1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *
7 CN INVESTORS LLC, a Nevada limited Case No.2:25-CV-533 JCM (EJY) liability company, 8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 9 v. 10 CN INVESTORS LLC, am unknown business 11 entity,
12 Defendant(s).
13 14 Presently before the court is plaintiff CN Investors LLC (“plaintiff”)’s motion for default 15 judgment. (ECF No. 17). Defendant, an unknown business entity also named CN Investors LLC 16 (“defendant”) did not respond. 17 I. Background 18 Plaintiff is a Nevada limited liability company with its principal place of business in Las 19 Vegas, Nevada. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant is an unknown business entity that claims to have 20 offices in Las Vegas, Nevada and in Manama, Bahrain. (Id.). 21 Plaintiff owns Chateau Nightclub LLC and manages two restaurants on the Las Vegas 22 Strip. (Id. at 3). The restaurants are located at the Paris Las Vegas Hotel & Casino and are known 23 for their views of the Las Vegas Strip and elevated food and drink selections. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff 24 is the record owner of a Nevada trademark registration for CN INVESTORS LLC which was 25 issued on February 27, 2025. (Id.). Plaintiff has continually used the mark in connection with 26 business management, business information, and restaurant management since at least February 27 22, 2010, and has spent substantial amounts of money to advertise and promote its mark. (Id.). 28 1 Defendant is impersonating plaintiff by fraudulently marketing itself as a financial 2 investment company using the name “CN Investors LLC” as a corporate name, trademark, and by 3 the way of infringing domain names. (Id. at 5). Defendant has registered two domain names in 4 support of its impersonation of plaintiff: , which was registered on May 8, 5 2024, through domain registrar NameSilo, LLC and , which was registered 6 on October 29, 2021 through domain name registrar NameCheap, Inc. (Id.). 7 On defendant’s “About Us” page, it purports to be an investment and financial services 8 company that operates throughout Europe, America, North Africa, and other emerging markets, 9 and claims it has invested over 48 billion USD. (Id. at 6). On the same page, defendant lists a Las 10 Vegas, Nevada address that is plaintiff’s previous address and lists plaintiffs Nevada Business ID 11 and Entity Number assigned by the Nevada Secretary of State. (Id.). 12 Plaintiff asserts that defendant includes this information on its websites to trade off 13 plaintiff’s goodwill and intentionally cause consumers to believe both sites are operated and 14 approved by plaintiff. (Id. at 7). In fact, plaintiff has identified multiple consumers who were 15 deceived by defendant. (Id. at 7–8). 16 Plaintiff sued on March 3, 2025. (ECF No. 1). Defendant did not, and still has not, 17 appeared to defend itself. On April 25, 2025, the court instituted a temporary restraining order. 18 (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff then moved for entry of clerk’s default which was granted on June 23, 19 2025. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff now moves for default judgment. 20 II. Legal Standard 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets forth a two-step process for obtaining a default 22 judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). “First, a party must obtain 23 a clerk’s entry of default under Rule 55(a),” and second, “the party may seek entry of default 24 judgment under Rule 55(b).” Doe v. Jeffries, No. 18CV2021-MMA (JMA), 2018 WL 6582832, 25 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Symantec Corp. v. Glob. Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922, 923 26 (9th Cir. 2009)). The court considers seven factors in determining whether to grant default 27 judgment: 28 . . . 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's 2 substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at 3 stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy 4 underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
5 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 6 III. Discussion 7 A. Procedural requirements 8 The required procedures described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 have been 9 satisfied. The clerk entered default on June 23, 2025. (ECF No. 16). 10 B. Factors for default judgment against defendants 11 The Eitel factors, discussed below, weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 12 1. Possibility of prejudice 13 The first Eitel factor requires the court to consider the possibility that plaintiff will suffer 14 prejudice if default judgment is denied. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Here, defendant has not filed a 15 responsive pleading, despite being adequately served. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff will have no other 16 recourse for recovery if default is denied. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 17 2. Merits of claim and sufficiency of complaint 18 The second and third Eitel factors analyze the substantive merits of plaintiff’s claim and 19 the sufficiency of the complaint. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. To warrant default judgment, the 20 allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 21 Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). “The general rule of law is that upon 22 default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, 23 will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) 24 (citation omitted). 25 Plaintiff alleges defendant is liable for 1) two violations Nevada’s Deceptive Trade 26 Practices Act, 2) false designation of origin and unfair competition, 3) Nevada state and common 27 law trademark infringement and unfair competition, 4) and cybersquatting. (ECF No. 1 at 10– 28 16). Upon review of the record, the court is satisfied with allegations pleaded in the complaint and 1 finds that these factors supports default judgment. 