Cody Hunter Funderburk v. Virginia Mason Medical Center doing business as Bailey-Boushay House; CommonSpirit Health doing business as Virginia Mason Franciscan Health

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01495
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CODY HUNTER FUNDERBURK, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01495-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION FOR EMERGENCY v. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 10 VIRGINIA MASON MEDICAL 11 CENTER doing business as BAILEY- BOUSHAY HOUSE; COMMONSPIRIT 12 HEALTH doing business as VIRGINA MASON FRANCISCAN HEALTH, 13 Defendants. 14

15 1. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff Cody Funderburk moves for emergency injunctive relief. Dkt. 17 No. 26. The Court construes the motion as one for an emergency temporary 18 restraining order under Rule 65. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; LCR 65. The Court DENIES the 19 motion for the reasons below. 20 2. BACKGROUND 21 Funderburk was a shelter advocate at Bailey Boushay House who worked 22 directly with shelter participants. Between 2022 and 2024, Funderburk experienced 23 1 harassment by shelter participants and complained to Bailey Boushay House about 2 the harassment, asserting a hostile work environment. In October 2024,

3 Funderburk commenced a 12-week leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. 4 Dkt. No. 31 at 6. In February 2025, Funderburk began administrative leave, and 5 Bailey Boushay House asserts that Funderburk has not actively worked since then. 6 On August 8, 2025, Funderburk sued Bailey Boushay House, alleging 7 discriminatory conduct including “[t]ermination of [their] employment,” “[f]ailure to 8 accommodate [their] disability” of anxiety, and “[r]etaliation.” Dkt. No. 5 at 4.

9 Funderburk asserts that they experienced a hostile work environment, that Bailey 10 Boushay House treated them in a discriminatory manner when handling their 11 reports and leave requests, and that it violated the Family Medical Leave Act 12 (FMLA) by failing to reinstate them after their leave. Id. at 5. 13 Beginning on August 21, 2025, Human Resources sought to meet with 14 Funderburk to discuss their employee status, but Funderburk refused to attend the 15 meeting and stated they would only respond to written communication. Specifically,

16 they wrote, “As you are aware, I am currently engaged in active litigation with 17 Virginia Mason/CHI/CommonSpirit regarding my employment. To ensure a clear 18 and accurate record, I request that all communications regarding my employment 19 status be provided in writing. I will review and respond as appropriate.” Dkt. No. 20 26-3 at 5. On September 8, 2025, Funderburk again requested written confirmation 21 of employment status, without referencing a disability or impairment. Dkt. No. 31

22 at 6. 23 1 On October 1, 2025, after several attempts to schedule a meeting with 2 Funderburk, a Human Resources representative scheduled a Zoom meeting for

3 October 8 and warned, “[i]f you do not appear for the scheduled meeting or do not 4 before that time provide me an alternative date/time within the next five workdays 5 when you could attend this meeting, [the company] will treat your refusal to meet 6 as a voluntary resignation, and thereafter will proceed to administratively 7 terminate your employment.” Id. at 11. In response, Funderburk stated, in part: 8 “Because I am a party to ongoing federal litigation . . . and because I have a

9 documented disability, I must request that all communications regarding my 10 employment status be conducted in writing. This is both a reasonable ADA 11 [Americans with Disabilities Act] accommodation and necessary to ensure that 12 there is a clear and accurate record of communications during the course of 13 litigation.” Id. at 12. 14 Funderburk did not attend the meeting, and on October 8, they filed a motion 15 for an emergency preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 26. The motion seeks an order:

16 (1) enjoining defendants from treating nonattendance at the October 8 meeting as 17 voluntary resignation or grounds for termination; (2) reinstating employment 18 status, pay, and benefits if termination has occurred; (3) compelling defendants to 19 communicate in writing for all employment-related matters as an ADA 20 accommodation; and (4) maintaining this relief until further order. Dkt. No. 26-2. 21 3. DISCUSSION

22 A TRO is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 23 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 1 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “[A] plaintiff seeking a [TRO] must make a clear showing 2 that ‘[they are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer

3 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 4 tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Starbucks 5 Corp. v. McKinney, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 6 These four elements—the Winter factors—apply whenever a preliminary injunction 7 is sought. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. To obtain relief, a plaintiff must “make a showing 8 on all four prongs.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135. (9th

9 Cir. 2011). The first Winter factor, “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits[,] is the 10 most important[.]” Edge v. City of Everett, 929 F.3d 657, 663 (9th Cir. 2019). 11 Where, as here, a party proceeds pro se, district courts must construe their 12 filings liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But even so, pro se 13 litigants remain subject to the stringent procedural and substantive rules that 14 govern TROs. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 15 Bailey Boushay House argues that the Court should deny the motion because

16 it’s unrelated to the misconduct alleged in the underlying complaint. The Court 17 agrees and denies the motion on that basis. “[T]here must be a relationship between 18 the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the 19 underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 20 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2015). “When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims 21 not pled in the complaint, the court does not have the authority to issue an

22 injunction.” Id. at 633. “Though new assertions of misconduct might support 23 1 additional claims against a defendant, they do not support preliminary injunctions 2 entirely unrelated to the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Id. at 637.

3 While the complaint includes a conclusory, legal assertion that Bailey 4 Boushay House failed to accommodate Funderburk’s disability of anxiety, see Dkt. 5 No. 5 at 4, it contains no facts related to any accommodation request—much less a 6 request to communicate only in writing about employment status. This is 7 unsurprising given that Funderburk’s alleged ADA accommodation request came 8 after they filed their complaint. Because the wrongful conduct alleged in the

9 complaint is not sufficiently related to the wrongful conduct alleged in Funderburk’s 10 motion, the Court lacks authority to grant the preliminary relief requested. 11 Indeed, Funderburk’s complaint criticized Bailey Boushay House for 12 improperly “refer[ring] [them] to a disability accommodation process for a workplace 13 safety issue.” Dkt. No. 5 at ¶ 5. Yet Funderburk now seeks a court-ordered 14 disability accommodation. This about-face underscores the absence of any nexus 15 between the underlying complaint and this motion.

16 The Court also denies the motion because Funderburk has failed to 17 demonstrate irreparable harm. “Irreparable harm is . . . harm for which there is no 18 adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. 19 Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). Funderburk argues that termination 20 and loss of health insurance are irreparable harm. But they cite no precedent to 21 support that claim, and courts generally find that “[i]n the employment context,

22 discharge and its associated consequences do not ordinarily constitute irreparable 23 harm[.]” O’Hailpin v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1302 (D. 1 Hawai'i 2022) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92 n.68 (1974)). As the

9 Supreme Court explained in Sampson, “external factors common to most discharged 3 employees,” such as insufficient savings, difficulties obtaining other employment— 4 |/or, as alleged here, loss of health insurance—do not support a finding of irreparable 5 injury. See 415 U.S. at 92 n.68. Courts typically find that loss of employment is

G compensable by monetary damages. O’Hailpin, 583 F. Supp. 3d at 1308 (collecting 7 cases). The Court recognizes that loss of employment and the associated

8 consequences may pose serious harm. But that harm is reparable, making 9 preliminary injunctive relief inappropriate. 10 4. CONCLUSION

11 Accordingly, Funderburk’s motion for emergency injunctive relief is DENIED.

1g ‘|| Dkt. No. 26. IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 14 Dated this 17th day of October, 2025.

16 amal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23