Coastal Oil v. Teamsters

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: January 29, 1998
• Docket: 97-1950
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________



          No. 97-1950



                          COASTAL OIL OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.,



                                Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                          v.



                                 TEAMSTERS LOCAL A/W

                       INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,



                                 Defendant, Appellee.



                                 ____________________



                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________



                                 ____________________



                                        Before



                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________



                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________



                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________



                                _____________________



               Alan  S. Miller, with  whom Stoneman, Chandler  & Miller LLP
               _______________             ________________________________

          was on brief for appellant.

               Christine L. Nickerson, with whom Matthew E. Dwyer and Dwyer
               ______________________            ________________     _____

          & Jenkins, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
          _______________


____________________



                                   January 23, 1998

                                 ____________________



TORRUELLA, Chief  Judge.  Although this appeal presents
                    TORRUELLA, Chief  Judge.
                               ____________



          a somewhat novel question, the answer is more mundane.



                    Appellant employer  Coastal Oil  of New  England, Inc.,



          filed  an  Application  to  Vacate an  arbitration  award  in the



          Superior  Court of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  on  the



          grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority.  Appellee



          labor organization Teamsters Local Union No. 25 A/W International



          Brotherhood of Teamsters removed the  matter to the United States



          District Court for the District  of Massachusetts.  See 28 U.S.C.
                                                              ___



             1441,  1331; 29  U.S.C.    185(a).   Both parties  filed cross



          motions for summary  judgment, whereupon the court  ruled against



          appellant and denied vacation of the arbitration award.  Instead,



          the district court granted appellee's  request that the award  be



          enforced.   Final judgment was entered thereafter and this appeal



          followed.



                    Appellant   operates  three   separate  facilities   in



          Massachusetts,  including one  in  Revere  and  one  in  Chelsea.



          Although  they  are  all  represented for  collective  bargaining



          purposes  by  appellee,  the  employees  in  each  of  the  three



          facilities belong to separate bargaining units and are covered by



          discrete collective bargaining agreements. 



                    Joseph   Abruzzese,  a   yardman   within  the   Revere



          bargaining unit,  was injured in a work-related accident in 1991,



          forcing him to take a leave  of absence, during which he received



          benefits  under  the  Massachusetts  Worker's  Compensation  Act.



          Mass.  Gen. Laws  ch. 152,    1  et seq.   In  August 1995,  when
                                           _______


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Abruzzese  sought  to  return  to  work,  no  job  openings  were



          available  in the  Revere  unit.    Nevertheless,  appellant  and



          appellee  reached an agreement that Abruzzese would be reinstated



          to  the next available position.  Subsequently, Abruzzese learned



          that a  yardman position was  available in the Chelsea  unit, the



          same job  that he  had previously  had in  the Revere  unit.   He



          applied for  that slot  through his union,  appellee.   Appellant



          refused the request,  contending that Abruzzese only  had a right



          to  reinstatement  in the  Revere  unit.   After  appellant hired



          someone else to the Chelsea  position, appellee filed a grievance



          pursuant to the Revere contract.



                    Eventually, the dispute was heard before an arbitrator.



          After hearing  the evidence,  the arbitrator  concluded that  the



          issue  to be  decided  was  "whether  the  Company  violated  the



          [Revere] Agreement when it refused  to place Joseph Abruzzese . .



          . in a position of yardman at the Company's Chelsea terminal  . .



          .  ."   Thereafter, the  arbitrator concluded  that Article  XIV,



          Section 10(a)  of the  Revere Agreement,  which incorporated  the



          Massachusetts Worker's Compensation  Law, mandated the employment



          of Abruzzese at the open position in Chelsea.  Appellant was thus



          ordered to reinstate him to the  Chelsea position and to make him



          whole as to back pay and lost benefits.



                    Appellant's challenge  to the district  court's rulings



          stems  from its  contention  that  the  arbitrator  exceeded  his



          authority  under  the Revere  collective bargaining  agreement by



          ordering the employment of a member of that unit into the Chelsea


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unit.   As a corollary to  that issue, appellant  claims that the



          arbitrator   lacked   authority   to   interpret   the   Worker's



          Compensation Act.



                    Labor arbitration is the product of the private will of



          voluntarily consenting parties.  Thus, the starting point, and in



          a real sense the finishing one in  this, as in most challenges to



          arbitration  awards, is the language of the collective bargaining



          contract.   Such  language  establishes  the  parameters  of  the



          arbitrator's authority.



