Filed 8/25/26 Cockrell v. Victor Martinez & Associates CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
FRANK COCKRELL, B342090
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22AVCV00843 v.
VICTOR MARTINEZ & ASSOCIATES, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Affirmed.
Frank Cockrell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilcox Dunakin Chrisopoulos, Chad C. Wilcox and Sam M.
Muriella for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Frank Cockrell appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered in his civil action after the trial court sustained a demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend. Cockrell’s failure to provide cogent, reasoned argument with adequate references to the record and supporting legal authority results in a waiver of his contentions on appeal. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Civil Complaints and Demurrers Nos. 1, 2, and 3 On October 28, 2022, Cockrell and six other plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondents for 1) “racketeering operating a criminal enterprise (RICO) in violation of state, federal and local city laws”; 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 3) “creating rules that are intended to remove older mobile homes so they can raise the rents to increase values for owners of the Californian Mobile Home Senior Park”; 4) “grand theft under [Penal Code sections] 186 & 486; violation of constitutional rights to life, liberty & pursuit of happiness; insider unfair trade advantage”; and 5) “violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act & Federal Fair Housing Act by moving children into a senior housing facility.” (Boldface and some capitalizations omitted.)
The complaint includes allegations about the management and rules of a senior mobile home park where Cockrell lives. However, the allegations are not provided in an intelligible manner, and many individuals’ names are included without explanation as to who they are and how exactly they are involved in the events prompting the action. We glean from the allegations that defendants/respondents may be the mobile home
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park’s management company, employees of the management company, and owners of the park.
On March 17, 2023, defendants filed a demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), and argued the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action and is not supported by the law.
At the hearing on April 25, 2023, the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. As part of its order, the trial court struck the six other parties from the complaint. The court “issued a ruling cautioning [Cockrell] against the unauthorized practice of law as [Cockrell] drafted the original complaint on behalf of all plaintiffs. . . . The Court emphasized that each named plaintiff may proceed in pro per by representing their individual interests.”
On May 8, 2023, Cockrell filed a motion for the court 1) to reconsider its prior order sustaining the demurrer and 2) to recuse itself per Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1 through 170.6. A minute order issued on June 6, 2023 provides the court’s “order striking statement of disqualification; verified answer is signed and filed this date.” (Some capitalization omitted.) On July 18, 2023, the trial court denied the motion.
On November 27, 2023, Cockrell filed a first amended complaint (FAC). We were not provided a copy of the FAC.
On April 26, 2024, respondents filed a demurrer to the FAC, which the trial court sustained on June 11, 2024. The trial court gave Cockrell 30 days to file an amended complaint.
On July 8, 2024, Cockrell filed a second amended complaint (SAC) with the same first three causes of action as the original complaint and amended the fourth and fifth causes of action to allege: 4) “violation of constitutional rights to life, liberty &
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pursuit of happiness & unfair trade advantages”; and 5) “violation of age restrictions in a senior park only facility both federal & state laws.” (Boldface and some capitalization omitted.) The SAC is replete with a multitude of allegations pertaining to the management and rules of the mobile home park, as well as various alleged events such as “placing monthly bills & notices of violations without postage in all the residents’ mail boxes except [one] resident”; “rents illegally raised”; “[m]anagement trespasses in yards, on decks, etc. without notice” to tenants/owners; non-senior citizens being allowed to live in unit 25 “in violation of Federal & State Laws (Unruh Law)” especially when “there were 3 sexual predators [that] resided in the [mobile home] park, since children weren’t allowed.” However, the SAC fails to present these allegations in a coherent, organized manner and largely consists of a stream-ofconsciousness narrative that does not comply with the basic requirements of legal pleadings, making it difficult to identify the factual basis for, and legal theories underlying, Cockrell’s claims.
On August 5, 2024, defendants filed a demurrer to the SAC.
They argued that the complaint is “uncertain,” “fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action,” and “cannot be maintained as a matter of law.”
