Coates v. Baker

12 Am. Tribal Law 335
CourtCherokee Nation Supreme Court
DecidedApril 13, 2015
DocketSC-2014-03
StatusPublished

This text of 12 Am. Tribal Law 335 (Coates v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cherokee Nation Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coates v. Baker, 12 Am. Tribal Law 335 (cherokee 2015).

Opinions

OPINION

JAMES G. WILCOXEN, Justice.

Appellant Coates is an elected council member of the Cherokee Nation. She brings suit alleging she was denied access to and copies of certain Tribal documents, thereby violating her rights under the Cherokee Nation Freedom of Information and Rights of Privacy Act (“Cherokee FOIA”) and the Government Records Act (“GRA”) of the Cherokee Constitution.

On March 18, 2013, Coates submitted four requests for Tribal documents1 to the Principal Chief along with other various department heads including Attorney General Hembree. Upon receiving Coates’ request, Hembree made the documents available for Coates to review in the Attorney General’s office during regular business hours. Although Coates was given the opportunity to review and make notes of the documents, Hembree denied her the ability to make copies of the documents declaring them to be “confidential.”2 Coates, through her attorney, reviewed the documents in question and deemed them to be insufficient. Coates then filed suit, claiming Respondents were withholding certain documents and denying her right to copy said documents under the Cherokee FOIA and the GRA.

Respondents moved to dismiss Coates’ claims, upon which the District Court held GRA arguments. The District Court dismissed the case without prejudice, holding:

1. The appropriate persons were not served requests for information under the GRA.
2. The matter was premature due to Coates’ failure to review all of the documents provided in detail to determine if the Respondents had properly responded to the request.
3. The documents were properly provided for Coates’ review at the Attorney General’s office.

Order at 2. In addition, the District Court held that, “Once the documents requested have been provided in accordance with the Act, it then becomes incumbent upon the person requesting such documents to identify those which he or she determines may not have been provided, and to make a specific request for those documents.” Order at 1. The District Court dismissed Coates’ claims without prejudice to allow her an opportunity to review the documents, and then make a request for any missing documents.

The ruling of the District Court aside, the principal issue in this case is whether Cherokee law requires confidential Tribal documents to be physically copied for use by Cherokee council members. While the crux of this case turns on whether the GRA requires this practice, Coates has [337]*337also claimed that her rights as a Cherokee citizen have been violated under the Cherokee FOIA.3 Therefore, we will take up this first issue in turn.

I.

The Cherokee FOIA was enacted to provide all Cherokee citizens the right of open access to any and all Cherokee Nation documents, records, and other materials, provided that the information sought is not exempt from disclosure, LA-25-01 at § 102. Naturally, as an elected council member of the Cherokee Nation, Coates is able to claim citizenship of the Tribe as well. The Act states that, “Any Cherokee Nation citizen has a right to inspect or copy any public record of a public body ...” Id, at § 104(A); (emphasis added). The statute then lists the types of records which must be made available for public inspection and copying in § 104(D). Obviously Coates as a Cherokee citizen has the right to both access to and copies of the documents falling within the purview of § 104(D). If any of the documents she has requested falls within the categories this provision contemplates, then she has an unequivocal right to copies of those documents. The Act goes on to explicitly list the types of documents, records, and other information that, “A public body may, but is not required to, exempt from disclosure ...” Id. at § 105(A). Clearly Coates cannot use her rights as a Cherokee citizen to réview and/or copy these types of documents if she is denied access by the public body which controls them.

We believe the Cherokee FOIA is dear: Appellant Coates has the right as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation to both review and copy any records listed under § 104(D) of the Cherokee FOIA. If Respondent Hem-bree’s office has fairly deemed the various requested documents exempt from access under the purview of § 105(A), then Coates has no recourse under her Cherokee citizenship. However, Coates has the added advantage of being council member, which gives her access to information over and above that of the common Cherokee citizen under the GRÁ.

As stated above, the Cherokee FOIA makes certain information public to the Cherokee Nation at-large. The GRA, on the other hand, deals strictly with the rights of Cherokee council members to have open access to certain Tribal documents, records, and other materials. The relevant portion of the GRA pertaining to this case states: “In the event that the record submitted to the Council Member(s) is ‘privileged or confidential’ as defined under the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) and the federal case law thereunder, that record shall, nevertheless, be produced or otherwise made available to the requesting Council Member(s).” 19 CNCA § 5(D); (emphasis added).”4

[338]*338Coates argues that the language of the GRA only makes sense if it is construed to allow council members not only access to the requested documents, but the right to make copies of them as well. We disagree with her interpretation. Coates contends that:

The GRA, amended on June 13, 2012, provides that Respondents shall provide the requested records to the requesting council member and the Council’s legislative aide. Then the legislative aide shall also provide a copy of all requested records to the Principal Chief and Speaker of the Council. This provision of the GRA clearly means Respondents provide copies of the requested records to Coates and the legislative aide who, in turn, provides additional copies to the Principal Chief and Speaker of the Council.

Coates’ Brief-in-Chief at 3; (emphasis added by Coates). What Coates is referring to is § 45(C) of the Enhanced GRA, which was enacted in 2014 in an attempt to “clarify” the original GRA. LA-IS-14 at § 2. As the Couneilmember points out, this amended version of the GRA includes the phrase “shall also provide a copy.” Yet, neither § 5(D) of the original GRA nor § 45(E) of the Enhanced GRA contain such language.5 Rather, they merely state “produced or otherwise [make] available.” We are of the opinion that the legislature would have included the word ‘copy’ throughout both the original and Enhanced versions of the GRA if it intended for such practices. Moreover, the fact that no such language was added to § 45(E) of the Enhanced GRA when it was recently “clarified” is particularly indicative that the legislature willfully excluded the allowance of copies.

Coates also makes several inquiries questioning the logic and overall common sense of § 4S(C):

The notion that the GRA does not require physical production of the document, either by hard copy or electronically is belied by the language that an additional copy

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Bluebook (online)
12 Am. Tribal Law 335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coates-v-baker-cherokee-2015.