Cody Merrill v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02386
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Cody Merrill, No. CV-25-02386-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Cody Merrill’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal from the 16 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“Defendant”) denial of Social 17 Security benefits. (Doc. 13-1). The appeal is fully briefed, (Docs. 14, 18, 19), and the Court 18 now rules. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On appeal, this Court considers whether the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to include all 21 limitations supported by the evidence in the “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), and 22 (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 23 A. Factual Overview 24 Plaintiff Cody Merrill was born in 1982 and was thirty-nine years old on his alleged 25 disability onset date of October 1, 2022. (Doc. 13-1 at 27). He has a high school education 26 and some college. (Doc. 13-1 at 27). His past relevant work includes employment as a store 27 laborer, cashier checker, retail cashier stocker, and fast-food worker—positions ranging 28 from light to heavy exertion. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 1 working part-time as a cashier at Dollar Tree, approximately ten to fifteen hours per week 2 at minimum wage. (Doc. 13-1 at 39–40). 3 Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on January 18, 2023, 4 alleging disability beginning October 1, 2022, based on cerebral palsy and epilepsy. (Doc. 5 13-1 at 20). The claim was denied initially on July 26, 2023, and upon reconsideration on 6 October 23, 2023. (Doc. 13-1 at 20). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative 7 Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on July 11, 2024. (Doc. 13-1 at 20). The ALJ issued 8 an unfavorable decision on October 31, 2024, finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Doc. 13- 9 1 at 28). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on June 13, 2025, 10 making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial 11 review. (Doc. 14 at 2–3). Plaintiff then filed this appeal. (Doc. 14). 12 B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process 13 To qualify for social security disability insurance benefits, a claimant must show 14 that he “is under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). To be “under a disability,” the 15 claimant must be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to any medically 16 determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 423(d)(1). The impairment must be of 17 such severity that the claimant cannot do his previous work or any other substantial gainful 18 work within the national economy. Id. § 423(d)(2). The SSA has created a five-step 19 sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The steps are followed in order, and each step is potentially 21 dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4). 22 At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial 23 gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that 24 is (1) “substantial,” i.e., doing “significant physical or mental activities”; and (2) “gainful,” 25 i.e., usually done “for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)–(b). If the claimant is engaging 26 in substantial gainful work activity, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 27 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 28 At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically 1 determinable physical or mental impairment” or severe “combination of impairments.” Id. 2 § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be “severe,” the claimant’s impairment must “significantly limit” 3 the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). 4 If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ 5 will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 6 At Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or 7 equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 8 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled, but if not, the ALJ 9 must assess the claimant’s RFC before proceeding to Step Four. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 10 (e). The claimant’s RFC refers to his ability to perform physical and mental work activities 11 “despite [his] limitations,” based on all relevant evidence in the case record. Id. § 12 404.1545(a)(1). To determine a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all the claimant’s 13 impairments, including those that are not “severe,” and any related symptoms that “affect 14 what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1)–(2). 15 At Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the 16 physical and mental demands of “[his] past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e). 17 “Past relevant work” is work the claimant has “done within the past five years that was 18 substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1)(i). If the claimant has the RFC to perform 19 his past relevant work, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 20 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will 21 proceed to Step Five. 22 Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can make an 23 adjustment to other work,” considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. 24 § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled. Id. If the claimant 25 cannot make this adjustment, the ALJ will find the opposite. Id. 26 C. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors 27 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 28 activity since October 1, 2022, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 13-1 at 22). The ALJ noted 1 that while Plaintiff worked after the alleged onset date, his earnings as a part-time cashier 2 did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity. (Doc. 13-1 at 22). 3 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 4 cerebral palsy and epilepsy. (Doc. 13-1 at 22). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s anxiety was 5 a non-severe impairment, resulting in no more than mild limitations in any of the four broad 6 areas of mental functioning. (Doc. 13-1 at 22–23). 7 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 8 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed 9 impairment. (Doc. 13-1 at 23–24). The ALJ considered the 11.00 series of listings, 10 including Listings 11.02 and 11.07. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). 11 As to the RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can lift and/or carry ten pounds 12 occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; stand and/or walk a total of two hours in 13 an eight-hour workday; sit for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday; push and/or 14 pull without limitation other than as shown for lift and/or carry; never climb ladders, ropes, 15 or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; 16 and frequently reach in all directions, handle, finger, and feel with the right nondominant 17 upper extremity. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). Plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure to vibration 18 and cannot work around hazards such as dangerous moving machinery and unprotected 19 heights. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). Plaintiff has no restrictions in driving. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). 20 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant 21 work. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). 