On September 5, 2024, Cockrell filed a motion to compel responses to form interrogatories and request for admissions, arguing that respondents’ “counsel of record shouldn’t profit from unethical conduct which is blatant & obvious with the BOILER PLATE ANSWERS providing zero discovery & dragging on this case to pad the bills to the Insurance carrier with the deep pockets.” Cockrell requested sanctions against respondents’ counsel. Cockrell included, as exhibits, no less than 10 total
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discovery responses from defendants Victor Martinez & Associates, Inc., Victor Martinez individually, Mario Rivera, Miguel Esparza, and Stephanie Rivera Esparza.
On September 13, 2024, Cockrell filed a response to the demurrer.
On September 23, 2024, defendants filed an opposition to Cockrell’s discovery motion. Cockrell did not provide this pleading in the appellate record. B. Trial Court Ruling On October 8, 2024, the trial court heard argument on defendants’ demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court ruled: “[T]he SAC is unclear as the allegations mix [Cockrell’s] own interests with that of others. [Citation.] As such, the Complaint lacks coherence as the individual rights of each previous plaintiff are blended in with allegations pertaining to [Cockrell]. [Cockrell’s] SAC also appears to contain a multitude of conclusory allegations as well. Conclusory allegations, without facts to support them, are ambiguous and uncertain. [Citation.] Throughout the SAC, there are references to criminal and civil law as well as federal, state, and city codes. The Complaint is unclear as to whether Cockrell has a private right of action to bring the alleged breaches of [Penal] Code statutes . . . . Further, there appears to be references to undefined nouns” such as “management/owners” or “manager” or “defendant heirs” or “owners.” “As pled, the Court agrees with . . . Defendants that the Complaint is so uncertain that [they] cannot reasonably respond. As pled, the Complaint would require Defendants to determine which claims are being asserted against it and which alleged actions not only apply to Defendants, but also comprise each claim. [¶] [Cockrell’s
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response does not address the deficiencies within the SAC.” In addition, “[a]s the Court has sustained the demurrer to the SAC without leave to amend, [Cockrell’s] motion to compel responses to form interrogatories & request for admissions and sanctions against legal counsel . . . is moot.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
On October 14, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We are unable to address the arguments raised in Cockrell’s opening brief because the briefing fails to pass muster in various ways. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading. (Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In reviewing a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we accept as true all material facts properly pleaded in the complaint that are not inconsistent with other allegations, exhibits, or judicially noticed facts; we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact and law. (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 163–164 (Dudek); Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292; Estate of Holdaway (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1049, 1052.) “We examine the complaint’s factual allegations to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal theory regardless of the label attached to a cause of action.” (Fischer v. Time Warner Cable Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 784, 790 (Fischer).) The judgment of dismissal after a sustained demurrer
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must be affirmed if the challenged pleading fails to plead an essential element or if the allegations disclose some defense or bar to recovery. (Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer and examine the operative complaint to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050 (King); Dudek, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) We will affirm an order sustaining a demurrer on any proper legal ground whether or not the trial court relied on that theory or it was raised by the defendant. (Fischer, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.) B. Analysis Cockrell argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. Cockrell also argues the judge failed “to recuse himself for obvious prejudicial conduct throughout the case.” Cockrell’s briefing and appellate record preclude us from entertaining his arguments on appeal.
First, “ ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Further, “[a] self-represented party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants having attorneys.” (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574; accord Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985 [self- represented litigant not entitled to lenient treatment].)
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Here, Cockrell cites to and relies on the various documents attached as exhibits to his opening brief, but the appellate record does not include those documents. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d) permits a party filing a brief to attach copies of “exhibits or other material in the appellate record,” or copies of relevant statutes, rules, regulations, and “similar citable materials that are not readily accessible.” (Italics added.) Thus, the exhibits Cockrell attached to his opening brief violate the California Rules of Court. Additionally, Cockrell argues that defendants “pass[ed] rules in conflict with the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (C.C.&R’s) [of the] Senior Mobile Home Park” but has not provided a copy of the C.C.&R’s in the appellate record. Cockrell argues the trial court prejudicially found his motion to compel moot (as a result of the sustained demurrer) but has failed to provide both a copy of defendants’ opposition to the motion to compel and a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. It is an appellant’s burden to ensure that the record is adequate to review the appellant’s claims, and the failure to provide an adequate record ordinarily results in affirmance of the judgment. (See, e.g., Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
Next, Cockrell purports to go into the mind of the trial court and argues the trial court was “biased” and “obvious[ly] prejudicial” in its various “baseless rulings,” its scheduling of hearings, and its conduct. Cockrell claims the trial court “falsely accused” him of the unauthorized practice of law—“an illegal act, then doubled down when the other Plaintiffs signed declarations under penalty of perjury telling them that he was wrong & it wasn’t true.” That finding was from the trial court’s April 25, 2023 hearing on defendants’ first demurrer—a ruling not
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properly before this court. Cockrell complains about the court’s scheduling of cases, claiming that when he “was in court on time[,] the case would be called out of order late and if he was a few minutes late[,] the case was already in progress or already heard within minutes which happened on 2 or 3 occasions.” The trial court does not hold hearings based on Cockrell’s timing and arrival to court. It is Cockrell’s responsibility to appear on time for each and every hearing, and Cockrell has not adequately explained how the trial court holding hearings on the date they are scheduled qualifies as prejudicial or biased merely because Cockrell had not timely appeared.
