IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-914
Filed 15 April 2026
Randolph County, No. 25CV000794-750
BEVERLY COBLE, Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM CLAYTON BALLENTINE, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 21 April 2025 by Judge O. Henry
Willis Jr. in Randolph County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17
February 2026.
Sue, Anderson & Bordman, L.L.P., by Gary K. Sue and Andrew T. Smith, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Greg Gaught, and Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, by David W. Rubin and James C. Grant, pro hac vice, for Defendant-Appellant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant William Clayton Ballentine appeals from the trial court’s civil no-
contact order. He argues the no-contact order issued under North Carolina General
Statute Chapter 50C was not supported by record evidence. Defendant contends his
online conduct did not amount to stalking or harassment within the meaning of
Chapter 50C. Moreover, Defendant claims the trial court’s no-contact order violates
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. We agree with Defendant COBLE V. BALLENTINE
Opinion of the Court
that his actions did not constitute unlawful conduct under Chapter 50C. Thus, we
reverse the trial court’s no-contact order. Consequently, this Court need not address
the First Amendment issue.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Both residents of Randleman in Randolph County, Defendant and Plaintiff
have known each other for years. Although Defendant and Plaintiff were originally
friendly with each other, their relationship deteriorated upon the death of
Defendant’s father. Defendant has not directly contacted Plaintiff since 2022.
Defendant and Plaintiff are active in local politics and use their social media
accounts to express their political views. While both associate with the Randolph
County Republican Party, Defendant and Plaintiff have supported opposing
candidates in the past.
In March 2024, Plaintiff announced on Facebook that she would run for mayor
of Randleman in the 2025 election. Later that year, in response to Plaintiff’s
candidacy announcement, Defendant made a Facebook page titled “Anybody But
Coble.” Additionally, Defendant later created a website,
www.AnybodyButCoble.org.1 On these platforms, Defendant wrote articles opposing
Plaintiff’s mayoral candidacy. Facially, Defendant created “Anybody But Coble” to
assist voters in their mayoral candidate selection for Randleman.
1 For ease of reading, we will proceed by collectively referring to Defendant’s “Anybody But
Coble” Facebook page and “www.AnybodyButCoble.org” website as “Anybody But Coble.”
-2- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
On 27 December 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a no-contact order
against Defendant. However, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this complaint. Shortly
after the dismissal, Plaintiff stated online that she would no longer run for mayor.
Nevertheless, the mayoral candidate filing period remained open until July 2025.
Despite Plaintiff’s online statement that she would not run for mayor, Defendant did
not remove the content on his platforms concerning his opposition to Plaintiff’s
mayoral candidacy.
In March 2025, Plaintiff filed another complaint for a no-contact order against
Defendant. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendant continually harassed her
online since 2022. The trial court found Defendant’s conduct unlawful under North
Carolina General Statute Chapter 50C. The court ordered Defendant to refrain from
publicly writing, printing, or speaking Plaintiff’s name in any manner as well as going
within fifty yards of Plaintiff. The trial court’s order remains effective through 21
April 2026. Defendant timely appeals the no-contact order.
II. Analysis
We review a trial court’s order to determine whether competent evidence
supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether such findings support its
conclusions of law. DiPrima v. Vann, 277 N.C. App. 438, 442, 860 S.E.2d 290, 293
(2021) (citation omitted); Tyll v. Willets, 229 N.C. App. 155, 158, 748 S.E.2d 329, 331
(2013) (citation omitted). Additionally, this Court reviews conclusions of law de novo.
Tyll, 229 N.C. App. at 158, 748 S.E.2d at 331.
-3- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
A person may commence an action for a civil no-contact order when he or she
is a victim of unlawful conduct in North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-2(a) (2023).
Such unlawful conduct includes stalking. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-1(7)(b) (2023).
Stalking, within the meaning of the statute, is the following or harassing of another
person on more than one occasion without legal purpose with the intent to either (1)
instill reasonable fear in another person for their safety or the safety of those close to
them, or (2) cause another “to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that
person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and that in fact causes
that person substantial emotional distress.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-1(6).
