Coastal Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.

51 F. Supp. 819, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedSeptember 22, 1943
DocketCivil Action No. 632
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 51 F. Supp. 819 (Coastal Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coastal Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 51 F. Supp. 819, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266 (W.D. La. 1943).

Opinion

PORTERIE, District Judge.

Omitting the purely argumentative parts, we quote practically verbatim the statement of the case as drafted by the counsel of the defendant company.

Plaintiff seeks the cancellation of an oil, gas and mineral lease held by defendant on its land, situated in what is known as the South East Extension of the Chalkley Field, or South East Chalkley Extension in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, and, in the alternative, damages in the sum of $36,000. Plaintiff prays likewise for attorney’s fees in the sum of $2,000. Both the claim for cancellation and that for damages are based on an alleged breach of the implied covenants of the lease. Two wells have been drilled on plaintiff’s land, Coastal Club No. 1, an oil well completed in June, 1940, in the W sand and Coastal Club No. 2, a gas well completed May 16, 1941, in the T sand. Plaintiff claims that another well should have been drilled on its land to the W sand on the 40-acre tract just south of that on which Coastal Club No. 1 is situated (referred to in this case as Coastal Club No. 3 and also as hypothetical or conjectural Coastal Club No. 3) and that the failure and refusal of defend[821]*821ant-lessee to drill the additional well was a breach of the implied obligations of the lease and entitles the plaintiff to the cancellation sought. Plaintiff admits that Coastal Club No. 1 is producing oil in paying quantities and concedes that defendant is entitled to retain the lease as to 5 acres around that well; but contends that Coastal Club No. 2, not being connected to a pipe line and having no available market for its gas, cannot be considered as producing gas in paying quantities although plaintiff has received royalties from well No. 2 averaging $70 per month to the time of the trial for gas used in field operations. Consequently, plaintiff contends that defendant is not entitled to retain any acreage around well No. 2.

The lease in question was granted by The Coastal Club, Inc. (plaintiff herein), to Walter C. Peters, April 11, 1935, and was assigned by Peters to Shell Oil Company, Incorporated (defendant herein). It originally covered 6,000 acres of land; but in February, 1942, defendant filed for record a release of all the leased premises except 240 acres. Thereafter, during the pendency of this suit, defendant filed for record a further release whereby it released all the leased acreage except 80 acres, that is NW % of NW )4, Section 27, .Township 12 South, Range 6 West, being the governmental subdivision of 40 acres on which Coastal Club No. 1 is located and NE % of SE %, Section 28, same township and range, being the governmental subdivision of 40 acres on which Coastal Club No. 2 is located. Plaintiff takes the position that the lease does not permit of partial surrender and that, when defendant put of record the two partial releases, defendant abandoned the lease and terminated it, except as to 5 acres around Coastal Club No. 1. In the alternative, plaintiff prays that if the partial surrenders did not operate as an abandonment of the lease, plaintiff is entitled to damages in the sum of $36,000 for failure to drill the additional well, hypothetical Coastal Club No. 3.

There is another point made by plaintiff, to-wit: that Coastal Club No. 1 is not in the center of the 40-acre tract retained by defendant and in no event should defendant be permitted to keep more of the retained acreage than that which would be included in a block of 40 acres shaped as nearly to a square as possible with Coastal Club No. 1 in the center,.

We believe that the real issue between plaintiff and defendant is whether or not defendant has adequately developed the premises.

The position of the defendant is that (a) the premises have been adequately developed and there has been no breach of any express or implied covenants of the lease, and, hence, no bases for any relief; (b) the question of whether or not the lease permits of partial surrender is immaterial to the decision of the case; but in any event partial surrender is not prohibited by the lease after the delay rental payment period is passed; (c) should the court decide there has been a failure to develop adequately, the defendant should be permitted nevertheless to hold the two tracts not surrendered, because they correspond to the field spacing, as required under existing governmental regulations; (d) in no event should defendant be given less than 5 acres around each well; (e) plaintiff is not entitled to damages; and (f) plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees even if cancellation be decreed.

We asked that the briefs submitted to the court be subdivided into four parts— the statement of the case, the discussion of the facts, the findings of fact, and the conclusions of law. Both briefs were so formulated and proved to be of great help to the court.

If defendant has adequately developed, then the partial surrenders did not damage plaintiff and they constituted simply an expression by defendant that it felt the released acreage would not support a well and that it did not intend to drill on the released acreage, nor did it want to stand in the way of plaintiff trying to find some other operator to drill. If there has been adequate development, there has been no breach of the obligations of the lease and hence no damage done to plaintiff by the defendant and, accordingly, there is no occasion for the court to inquire into whether or not the arrangement of the retained acreage around the wells is scientific or desirable.

We shall now discuss the dominant facts, established by the clear preponderance of the evidence.

The eight wells that have already been drilled and that are now producing in the field are producing all the recoverable oil from the reservoir. This was supported by the evidence of the experts on both [822]*822sides, and is pleaded by both parties. From the established premise that the wells in existence are capable of producing all of the oil in the field there follows indubitably the conclusion that the field as a whole has been adequately developed. Any additional wells would be unnecessary wells. In the recent case of Hunter Co. v. McHugh, Commissioner of Conservation, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495, 510, the court said: “Any well which will not increase materially the total ultimate recovery from the gas pool is an unnecessary well. The drilling and completion of every unnecessary well invariably threatens to cause physical waste of gas and results in an inefficient and uneconomic drainage area for such well.”

The next important and dominant question is whether or not the distribution of the development is such as to give plaintiff its fair share of the reserve.

The following tabulation taken from defendant’s brief (checked by the court against the transcript and found to be true) shows the percentage of the total productive acreage owned by the Coastal Club :

“Name Total Productive ' ' Acreage Total Coastal Club Productive Acreage Percent of Total
Bates 700 (P. 71) 80 (P. 74 and 77) 11.4 (Ex. D. 25 and P. 226)
Collett 695 (P. 166) 85 (P. 166) 12.2 (Ex. D. 25 and P. 226)
Burpee 605 (P. 220) 70.4 (P. 220) 11.6 (P. 220)
Torrey 556 (P. 300, 301) 68 (P. 301) 12.23 (P. 332)
Craft 605 (P. 373) 70.4 (P. 374) 11.6 (P. 374)”

From this tabulation it is proved that the plaintiff has somewhere between 11.4% and 12.23% of the total productive acreage.

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Related

Billeaud Planters Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.
144 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Louisiana, 1956)
Coastal Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.
56 F. Supp. 641 (W.D. Louisiana, 1944)
Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Coastal Club, Inc.
141 F.2d 382 (Fifth Circuit, 1944)

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Bluebook (online)
51 F. Supp. 819, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coastal-club-inc-v-shell-oil-co-lawd-1943.