                    We commence  our quest  for the  answers to  the issues



          raised by  this appeal with  a reading  of Article  XVIII of  the



          Revere Agreement entitled  "Grievance Procedure," which  provides



          in Section 2, in effect, that in exchange for labor peace "during



          the  life   of  this   Agreement[,]  .  .   .  any   question  of



          interpretation,  enforcement,  adjustment  or  grievance  .  .  .



          between the employer and the Union and his employees which cannot



          be  adjusted[,]  .  . .  shall  be  referred  .  .  . to  .  .  .



          arbitration[,] . . . [which] . . .  decision . . . shall be final



          and binding upon both parties."



                    We  next proceed to  the specific provision  upon which



          the arbitrator relied  for his ruling, Article XIV, Section 10(a)



          of the Revere contract.  It states that:                         


The   Company   shall    either   carry   worker's

                    compensation  or, in the event of  an injury to an

                    employee,  shall provide  said  employee with  the

                    same benefits  and payments and in the same manner

                    as provided  by  the provisions  of  the  Worker's

                    Compensation  Law  (Massachusetts  G.L.,   Chapter



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152) and Amendments thereto,  up to and  including

                    the date of the signing of this Agreement.

                        

                    We  thus come  to  Section  75A  of  the  Massachusetts



          Worker's  Compensation   statute,  which  the   arbitrator  found



          applicable  to the submitted grievance under the previously cited



          contractual provision, and  which he interpreted to  require that



          Abruzzese be  reinstated to the Chelsea  position notwithstanding



          his previous employment outside that  unit.  Section 75A reads as



          follows:



                    Any person who  has lost a job  as a result  of an

                    injury  compensable under  this  chapter shall  be

                    given preference  in hiring  by  the employer  for

                    whom he worked at  the time of compensable  injury

                    over any  persons not  at the time  of application

                    for  re-employment  employed   by  such  employer;

                    provided,   however,  that   a  suitable   job  is

                    available.    Actions  may  be  filed  under  this

                    section with the superior  court department of the

                    trial court  for the  county in which  the alleged

                    violation  occurred.   An  employer found  to have

                    violated this section shall be  exclusively liable

                    to  pay to  the employee  lost wages,  shall grant

                    the employee  a suitable job, and  shall reimburse

                    such  reasonable  attorney  fees incurred  in  the

                    protection of  rights granted  by this section  as

                    shall be determined by the court.



                    In the  event that  any right  set  forth in  this

                    section   is  inconsistent   with  an   applicable

                    collective   bargaining   agreement   or   chapter

                    thirty- one,  the collective  bargaining agreement

                    or said chapter thirty-one shall prevail.



                    Although we have often stated  the following principle,



          due to the number of groundless appeals that have come before  us



          challenging   arbitration  awards,   it  bears   repeating  that:



          "[j]udicial review of an arbitration award is among the narrowest



          known  to the  law."   Maine  Cent.  R.R. Co.  v.  Brotherhood of
                                 ______________________      ______________



          Maintenance of Way Employees, 873  F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1989).
          ____________________________



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For courts  "do not sit to hear claims  of factual or legal error



          by  an arbitrator[,]  as  an appellate  court  does in  reviewing



          decisions  of lower courts."   United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
                                         _______________________________



          Misco, 484 U.S.  29, 38 (1987).  In fact, "[f]ederal court review
          _____



          of arbitral  decisions  is extremely  narrow and  extraordinarily



          deferential."  Service Employees Int'l Union v. Local 1199, N.E.,
                         _____________________________    ________________



          70 F.3d 647, 651 (1st Cir. 1995).



                    "[A] court should  uphold an award that  depends on the



          arbitrator's interpretation of a  collective bargaining agreement



          if it  can find, within  the four  corners of the  agreement, any



          plausible  basis  for that  interpretation." El  Dorado Technical
                                                       ____________________



          Servs., Inc. v. Uni n General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961
          ____________    ____________________________________________



          F.2d 317,  319 (1st Cir. 1992).  That  a court would have decided



          an issue differently is not  a basis for overruling an arbitrator



          if the  arbitrator "even arguably  acted within the scope  of his



          authority."  Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
                       _____



                    Absent a claim  that the award is  against an explicit,



          well-defined, and dominant  public policy, see Service  Employees
                                                     ___ __________________



