Coale v. Coale

63 A.D. 32, 71 N.Y.S. 214, 1901 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1541

This text of 63 A.D. 32 (Coale v. Coale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coale v. Coale, 63 A.D. 32, 71 N.Y.S. 214, 1901 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1541 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1901).

Opinions

O’Brien, J.:

The action was brought against the Farmers’ Loan and Trust 'Company, as temporary receiver of the estate of Jane A. Dwyer, deceased, to recover four claims made by the plaintiff against the estate. Subsequently, by an order of revivor, the action was continued against the plaintiff and others as executors, they having become such upon the probate of the will of the deceased. The claims, which aggregated $8,498.19, were to obtain (1) a balance alleged to be due on a demand note given by the deceased to the plaintiff for $7,000 and dated.April 17, 1890, with interest, less the amounts paid thereon with interest; (2) a balance on a demand note for $2,000, dated August 17, 1893, with interest, less payments thereon and interest; (3) payment of a check for $432, signed by the decedent, and dated July 2, 1895, but not presented for payment by the plaintiff before her death, which occurred August 15, 1895, and (4) reimbursement for $350 paid by the plaintiff August % 1895, for a hotel bill incurred by the deceased. With some slight changes in the sums demanded, the referee found in plaintiff’s favor upon all the claims, and held that he was entitled to recover of the estate $8,309.02. From the judgment entered upon the referee’s report, the defendants appeal.

We have presented upon this appeal purely questions of fact, and conceding, in view of the nature of the claims which are made against a decedent’s estate by one who to a considerable extent has been connected with its management, that they should be closely scrutinized and satisfactorily proved, there is still no difference in the rule to be applied in determining whether the questions of fact were rightly decided in the trial court. The rule, as we understand it, is that where there is evidence to support the findings of a referee or of the trial court, we are not justified in disturbing such findings unless they are clearly against the weight of evidence. The record before us furnishes ample testimony to support the findings of the referee, and though with respect to certain of the claims it might seem to us individually that the evidence is not as strong as we could wish, that is no reason for setting aside the referee’s conclusions, provided there is, as stated, sufficient evidence to support them. And with respect to all the claims, it must be remembered [34]*34that a prima faoie case was established after the plaintiff had sustained the burden which rested upon him of proving in the first instance that he had parted with his money at the request and for the .benefit of the deceased. This burden, we think, he sustained, and there was no evidence given on behalf of the defendants which outweighed it. The defendants in fact relied almost exclusively upon probing the plaintiff’s testimony, and by arguments resting thereupon sought to deduce a refutation of- the claims made by him.

Particularly is this true with regard to the hotel bill of $350 which, as the receipt in evidence shows, was paid by the plaintiff on .August 2, 1895, in compromise of a bill first made for $374.89, .the evidence offered being all one way and consisting of the plaintiff’s own statement, corroborated by that of the hotel keeper to whom the sum was given, that the amount paid was on account of and for the benefit of the deceased. In refuting this claim and to overcome the probative force of such evidence, the defendants suggest that it is possible that, as the plaintiff from time to time had moneys of the deceased, particularly after her death about the middle of August; which moneys he received .as her manager in running her hotel, it might well be that the payment of this account was balanced by the receipt by him of other moneys. This suggestion, .however, is a mere surmise and conjecture, resting on no solid foundation ; and, as we have already stated, after the plaintiff had sustained the-burden of showing that he had made the payment, it was then incumbent upon those who disputed it to prove by way of defense, as was not done or even attempted, that he was in some way repaid Out of moneys belonging to the decedent.

What has just been said applies equally well to the claim represented by the check for $432 which the plaintiff testified was given him by the deceased during the month prior to her death.for expenditures he had made for her, which check he had. not presented for payment.

The more serious questions relate to the notes upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover. As to them he was subjected to a long and searching cross-examination, during which he apparently made every effort to give information as to everything connected with the business of the deceased as well as his personal affairs. Thus he [35]*35submitted his savings bank book, and when asked if he minded telling where the checks were from, answered, “Not a bit. I am willing to tell you all that I can.” And when asked if he objected to leaving his book to be looked through with reference to the checks, said, “Oh, yes, we will leave them all.” Many of the checks he explained at length, and he gave such details as could be expected of a man who was charged with many duties in relation to various transactions. His explanation of the giving of the notes to him was that he had saved considerable ready cash from his earnings while in Mrs. Dwyer’s employ which he kept' in a safe, and Mrs. Dwyer, who trusted him and was interested in his advancement, preferred to borrow of him, from time to time, such moneys as she required, giving him the six per cent interest to help him along rather than raise the moneys by giving her bonds or other property as security to outsiders. Both the notes were identified as being signed by the deceased, and they bear indorsements of payments at various times, which payments, the plaintiff testified, were generally made to him in cash.

As to the note for $2,000 the explanation given was very complete. The plaintiff testified that Mrs. Dwyer went to Italy before interest on a mortgage came due and left a note in her favor for $3,000 which he was to collect and apply to that interest; that the ¡note was protested, and by taking what money he could get at the house and $2,000 of his own, he paid the $3,000 of interest and the note to him was signed upon Mrs. Dwyer’s return. Upon this note the plaintiff had indorsed two payments which he testified were made to him by the deceased of $500 and $100, dated respectively March 27 and July 10, 1895. As to this item, therefore, we think the evidence amply supports the conclusion of the referee.

Thus we come to the first note for $7,000 which was dated April 17, 1890. The plaintiff testified that he had advanced on this note only $4,000 individually, the balance of $3,000 he having borrowed from others; that his own money represented various small accounts which had accumulated and which the deceased had figured out and settled by giving the note, the memorandum used being thereafter destroyed; that Mrs. Dwyer had been interested in various enterprises, including a quarry and an ice company, and had lost con siderable, and he thought this $7,000 went into the quarry and the [36]*36ice company. The note, he said, she had dated back a year in order to allow him interest. It also bears indorsements of payments, the plaintiff testifying that he Was in the habit of applying sums therefor with the knowledge and consent of Mrs. Dwyer. Those indorsements amount to $4,254, and two of them were credited after the death of Mrs. Dwyer.

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Bluebook (online)
63 A.D. 32, 71 N.Y.S. 214, 1901 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coale-v-coale-nyappdiv-1901.