Cochran v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedJanuary 11, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-02008
StatusUnknown

This text of Cochran v. Social Security Administration Commissioner (Cochran v. Social Security Administration Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cochran v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, (W.D. Ark. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FORT SMITH DIVISION

TAMMIE COCHRAN PLAINTIFF

V. Civil No. 2:22-cv-02008-PKH-MEF

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Tammie Cochran, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on May 3, 2019, alleging disability since January 3, 2019, due to Kienbock’s disease (interrupted blood supply to the lunate of the wrist, leading to death of the bone) and carpal tunnel syndrome in the left wrist with chronic pain and loss of motion; severe migraines; lower back pain; foot pain; and rheumatoid arthritis. (ECF No. 9-4, pp. 3, 15; ECF No. 9-6, pp. 2-3; ECF No. 9-7, pp. 3, 20, 45-46). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and on reconsideration, and an administrative hearing was held on December 16, 2020. (ECF No. 9-3, pp. 2-48). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. On her alleged onset date, Plaintiff was 47 years old and possessed a high school education. (ECF No. 9-4, p. 15). Although she had past relevant work (“PRW”) experience as a box maker, cashier, secretary, and clerk/stocker/cashier, she performed no substantial gainful activity after her alleged onset date. (ECF No. 9-7, pp. 4-5,12-19, 86). On March 10, 2021, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Glenn Neel, issued a partially favorable decision in which he found the Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis of the left wrist, status post multiple surgeries; mild degenerative disk disease (“DDD”) of the lumbar spine; and left carpal

tunnel syndrome (“CTS”), status post release surgery to be severe. (ECF No. 9-2, p. 42). He concluded Plaintiff was disabled between January 3, 2019, and June 4, 2020, due to severe wrist impairment that would result in absenteeism of at least two days of work per month. (Id. at 44- 48). However, beginning June 5, 2020, the ALJ noted medical improvement, concluding that she maintained the RFC to perform light work with occasional climbing of ladders/stairs, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and handling/fingering with her left upper extremity, and no concentrated exposure to workplace hazards, including the operation of a motor vehicle. (Id. at 49-52). Although this RFC prevented her from performing her past relevant work (“PRW”), with the assistance of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work as

a furniture rental clerk, laminating machine off bearer, protective clothing issuer, school bus monitor, head hostess, and chaperone. On December 21, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 2-8), and Plaintiff subsequently filed her Complaint to initiate this action (ECF No. 3). Both parties have filed appeal briefs (ECF Nos. 14, 15), and the matter is ripe for resolution. The case has been referred to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation. II. Applicable Law This Court’s role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014). If there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because

substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id. A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental

impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The fact finder only considers Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in the light of her residual functional capacity if the final stage of the analysis is reached. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). III. Discussion

In a single issue on appeal, the Plaintiff insists that the ALJ improperly concluded that she had experienced medical improvement as of June 5, 2020. As previously mentioned, the ALJ entered a partially favorable decision, finding the Plaintiff disabled from January 3, 2019, through June 4, 2020. Following a thorough review of the record, we agree that the record does not support a finding of medical improvement as of June 5, 2020. Once the ALJ has found that a claimant was disabled for a period but has improved, he must apply the medical improvement standard to determine whether their disability has ceased. Koch v. Kijakazi,

Related

Vossen v. Astrue
612 F.3d 1011 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Delph v. Astrue
538 F.3d 940 (Eighth Circuit, 2008)
Robert Blackburn v. Carolyn W. Colvin
761 F.3d 853 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Charles Miller v. Carolyn W. Colvin
784 F.3d 472 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Tammy Koch v. Kilolo Kijakazi
4 F.4th 656 (Eighth Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Cochran v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cochran-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-arwd-2023.