2 3. Money at stake 3 The third Eitel factor requires the court to consider the amount of money at stake in relation 4 to the seriousness of defendants’ conduct. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. “[D]efault judgment is 5 disfavored when a large amount of money is involved or is unreasonable in light of the 6 [d]efendant’s actions.” Warrington v. Taylor, 2022 WL 2062921, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2022) 7 (quoting Valentin v. Grant Mercantile Agency, Inc., 2017 WL 6604410, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 8 2017)). 9 The money at stake in this case is modest. Plaintiff requests monetary relief in the form of 10 statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. The court finds that in light of this limited request for 11 monetary relief, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. However, the court will discuss 12 damages in more detail below. 13 4. Whether default was due to excusable neglect 14 The fourth Eitel factor requires the court to consider whether the default was due to 15 excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, despite being properly served with the summons 16 and complaint (ECF No. 12), defendant has failed to appear and defend itself. This factor weighs 17 in favor of default judgment. 18 5.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *
7 CN INVESTORS LLC, a Nevada limited Case No.2:25-CV-533 JCM (EJY) liability company, 8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 9 v. 10 CN INVESTORS LLC, am unknown business 11 entity,
12 Defendant(s).
13 14 Presently before the court is plaintiff CN Investors LLC (“plaintiff”)’s motion for default 15 judgment. (ECF No. 17). Defendant, an unknown business entity also named CN Investors LLC 16 (“defendant”) did not respond. 17 I. Background 18 Plaintiff is a Nevada limited liability company with its principal place of business in Las 19 Vegas, Nevada. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant is an unknown business entity that claims to have 20 offices in Las Vegas, Nevada and in Manama, Bahrain. (Id.). 21 Plaintiff owns Chateau Nightclub LLC and manages two restaurants on the Las Vegas 22 Strip. (Id. at 3). The restaurants are located at the Paris Las Vegas Hotel & Casino and are known 23 for their views of the Las Vegas Strip and elevated food and drink selections. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff 24 is the record owner of a Nevada trademark registration for CN INVESTORS LLC which was 25 issued on February 27, 2025. (Id.). Plaintiff has continually used the mark in connection with 26 business management, business information, and restaurant management since at least February 27 22, 2010, and has spent substantial amounts of money to advertise and promote its mark. (Id.). 28 1 Defendant is impersonating plaintiff by fraudulently marketing itself as a financial 2 investment company using the name “CN Investors LLC” as a corporate name, trademark, and by 3 the way of infringing domain names. (Id. at 5). Defendant has registered two domain names in 4 support of its impersonation of plaintiff: , which was registered on May 8, 5 2024, through domain registrar NameSilo, LLC and , which was registered 6 on October 29, 2021 through domain name registrar NameCheap, Inc. (Id.). 7 On defendant’s “About Us” page, it purports to be an investment and financial services 8 company that operates throughout Europe, America, North Africa, and other emerging markets, 9 and claims it has invested over 48 billion USD. (Id. at 6). On the same page, defendant lists a Las 10 Vegas, Nevada address that is plaintiff’s previous address and lists plaintiffs Nevada Business ID 11 and Entity Number assigned by the Nevada Secretary of State. (Id.). 12 Plaintiff asserts that defendant includes this information on its websites to trade off 13 plaintiff’s goodwill and intentionally cause consumers to believe both sites are operated and 14 approved by plaintiff. (Id. at 7). In fact, plaintiff has identified multiple consumers who were 15 deceived by defendant. (Id. at 7–8). 16 Plaintiff sued on March 3, 2025. (ECF No. 1). Defendant did not, and still has not, 17 appeared to defend itself. On April 25, 2025, the court instituted a temporary restraining order. 18 (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff then moved for entry of clerk’s default which was granted on June 23, 19 2025. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff now moves for default judgment. 20 II. Legal Standard 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets forth a two-step process for obtaining a default 22 judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). “First, a party must obtain 23 a clerk’s entry of default under Rule 55(a),” and second, “the party may seek entry of default 24 judgment under Rule 55(b).” Doe v. Jeffries, No. 18CV2021-MMA (JMA), 2018 WL 6582832, 25 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Symantec Corp. v. Glob. Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922, 923 26 (9th Cir. 2009)). The court considers seven factors in determining whether to grant default 27 judgment: 28 . . . 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's 2 substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at 3 stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy 4 underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