22 At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 23 experience, and RFC, Plaintiff has acquired transferable work skills and there are jobs that 24 exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including 25 telephone solicitor (36,000 jobs), escort vehicle driver (37,468 jobs), and document 26 preparer (13,988 jobs). (Doc. 13-1 at 27–28). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has 27 not been under a disability from October 1, 2022, through the date of the decision. (Doc. 28 13-1 at 28). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 This Court may not set aside a final denial of disability benefits unless the ALJ 3 decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 4 Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. 5 Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). Substantial evidence refers to “such 6 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 7 Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 8 1988)). The Court, in its review, must consider the record in its entirety, “weighing both 9 the evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Id. 10 (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007)). 11 The ALJ—not this Court—is responsible for resolving ambiguities, resolving 12 conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and drawing logical inferences 13 from the medical record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 14 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 15 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, when the evidence of record could result in more than 16 one rational interpretation, “the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 17 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th 18 Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 19 interpretation, [the Court] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.”). Further, this Court may 20 only review the reasons the ALJ provides in the disability determination, and “may not 21 affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010. 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff raises two claims of error: (1) the ALJ’s RFC finding failed to account for 24 all limitations supported by the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s right upper extremity, and 25 (2) the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s 26 subjective symptom testimony. (Doc. 14 at 2). Neither claim warrants reversal. 27 a. The RFC’s Right Upper Extremity Limitations 28 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff can frequently reach, handle, 1 finger, and feel with his right nondominant upper extremity, because “all available 2 evidence shows that . . . he cannot use his right arm as any more than a helper limb.” (Doc. 3 14 at 5–6). Defendant responds that Plaintiff has failed to point to evidence that additional 4 limitations were warranted beyond what the ALJ assessed. (Doc. 18 at 4). 5 i. Legal Standard 6 The RFC is an assessment of the most a claimant can do in spite of his limitations. 7 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical 8 findings into a succinct RFC. Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 9 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ must consider all the limitations imposed by the claimant’s 10 impairments, even those that are not severe. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 11 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). At all times, the burden is on the claimant to establish 12 entitlement to disability insurance benefits. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 13 1998). Furthermore, the ALJ is “free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical 14 question that are not supported by substantial evidence.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 15 742 (9th Cir. 2023). 16 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluates medical opinions 17 according to several enumerated factors, of which supportability and consistency are the 18 most important. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ does not defer or give any specific 19 evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion or prior 20 administrative medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). An ALJ’s decision to discredit 21 any medical opinion must be supported by substantial evidence. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 22 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). 23 ii. Analysis 24 The ALJ’s RFC assessment regarding Plaintiff’s right upper extremity is supported 25 by substantial evidence. Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 26 interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 27 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 28 Plaintiff’s central argument is that the ALJ relied on no objective medical evidence 1 in assessing frequent right-hand manipulation. (Doc. 14 at 6). But the ALJ found the 2 October 2023 state agency medical findings at the reconsideration level “generally 3 persuasive,” and those findings assessed frequent reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling 4 with the right upper extremity. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). The reconsideration consultant reviewed 5 the longitudinal record—including the documented atrophy, smaller right arm, and wrist 6 flexion—and nevertheless concluded that Plaintiff retained the capacity for frequent 7 manipulation. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). The ALJ found these findings “generally consistent with 8 and supported by the treatment record and activities of daily living.” (Doc. 13-1 at 26). 9 Plaintiff acknowledges the ALJ relied on these findings but contends they “do[] not 10 cite to objective evidence and appear[] to arbitrarily assign” a frequent limitation. (Doc. 14 11 at 7). But state agency medical consultants’ opinions constitute substantial evidence when 12 consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. Thomas v. 13 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). And Plaintiff does not meaningfully challenge 14 the ALJ’s persuasiveness determination under the supportability and consistency factors. 15 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). 16 The ALJ also reasonably considered Plaintiff’s work history and current work 17 activity. Plaintiff’s cerebral palsy is a lifelong, static condition that existed during periods 18 when Plaintiff performed full-time work at light and medium exertional levels. (Doc. 13-1 19 at 25). Longstanding impairments existing during periods when a claimant was employed 20 may undermine claims of disability. Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2021). 21 Additionally, even where work does not constitute substantial gainful activity, it may show 22 that a claimant is able to do more than he actually did. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571. Here, the 23 ALJ noted that Plaintiff was working part-time as a cashier—a job requiring him to be on 24 his feet—and had offered to work full-time but the opportunity had not arisen. (Doc. 13-1 25 at 25). Notably, all of Plaintiff’s past and current work was performed at exertional levels 26 at or above the sedentary RFC the ALJ assessed. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). This supports the ALJ’s 27 determination that Plaintiff can perform sedentary work with frequent right-hand 28 manipulation. 1 Furthermore, Plaintiff identifies no medical opinion in the record supporting a 2 greater restriction than frequent. No treating physician, examining physician, or other 3 medical source opined that Plaintiff’s right upper extremity was limited to occasional use 4 or less. The 2013 consultative examiner noted “limitations” in working with the right upper 5 extremity but did not specify a degree, and that opinion predated the alleged onset date by 6 nine years. