DAVIDOFF HUICHER & CITRON LLP D = ‘oe ATTORNEYS AT LAW 605 THIRD AVENUE Megan astecney meee NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10158 TEL: (212) 557-7200 OFFICES FAX: (212) 286-1884 □□□□ WHITE PLAINS WWW, DHCLEGAL,COM ALBANY ATTORNEYS AT LAW ATTORNEYS AT LAW 120 BLOOMINGDALE ROAD [50 STATE STREET WHITE PLAINS, NY 10605 ALBANY, NY | 2207 (914) 381-7400 (518) 465-8230 PALM BEACH WASHINGTON, D.C. ATTORNEYS AT LAW ATTORNEYS AT LAW 250 ROYAL PALM WAY MENO END ORSED 20 | MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.E. SUITE 202 WASHINGTON, D.C, 20002 PALM BEACH, FL 33480 (202) 347-1117 (561) 567-8488 \ f WRITER'S DIRECT: (646) 428-3272 . U Ne A - E-MAIL: mry@dhclegal.com HON. VALERIE FIGUER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE VIA ECF Dated: February 2, 2026 Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J.| Coach is directed to file a response by Southern District of New York February 5. 2026 v5, . 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 Re: Coach IP Holdings, LLC, et al. v. ACS Group Acquisitions LLC, et al. No. 1:23-cv-10612 (LGS) (VF Dear Judge Figueredo: This firm represents Vinci Brands LLC (“Vinci”), Onward Brands LLC (“Onward”), ACS Group Acquisition LLC (“ACS”), Charles Tebele, and Sam Haddad (Vinci, Onward, ACS, Tebele, and Haddad collectively, “Defendants’) in the above-captioned matter against Coach IP Holdings, LLC (“Coach IP”), Coach Services, Inc. (“Coach Services”), and Tapestry, Inc. (“Tapestry”) (Coach IP, Coach Services, and Tapestry collectively, “Coach’). I write pursuant to Section I.c.2 of Your Honor’s Individual Rules to request a discovery conference with the Court. The reason for the requested discovery conference is Coach’s objection and refusal to permit Defendants to depose Todd Kahn, Coach Services’ chief executive officer. Consistent with this Court’s January 5, 2026 Order, see ECF Dkt. No. 264, Defendants provided Coach with their list of intended deponents, inclusive of three dates of availability with respect to each such deposition on January 19, 2026. Coach did not object to Defendants’ inclusion of Kahn upon their receipt of Defendants’ aforementioned list. On January 20, 2026, also in accordance with this Court’s January 5, 2026 Order, counsel for the parties conducted a meet-and-confer with respect to their respective lists of intended deponents. During the meet- and-confer, the parties then agreed to reconvene at a date to be determined in order to allow them to inquire about their own witnesses’ availability. Notably, Coach again failed to object to Defendants’ inclusion of Kahn as an intended deponent. Counsel for the parties reconvened via video conference, which commenced at 10:15am on January 26, 2026. The conference lasted for approximately 30 minutes. Present on behalf of Defendants were the undersigned, Matthew Yogg, along with Robert Price of Davidoff Hutcher & Citron LLP. Present on behalf of Coach were Tim Beyer and Bret Ruber of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP. Following the undersigned’s inquiry as to whether any of Defendants’
Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J. January 30, 2026 Page 2
three proposed dates of availability worked for Kahn, counsel for Coach responded — for the first time — that they were objecting to Defendants’ intended deposition of him. When the undersigned inquired about the grounds of Coach’s objection, counsel responded by citing the apex doctrine. The undersigned then informed counsel that Defendants possessed numerous communications directly involving Kahn, that Defendants would not agree to forgo deposing Kahn, and that they intended to seek relief from the Court. In response to the undersigned’s request that counsel provide dates of availability for another meet-and-confer, counsel for Coach stated that Defendants should “use this [telephone conference] as your meet-and-confer.” As succinctly stated by this Court, “[h]ighly-placed executives are not immune from discovery.” Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 306 F.R.D. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “{B]ecause principles relating to apex witnesses are in tension with the broad availability of discovery . . . it is important to excuse a witness from giving testimony only in compelling circumstances.” Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 CIV. 0691 LAK JCF, 2013 WL 1896932, at *] (S.D.N-Y. May 7, 2013); Naftchi v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 172 F.R.D. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[I]t 1s exceedingly difficult to demonstrate an appropriate basis for an order barring the taking of a deposition. Nor, in ordinary circumstances, does it matter that the proposed witness is a busy person or professes lack of knowledge of the matters at issue, as the party seeking discovery is entitled to test the asserted lack of knowledge.”). Notably, courts “begin with the proposition that plaintiffs have no burden to show that the deponents have any relevant knowledge.” Jn re Deposition Subpoenas of David Garlock, 463 F.Supp.2d 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Rather, courts assessing an apex challenge consider the likelihood that the individual possesses relevant knowledge, whether another source could provide identical information, the possibility of harassment, and the potential disruption of business. See Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 03 Civ. 3002(PKL)(JCF), 2006 WL 468314, at *1—2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); accord Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 CIV. 0691 LAK JCF, 2013 WL 1896932, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (allowing the defendant's deposition of the plaintiff's CEO despite harassment concerns because there was “little doubt that [the CEO] has relevant knowledge,” even if his knowledge was not necessarily unique). Here, the documents and information in Defendants’ possession not only establish a likelihood that Kahn possesses relevant and unique knowledge about the parties’ claims and defenses in this action. They go even further by establishing that Kahn actually possesses such knowledge. By way of example, by email sent on May 26, 2023, Kahn writes that ” Ex. 1, at 1. ’s identification of a‘ ” ostensibly refers to a prospective license agreement between Coach and Case-Mate, the facts and circumstance of which are relevant to Vinci’s claim that Coach breached Section 11 of the Vinci-Coach License Agreement by denying Vinci’s post-termination sell-off rights in order to benefit Case-Mate. Kahn’s reference of a — ostensibly refers to Case-Mate’s failed efforts to purchase Vinci’s assets, the facts and circumstance of which are relevant to Vinci’s prospective claims against Case-Mate for trade secret misappropriation (both common law and under the DTSA) and breach of the 1st and 2nd Case-Mate NDA. Kahn’s concern about hi
Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J. January 30, 2026 Page 3
a ostensibly refers to outstanding general minimum royalties that Coach claimed it was owed by Vinci, the facts and circumstance of which are relevant to Coach’s breach of contract claims and Vinci’s claim that Coach failed to renegotiate the general minimum royalty rate in good faith, also in breach of the Vinci-Coach License Agreement. Of course, Vinci cannot know for certain what Mr. Kahn meant when writing these emails, among numerous other facts and circumstances, without eliciting his testimony. By email sent on April 26, 2023, Kahn writes to Charlotte Warshaw as follows:
Ex. 2, at 2. Kahn’s identification of ‘ » ostensibly refers to Vinci. Kahn’s identification of ‘ ” ostensibly refers to the COACH and KATE SPADE brands. And Kahn’s identification of * ” ostensibly refers to prospective negotiations with the ‘ ” itself an ostensible reference to Case-Mate. But perhaps more importantly, the email establishes that Kahn was, at a minimum, actively overseeing Warshaw’s dealings with Vinci and Case-Mate. But more likely, Kahn was actively involved in the decision-making concerning Vinci and Case-Mate. See, e.g., Ex. 3, June 26, 2023 Zoom Invite (showing Kahn as a participant); Ex. 4, May 26, 2023 Email, at 1 (Jude Allan informing Kahn that ‘
).
