALJ’s determination where, as here,

it is based on reasonable interpretation of the evidence. See Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d

1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2021). And we do not consider arguments insufficiently

developed in Cody’s opening brief. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166

(9th Cir. 2010).

2. Nor did the ALJ err in discounting Cody’s symptom-related testimony.

This is not a case where the ALJ simply “stated h[is] non-credibility conclusion and

then summarized the medical evidence supporting h[is] [residual functional

capacity] determination.” See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir.

2015). Rather, the ALJ provided “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” supported

by substantial evidence. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ

explained that he discounted Cody’s testimony in part because the record indicated

that Cody sought minimal treatment and told his counselors that he attended therapy

only as a requirement to keep his state-provided cash benefits. See Tommasetti v.

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (the ALJ may consider treatment history

when assessing credibility). His testimony regarding his physical and mental

4 25-3837 limitations was further undermined by his performance on mental and physical status

clinical examinations and his reports that he enjoyed daily walks, sightseeing, going

to the library, playing instruments, going to coffee with a friend, and volunteering

with the City Gates Ministry. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (recognizing that

“[c]ontradiction with the medical record” and engagement in “daily activities

inconsistent with the alleged symptoms” are “sufficient bas[e]s for rejecting the

claimant’s subjective testimony” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

The ALJ also reasonably found that inconsistencies in Cody’s statements called his

credibility into question. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002)

(upholding the ALJ’s credibility determination that inconsistencies in claimant’s

statements indicated lack of candor).

3. The ALJ properly considered notes from W. Andrillon Mo, a Social

Security Administration interviewer, and Cindy Harbaugh, a social worker, that

included observations about Cody’s physical and mental functioning. See Molina,

674 F.3d at 1114. Further, any error in the ALJ’s consideration of this evidence

necessarily would be harmless as Mo and Harbaugh did not describe any limitations

beyond those that Cody described in his testimony. See id. at 1122.

4. Because Cody’s remaining arguments regarding the ALJ’s

determination of his residual functional capacity and ultimate non-disability finding

are derivative of his arguments relating to the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence, they

5 25-3837 also fail. See, e.g., Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir.

2008) (rejecting argument that the ALJ’s hypothetical did not include all limitations

as derivative of already rejected arguments that the ALJ improperly discounted

claimant’s testimony and opinions of medical experts).

AFFIRMED.

6 25-3837