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). The ALJ found that opinion only partially persuasive for 7 these reasons. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing disability, and 8 has not pointed to a medical source opinion supporting the manipulative restrictions he 9 now advocates. Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601. 10 Finally, the objective evidence Plaintiff cites—visible atrophy, wrist contracture, 11 spastic dystonia, and inability to rotate the wrist (Doc. 14 at 6)—does not compel a finding 12 of greater limitations than the ALJ assessed. These conditions are documented throughout 13 the record, and both the ALJ and the state agency consultant were aware of them in 14 formulating the RFC. (Doc. 13-1 at 26). The RFC does not assume full use of the right 15 hand; it accounts for Plaintiff’s limitations by restricting him to sedentary work with 16 frequent, rather than constant, right-hand manipulation. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). Moreover, even 17 the evidence Plaintiff cites reflects some residual function. At the 2013 consultative 18 examination, Plaintiff demonstrated the ability to press his right hand against objects held 19 with his left hand and could lift a quart of milk with his right arm. (Doc. 18 at 7). The ALJ’s 20 assessment represents a rational interpretation of the evidence. 21 b. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 22 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons to discount 23 his testimony regarding the severity of his right upper extremity limitations and his seizure 24 symptoms. (Doc. 14 at 8-10). Defendant responds that the ALJ’s evaluation was supported 25 by substantial evidence. (Doc. 18 at 4-8). 26 i. Legal Standard 27 In assessing the credibility of a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ 28 must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 First, “the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 2 evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the 3 pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 4 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir.1991)). If there is such 5 objective evidence, and “no evidence of malingering,” “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s 6 testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 7 convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th 8 Cir. 1996)). “The standard isn’t whether [the reviewing] court is convinced, but instead 9 whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. 10 Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). 11 When assessing witness credibility, an ALJ may consider “(1) ordinary techniques 12 of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 13 statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less 14 than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to 15 follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Ghanim v. 16 Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282). 17 ii. Analysis 18 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 19 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms but that his statements concerning 20 their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were not entirely consistent with the record. 21 (Doc. 13-1 at 24). The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for this 22 determination. 23 As to Plaintiff’s right upper extremity testimony, the ALJ’s reasoning rests on the 24 same work history, current employment, and daily activities discussed in Section A—all 25 of which the Court has found constitute substantial evidence supporting the RFC. 26 Plaintiff’s remaining argument on this point concerns daily activities specifically. 27 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in relying on daily activities because every activity 28 the ALJ cited can be performed one-handed. (Doc. 14 at 10; Doc. 19 at 4). But the ALJ 1 was not required to find that Plaintiff performs these activities with his right hand in order 2 to rely on them. Daily activities may be grounds for discrediting a claimant’s testimony to 3 the extent they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment, even where those 4 activities suggest some difficulty functioning. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th 5 Cir. 2012). The ALJ found that the scope of Plaintiff’s activities—part-time work, 6 household chores, self-care, driving, pet care, managing finances, attending family 7 gatherings, and shopping (Doc. 13-1 at 25)—considered alongside his work history and the 8 medical evidence, did not support the degree of limitation alleged. Daily activities are a 9 permissible consideration under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i), and the ALJ’s reliance on 10 them here was reasonable. 11 Plaintiff cites Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024), for the 12 proposition that the ALJ must expressly state what medical evidence is inconsistent with 13 the claimant’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 14 at 9). But Ferguson is distinguishable. There, 14 the ALJ “never expressly and specifically stated that [the claimant’s] headache symptom 15 testimony was inconsistent with any particular record evidence.” Id. at 1200. Here, the ALJ 16 identified the specific basis for his finding: Plaintiff’s statements about his right-hand 17 limitations were inconsistent with his history of performing full-time work at light and 18 medium exertion levels with the same condition, his current part-time cashier employment, 19 his daily activities, and the generally persuasive state agency findings assessing frequent 20 manipulation. (Doc. 13-1 at 24–26). The ALJ’s path from the evidence to his conclusion 21 can be reasonably discerned. 22 As to Plaintiff’s seizure testimony, the ALJ identified specific inconsistencies that 23 independently constitute clear and convincing reasons to discount the alleged severity. 24 Plaintiff claimed two to three seizures per week in his seizure questionnaire but listed only 25 six seizures over twelve months in the same document. (Doc. 13-1 at 25). He did not 26 provide the names of anyone who had witnessed his seizures. (Doc. 13-1 at 25). His 27 seizures were described as non-epileptic on multiple occasions in the treatment record. 28 (Doc. 13-1 at 25). Plaintiff reported the ability to abort many episodes by sitting down or 1 || closing his eyes, and reported short-duration episodes of two to five minutes. (Doc. 13-1 2|| at 25). The treatment record lacks specific information regarding recovery times. (Doc. 13- 1 at25). And Plaintiff's doctor had not restricted his right to drive. (Doc. 13-1 at 25). These are precisely the types of specific, identifiable inconsistencies that satisfy the clear and 5 || convincing standard. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. Plaintiff does not substantively challenge || the ALJ’s seizure analysis in his briefs, focusing instead on the right upper extremity issue. 7 The ALJ’s decision, read as a whole, provides a clear path from the evidence to the 8 || conclusions reached. See Kaufmann, 32 F.4th at 851. 9 Because the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff's request for remand 1s || denied. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, 13 IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 15 || accordingly. 16 Dated this 18th day of March, 2026. 17

19 0 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-ll-