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DAVIDOFF HUICHER & CITRON LLP D = ‘oe ATTORNEYS AT LAW 605 THIRD AVENUE Megan astecney meee NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10158 TEL: (212) 557-7200 OFFICES FAX: (212) 286-1884 □□□□ WHITE PLAINS WWW, DHCLEGAL,COM ALBANY ATTORNEYS AT LAW ATTORNEYS AT LAW 120 BLOOMINGDALE ROAD [50 STATE STREET WHITE PLAINS, NY 10605 ALBANY, NY | 2207 (914) 381-7400 (518) 465-8230 PALM BEACH WASHINGTON, D.C. ATTORNEYS AT LAW ATTORNEYS AT LAW 250 ROYAL PALM WAY MENO END ORSED 20 | MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.E. SUITE 202 WASHINGTON, D.C, 20002 PALM BEACH, FL 33480 (202) 347-1117 (561) 567-8488 \ f WRITER'S DIRECT: (646) 428-3272 . U Ne A - E-MAIL: mry@dhclegal.com HON. VALERIE FIGUER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE VIA ECF Dated: February 2, 2026 Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J.| Coach is directed to file a response by Southern District of New York February 5. 2026 v5, . 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 Re: Coach IP Holdings, LLC, et al. v. ACS Group Acquisitions LLC, et al. No. 1:23-cv-10612 (LGS) (VF Dear Judge Figueredo: This firm represents Vinci Brands LLC (“Vinci”), Onward Brands LLC (“Onward”), ACS Group Acquisition LLC (“ACS”), Charles Tebele, and Sam Haddad (Vinci, Onward, ACS, Tebele, and Haddad collectively, “Defendants’) in the above-captioned matter against Coach IP Holdings, LLC (“Coach IP”), Coach Services, Inc. (“Coach Services”), and Tapestry, Inc. (“Tapestry”) (Coach IP, Coach Services, and Tapestry collectively, “Coach’). I write pursuant to Section I.c.2 of Your Honor’s Individual Rules to request a discovery conference with the Court. The reason for the requested discovery conference is Coach’s objection and refusal to permit Defendants to depose Todd Kahn, Coach Services’ chief executive officer. Consistent with this Court’s January 5, 2026 Order, see ECF Dkt. No. 264, Defendants provided Coach with their list of intended deponents, inclusive of three dates of availability with respect to each such deposition on January 19, 2026. Coach did not object to Defendants’ inclusion of Kahn upon their receipt of Defendants’ aforementioned list. On January 20, 2026, also in accordance with this Court’s January 5, 2026 Order, counsel for the parties conducted a meet-and-confer with respect to their respective lists of intended deponents. During the meet- and-confer, the parties then agreed to reconvene at a date to be determined in order to allow them to inquire about their own witnesses’ availability. Notably, Coach again failed to object to Defendants’ inclusion of Kahn as an intended deponent. Counsel for the parties reconvened via video conference, which commenced at 10:15am on January 26, 2026. The conference lasted for approximately 30 minutes. Present on behalf of Defendants were the undersigned, Matthew Yogg, along with Robert Price of Davidoff Hutcher & Citron LLP. Present on behalf of Coach were Tim Beyer and Bret Ruber of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP. Following the undersigned’s inquiry as to whether any of Defendants’
Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J. January 30, 2026 Page 2
three proposed dates of availability worked for Kahn, counsel for Coach responded — for the first time — that they were objecting to Defendants’ intended deposition of him. When the undersigned inquired about the grounds of Coach’s objection, counsel responded by citing the apex doctrine. The undersigned then informed counsel that Defendants possessed numerous communications directly involving Kahn, that Defendants would not agree to forgo deposing Kahn, and that they intended to seek relief from the Court. In response to the undersigned’s request that counsel provide dates of availability for another meet-and-confer, counsel for Coach stated that Defendants should “use this [telephone conference] as your meet-and-confer.” As succinctly stated by this Court, “[h]ighly-placed executives are not immune from discovery.” Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 306 F.R.D. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “{B]ecause principles relating to apex witnesses are in tension with the broad availability of discovery . . . it is important to excuse a witness from giving testimony only in compelling circumstances.” Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 CIV. 0691 LAK JCF, 2013 WL 1896932, at *] (S.D.N-Y. May 7, 2013); Naftchi v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 172 F.R.D. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[I]t 1s exceedingly difficult to demonstrate an appropriate basis for an order barring the taking of a deposition. Nor, in ordinary circumstances, does it matter that the proposed witness is a busy person or professes lack of knowledge of the matters at issue, as the party seeking discovery is entitled to test the asserted lack of knowledge.”). Notably, courts “begin with the proposition that plaintiffs have no burden to show that the deponents have any relevant knowledge.” Jn re Deposition Subpoenas of David Garlock, 463 F.Supp.2d 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Rather, courts assessing an apex challenge consider the likelihood that the individual possesses relevant knowledge, whether another source could provide identical information, the possibility of harassment, and the potential disruption of business. See Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 03 Civ. 3002(PKL)(JCF), 2006 WL 468314, at *1—2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); accord Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 CIV. 0691 LAK JCF, 2013 WL 1896932, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (allowing the defendant's deposition of the plaintiff's CEO despite harassment concerns because there was “little doubt that [the CEO] has relevant knowledge,” even if his knowledge was not necessarily unique). Here, the documents and information in Defendants’ possession not only establish a likelihood that Kahn possesses relevant and unique knowledge about the parties’ claims and defenses in this action. They go even further by establishing that Kahn actually possesses such knowledge. By way of example, by email sent on May 26, 2023, Kahn writes that ” Ex. 1, at 1. ’s identification of a‘ ” ostensibly refers to a prospective license agreement between Coach and Case-Mate, the facts and circumstance of which are relevant to Vinci’s claim that Coach breached Section 11 of the Vinci-Coach License Agreement by denying Vinci’s post-termination sell-off rights in order to benefit Case-Mate. Kahn’s reference of a — ostensibly refers to Case-Mate’s failed efforts to purchase Vinci’s assets, the facts and circumstance of which are relevant to Vinci’s prospective claims against Case-Mate for trade secret misappropriation (both common law and under the DTSA) and breach of the 1st and 2nd Case-Mate NDA. Kahn’s concern about hi
Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J. January 30, 2026 Page 3
a ostensibly refers to outstanding general minimum royalties that Coach claimed it was owed by Vinci, the facts and circumstance of which are relevant to Coach’s breach of contract claims and Vinci’s claim that Coach failed to renegotiate the general minimum royalty rate in good faith, also in breach of the Vinci-Coach License Agreement. Of course, Vinci cannot know for certain what Mr. Kahn meant when writing these emails, among numerous other facts and circumstances, without eliciting his testimony. By email sent on April 26, 2023, Kahn writes to Charlotte Warshaw as follows:
Ex. 2, at 2. Kahn’s identification of ‘ » ostensibly refers to Vinci. Kahn’s identification of ‘ ” ostensibly refers to the COACH and KATE SPADE brands. And Kahn’s identification of * ” ostensibly refers to prospective negotiations with the ‘ ” itself an ostensible reference to Case-Mate. But perhaps more importantly, the email establishes that Kahn was, at a minimum, actively overseeing Warshaw’s dealings with Vinci and Case-Mate. But more likely, Kahn was actively involved in the decision-making concerning Vinci and Case-Mate. See, e.g., Ex. 3, June 26, 2023 Zoom Invite (showing Kahn as a participant); Ex. 4, May 26, 2023 Email, at 1 (Jude Allan informing Kahn that ‘
). In fact, on April 26, 2023, in response to a pitch to replace Vinci made directly to Kahn by a third- Kahn writes Warshaw stating that ” establishing that — to the exclusion of Warshaw —was the ultimate decision-maker on the issue of mobile phone case licensee. See Ex. 5, at 2. Of course, a central issue to this litigation comprises the Omicron variant of the Covid-19 global pandemic, and whether Coach’s refusal to renegotiate Vinci’s general minimum royalties under the Vinci-Coach License Agreement was justified or instead, whether it comprised a breach of Section 8 thereof. No doubt, Kahn was at least directly involved in Coach’s decision to refuse to entertain such negotiations. Good faith proscribes a party from punishing its counterparty for facts and circumstances entirely out of its control. The October 28, 2022 email directed to Mr. Kahn establishes his actual knowledge about the debilitating conditions then at issue in China, thus triggering his obligation to act in good faith — that is, not punish Vinci for these conditions — by renegotiating Vinci’s general minimum royalty rate. See Ex. 6, at 1. The foregoing comprises only a sampling of relevant communications directly implicating Mr. Kahn, the remainder of which cannot fit within the three pages allotted to Defendants. In any event, these communications, facts, and circumstances easily satisfy the very low threshold required to entitle Defendants to depose Mr. Kahn.
Hon. Valerie Figueredo, U.S.M.J. January 30, 2026 Page 4 Matthew R. Yogg MRY/
Encl. ce: All Counsel of Record (via ECF)