Furthermore, such harassment includes knowing conduct such as “written or printed
communication or transmission . . . or other computerized or electronic transmissions
directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and
that serves no legitimate purpose.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2) (2023). Simply,
civil harassment constitutes “(1) knowing conduct (2) directed at (3) a specific person
(4) that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies, and (5) serves no legitimate purpose.”
Durham Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Wallace, 295 N.C. App. 440, 445, 907 S.E.2d 1, 6
(2024) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2)).
This Court has acknowledged a distinction between online posts written
“about” an individual and those sent “directly to” an individual. Weller v. Jackson,
279 N.C. App. 260, 2021 WL 4059970, at *3 (2021) (unpublished) (citing State v.
-4- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
Shackleford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 556, 825 S.E.2d 689, 698 (2019)).2 In Weller, the
defendant posted online articles that discussed the plaintiff, but these posts were not
directed at the plaintiff; therefore, the no-contact order was reversed. Id. at *4.
Unlike the criminal stalking statute in Shackleford, Chapter 50C concerning civil no-
contact orders does not expressly include definitional language of communicating “to
or about a person.” State v. Shackleford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 556, 825 S.E.2d 689, 698
(2019) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(c)).
Here, Defendant posted online articles and opinions about Plaintiff and her
eligibility as mayor; they were not directed to her. Even assuming Defendant was
aware Plaintiff used social media, such awareness does not necessarily mean
Defendant directed his online posts to Plaintiff. Furthermore, the purported purpose
of “Anybody But Coble” to aid voters buttresses the notion that Defendant’s
publications were directed at undecided voters in Randleman, not Plaintiff.
Moreover, writing in the second person suggests the writer is writing directly
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-914
Filed 15 April 2026
Randolph County, No. 25CV000794-750
BEVERLY COBLE, Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM CLAYTON BALLENTINE, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 21 April 2025 by Judge O. Henry
Willis Jr. in Randolph County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17
February 2026.
Sue, Anderson & Bordman, L.L.P., by Gary K. Sue and Andrew T. Smith, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Greg Gaught, and Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, by David W. Rubin and James C. Grant, pro hac vice, for Defendant-Appellant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant William Clayton Ballentine appeals from the trial court’s civil no-
contact order. He argues the no-contact order issued under North Carolina General
Statute Chapter 50C was not supported by record evidence. Defendant contends his
online conduct did not amount to stalking or harassment within the meaning of
Chapter 50C. Moreover, Defendant claims the trial court’s no-contact order violates
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. We agree with Defendant COBLE V. BALLENTINE
Opinion of the Court
that his actions did not constitute unlawful conduct under Chapter 50C. Thus, we
reverse the trial court’s no-contact order. Consequently, this Court need not address
the First Amendment issue.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Both residents of Randleman in Randolph County, Defendant and Plaintiff
have known each other for years. Although Defendant and Plaintiff were originally
friendly with each other, their relationship deteriorated upon the death of
Defendant’s father. Defendant has not directly contacted Plaintiff since 2022.
Defendant and Plaintiff are active in local politics and use their social media
accounts to express their political views. While both associate with the Randolph
County Republican Party, Defendant and Plaintiff have supported opposing
candidates in the past.
In March 2024, Plaintiff announced on Facebook that she would run for mayor
of Randleman in the 2025 election. Later that year, in response to Plaintiff’s
candidacy announcement, Defendant made a Facebook page titled “Anybody But
Coble.” Additionally, Defendant later created a website,
www.AnybodyButCoble.org.1 On these platforms, Defendant wrote articles opposing
Plaintiff’s mayoral candidacy. Facially, Defendant created “Anybody But Coble” to
assist voters in their mayoral candidate selection for Randleman.
1 For ease of reading, we will proceed by collectively referring to Defendant’s “Anybody But
Coble” Facebook page and “www.AnybodyButCoble.org” website as “Anybody But Coble.”
-2- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
On 27 December 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a no-contact order
against Defendant. However, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this complaint. Shortly
after the dismissal, Plaintiff stated online that she would no longer run for mayor.
Nevertheless, the mayoral candidate filing period remained open until July 2025.
Despite Plaintiff’s online statement that she would not run for mayor, Defendant did
not remove the content on his platforms concerning his opposition to Plaintiff’s
mayoral candidacy.