Cockrell’s opening brief then segues into his personal and family history, stating he attended law school and that a family member he “personally never met” was previously a Los Angeles Superior Court and Court of Appeal judge. Cockrell claims, “So, when I get a biased judge, I find it offensive and I wasn’t asking for anything other than the opportunity to reasonable discovery so I could fully present my case.” Cockrell contends the trial court’s “refusal to recuse himself (with the CCP 170.1 thru 170.6 part of the record) . . . show[s] nothing but prejudicial misconduct.”
Cockrell’s reference to “the CCP 170.1 thru 170.6 part of the record” is not a proper record citation. (See Sharabianlou v. Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149 [Each brief must support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears].) We may disregard statements of fact when those statements are unsupported by citations to the record. (Ibid.; Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 481, fn. 1.) And we will not scour the
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record on our own in search of supporting evidence. (Sharabianlou, at p. 1149.)
Further, the June 6, 2023 minute order specifies that the trial court’s “order striking statement of disqualification [was] signed and filed this date.” (Some capitalization omitted.) If Cockrell is attempting to challenge the trial court’s June 6, 2023 order striking Cockrell’s statement of disqualification, his challenge by this appeal is improper. (See Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1176.) Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); see Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73, 75 [writ petition challenging order striking statement of disqualification, filed almost two months after petitioner was served notice of entry of order, was summarily denied as untimely].) Cockrell therefore may not challenge the trial court’s June 6, 2023 order through this appeal.
Cockrell’s briefing includes a handful of citations to the record. Most factual assertions are not supported with references to the record. “An appellant must support his argument in the briefs by appropriate references to the record, which includes providing exact page citation.” (Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140.) An appellant’s brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the
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matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that an appellant must support all statements of fact in [their] briefs with citations to the record.” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29.) “We look askance at this practice of stating what purport to be facts—and not unimportant facts—without support in the record. This is a violation of the rules . . . with the consequence that such assertions will, at a minimum, be disregarded.” (Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 839, 846.)
Cockrell has failed to present adequate legal discussion and cogent argument as to why the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrer, resulting in a waiver of his argument. For instance, he argues defendants “violated the State, Federal & City of Lancaster rent control laws” but does not specify which exact laws or statutes he is referring to. Conclusive statements such as “[t]his is also a crime under penal code section 368” and that the “[d]emurrer that Judge Morgan granted is against the case law” without any legal analysis is hardly sufficient. (Boldface omitted.) The burden is not on the reviewing court to make inquiry as to the basis for a party’s arguments; rather it is on the party to make those arguments—convincingly, and with evidentiary support. “Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by [substantive] argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived.” (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99; see also Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700 [“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument, it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary.”].) Cockrell’s failure to present
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adequate legal authority and cogent argument with references to the relevant evidence and the appellate record results in a waiver of these contentions. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [“support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].)
The stream-of-consciousness nature of Cockrell’s brief, coupled with the absence of argument headings and reasoned analysis, renders it very difficult to discern what precise errors he is claiming and how any such errors were prejudicial. His self- represented status may explain the deficiencies in his brief but does not excuse them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney” ’ ”].) Because we are unable to discern any of his arguments due to his failure to provide a cogent statement of facts or cite to legal authority, we deem his arguments waived. (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 109.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
SCHERB, J.