          Int'l Union, 70  F.3d at 652, the  scope of review is  limited to
          ___________



          claims  that  the  arbitrator's decision  is:  "(1)  unfounded in



          reason and fact;  (2) based on reasoning so  palpably faulty that



          no judge,  or group of  judges, ever could conceivably  have made



          such a  ruling; or (3)  mistakenly based on a  crucial assumption



          that  is concededly  a non-fact."    Local 1445  United Food  and
                                               ____________________________



          Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776  F.2d 19,
          ______________________________    ________________



          21 (1st Cir. 1985).  And,  of course, "[a]n arbitrator's view  of


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the scope  of the  issue .  . .  is entitled  to the  same .  . .



          deference  .   .  .   normally  accorded   to  the   arbitrator's



          interpretation of  the collective  bargaining agreement  itself."



          Larocque v.  R.W.F., Inc., 8 F.3d 95, 97  (1st Cir. 1993).  Based
          ________     ____________



          on  these well-established principles, the outcome of this appeal



          is preordained.



                    Although the scope of the reinstatement remedy provided



          through an arbitral  award is usually limited  to the contractual



          bargaining  unit  from  which the  grievance  arises,  a contrary



          result  is not  unheard of  where the  parties have  bargained to



          grant the arbitrator  such power.  See supra.  The parties to the
                                             ___ _____



          collective  bargaining  agreement,  the  same entities  presently



          before us, voluntarily contracted to submit to  final and binding



          arbitration  any question of interpretation of that agreement, or



          any  grievance involving  employees.    It  cannot  be  seriously



          contended  that  the  underlying controversy  submitted  to,  and



          litigated  before, the  arbitrator  does  not  concern  both  the



          interpretation  of the collective bargaining agreement as well as



          a grievance  involving an employee.   How can the  arbitrator, in



          determining  whether  appellant  lived  up  to  the   contractual



          obligations  mandated  by Section  10(a)  of Article  XIV  of the



          Revere Agreement, fail to address  whether the provisions of  the



          Massachusetts Worker's  Compensation Law, incorporated  into that



          agreement by Section 10(a), have been met?



                    The response to this question as well as to appellant's



          challenge   to  the  arbitrator's   authority  to  interpret  the


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aforementioned Massachusetts statute is self-evident.  Obviously,



          the  arbitrator  acted  properly  and  within  the  scope of  his



          delegated authority.  We can perceive of no valid reason  why the



          parties  could not also  agree to have  statutory rights enforced



          before   an   arbitral    forum.      See,   e.g.,    Gilmer   v.
                                                ___    ____     ______



          Interstate/Johnson  Lane Corp., 500  U.S. 20, 35  (1991) (holding
          ______________________________



          ADEA  claims to be arbitrable); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc.,
                                          __________    __________________



          1998 WL 5845, __ F.3d __  (1st Cir. 1998) (ADA claims subject  to



          arbitration);  (Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832
                          _________    ______________________



          (8th Cir. 1997)  (extending Gilmer to Title VII  claims); Mago v.
                                      ______                        ____



          Shearson Lehman Hutton,  Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935  (9th Cir. 1992)
          _____________________________



          (extending Gilmer to Title VII  claims); Utley v. Goldman Sachs &
                     ______                        _____    _______________



          Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186 (1st  Cir. 1989) (holding inter alia Title
          ___                                              __________



          VII claims to be arbitrable); cf. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
                                        ___ _______________________________



          v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (holding Securities Exchange
             _______



          Act and RICO claims to be arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
                                                 _______________________



          Soler  Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (holding
          ______________________________



          Sherman Act claims to be arbitrable).



                    A   cursory  reading  of  that  statute  leads  to  the



          inevitable conclusion that  the arbitrator's ruling in  this case



          was not  only clearly  within the  powers granted  to him  in the



          collective bargaining agreement, it  is substantially the  remedy



          that  the Massachusetts  Superior Court  would  likely have  felt



          required to grant Joseph Abruzzese  given that the appellant is a



          single, unitary employer, for workman's compensation purpose.  As



          a result, its  trinary profile, for labor  relations purposes, is


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presently  irrelevant.   We note that  our views as  to the legal



          soundness of the arbitrator's conclusions are largely gratuitous,



          for as previously stated, even an erroneous interpretation of the



          law by an  arbitrator is not subject  to judicial review  if that



          authority has been delegated to the arbitrator, as it was in this



          case.



                    The  decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.  Costs
                                                           AFFIRMED
                                                           ________



          are granted to appellee.


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