In March 2025, Plaintiff filed another complaint for a no-contact order against
Defendant. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendant continually harassed her
online since 2022. The trial court found Defendant’s conduct unlawful under North
Carolina General Statute Chapter 50C. The court ordered Defendant to refrain from
publicly writing, printing, or speaking Plaintiff’s name in any manner as well as going
within fifty yards of Plaintiff. The trial court’s order remains effective through 21
April 2026. Defendant timely appeals the no-contact order.
II. Analysis
We review a trial court’s order to determine whether competent evidence
supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether such findings support its
conclusions of law. DiPrima v. Vann, 277 N.C. App. 438, 442, 860 S.E.2d 290, 293
(2021) (citation omitted); Tyll v. Willets, 229 N.C. App. 155, 158, 748 S.E.2d 329, 331
(2013) (citation omitted). Additionally, this Court reviews conclusions of law de novo.
Tyll, 229 N.C. App. at 158, 748 S.E.2d at 331.
-3- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
A person may commence an action for a civil no-contact order when he or she
is a victim of unlawful conduct in North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-2(a) (2023).
Such unlawful conduct includes stalking. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-1(7)(b) (2023).
Stalking, within the meaning of the statute, is the following or harassing of another
person on more than one occasion without legal purpose with the intent to either (1)
instill reasonable fear in another person for their safety or the safety of those close to
them, or (2) cause another “to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that
person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and that in fact causes
that person substantial emotional distress.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-1(6).
Furthermore, such harassment includes knowing conduct such as “written or printed
communication or transmission . . . or other computerized or electronic transmissions
directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and
that serves no legitimate purpose.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2) (2023). Simply,
civil harassment constitutes “(1) knowing conduct (2) directed at (3) a specific person
(4) that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies, and (5) serves no legitimate purpose.”
Durham Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Wallace, 295 N.C. App. 440, 445, 907 S.E.2d 1, 6
(2024) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2)).
This Court has acknowledged a distinction between online posts written
“about” an individual and those sent “directly to” an individual. Weller v. Jackson,
279 N.C. App. 260, 2021 WL 4059970, at *3 (2021) (unpublished) (citing State v.
-4- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
Shackleford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 556, 825 S.E.2d 689, 698 (2019)).2 In Weller, the
defendant posted online articles that discussed the plaintiff, but these posts were not
directed at the plaintiff; therefore, the no-contact order was reversed. Id. at *4.
Unlike the criminal stalking statute in Shackleford, Chapter 50C concerning civil no-
contact orders does not expressly include definitional language of communicating “to
or about a person.” State v. Shackleford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 556, 825 S.E.2d 689, 698
(2019) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(c)).
Here, Defendant posted online articles and opinions about Plaintiff and her
eligibility as mayor; they were not directed to her. Even assuming Defendant was
aware Plaintiff used social media, such awareness does not necessarily mean
Defendant directed his online posts to Plaintiff. Furthermore, the purported purpose
of “Anybody But Coble” to aid voters buttresses the notion that Defendant’s
publications were directed at undecided voters in Randleman, not Plaintiff.
Moreover, writing in the second person suggests the writer is writing directly
to someone; we do not see the use of the second person in Defendant’s posts.
Defendant refers to Plaintiff in the third person throughout his publications in
“Anybody But Coble.” While writing in the third person is not dispositive, it tends to
support Defendant’s claim that his online communications were about Plaintiff.
2 We recognize Weller is unpublished and, thus, it is not binding precedent.Nevertheless, we find the reasoning persuasive. Weller involves a similar factual pattern and turns on whether that defendant’s online posts were directed at the plaintiff or whether the posts were simply about that plaintiff.
-5- COBLE V. BALLENTINE
Plaintiff fails to carry her burden in demonstrating Defendant directed these
posts, or any other communication, at her. Therefore, there is a lack of evidence to
support a finding that Defendant stalked or harassed Plaintiff. Thus, we reverse the
trial court’s no-contact order. Accordingly, this Court need not address Defendant’s
First Amendment argument.
III. Conclusion
Since Defendant’s publications were not directed at Plaintiff, we reverse the
no-contact order.
REVERSED.
Judges ARROWOOD and WOOD concur.
-6-