5 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 6 III. Discussion 7 A. Procedural requirements 8 The required procedures described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 have been 9 satisfied. The clerk entered default on June 23, 2025. (ECF No. 16). 10 B. Factors for default judgment against defendants 11 The Eitel factors, discussed below, weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 12 1. Possibility of prejudice 13 The first Eitel factor requires the court to consider the possibility that plaintiff will suffer 14 prejudice if default judgment is denied. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Here, defendant has not filed a 15 responsive pleading, despite being adequately served. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff will have no other 16 recourse for recovery if default is denied. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 17 2. Merits of claim and sufficiency of complaint 18 The second and third Eitel factors analyze the substantive merits of plaintiff’s claim and 19 the sufficiency of the complaint. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. To warrant default judgment, the 20 allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 21 Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). “The general rule of law is that upon 22 default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, 23 will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) 24 (citation omitted). 25 Plaintiff alleges defendant is liable for 1) two violations Nevada’s Deceptive Trade 26 Practices Act, 2) false designation of origin and unfair competition, 3) Nevada state and common 27 law trademark infringement and unfair competition, 4) and cybersquatting. (ECF No. 1 at 10– 28 16). Upon review of the record, the court is satisfied with allegations pleaded in the complaint and 1 finds that these factors supports default judgment. 2 3. Money at stake 3 The third Eitel factor requires the court to consider the amount of money at stake in relation 4 to the seriousness of defendants’ conduct. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. “[D]efault judgment is 5 disfavored when a large amount of money is involved or is unreasonable in light of the 6 [d]efendant’s actions.” Warrington v. Taylor, 2022 WL 2062921, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2022) 7 (quoting Valentin v. Grant Mercantile Agency, Inc., 2017 WL 6604410, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 8 2017)). 9 The money at stake in this case is modest. Plaintiff requests monetary relief in the form of 10 statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. The court finds that in light of this limited request for 11 monetary relief, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. However, the court will discuss 12 damages in more detail below. 13 4. Whether default was due to excusable neglect 14 The fourth Eitel factor requires the court to consider whether the default was due to 15 excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, despite being properly served with the summons 16 and complaint (ECF No. 12), defendant has failed to appear and defend itself. This factor weighs 17 in favor of default judgment. 18 5. Possibility of dispute concerning material facts 19 The fifth Eitel factor requires the court to consider whether there is a dispute over material 20 facts. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual 21 allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” 22 TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917–18 (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 23 (9th Cir. 1977)). Since defendant has not filed any motions or responsive pleadings in this case 24 and has not contradicted any of the allegations, there cannot be a possibility of dispute. This factor 25 weighs in favor of default judgment. 26 6. Public policy favoring a decision on the merits 27 The final Eitel factor is whether there is a strong policy favoring a decision on the merits. 28 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Although this factor inherently favors decisions on the merits, “this 1 preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. In fact, 2 when a defendant fails to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint, ignores requests to participate in 3 litigation, and fails to demonstrate an intent to defend the action, this factor shifts in favor of default 4 judgment. See Sideshow, Inc. v. Damon, 2020 WL 8093348, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020). 5 Here, defendant has failed to appear or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s complaint. 6 Defendant has not demonstrated an intent to defend itself in this action. This factor weighs in favor 7 of default judgment. 8 IV. Remedies 9 A. Damages 10 Although the court enjoys discretion when determining the amount of damages, see Fed. 11 R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), “[t]he general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the 12 complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., 13 Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). “It is well settled that a default judgment 14 for money may not be entered without a hearing unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or 15 capable of mathematical calculation.” Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981). 16 A party that prevails on a claim of cybersquatting may elect to recover “instead of actual 17 damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not 18 more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). Plaintiff 19 seeks the maximum statutory damages for each of the defendant’s cybersquatting domains, for a 20 total of $200,000. 21 When determining appropriate statutory damages for cybersquatting, courts weigh several 22 factors: the egregiousness or willfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the use of false contact 23 information to conceal infringing activity, whether the defendant is a “serial” cybersquatter— 24 meaning one who systematically registers and uses domain names that infringe on the rights of 25 others—and any behavior reflecting contempt for the court or its proceedings. Verizon California 26 Inc. v. Onlinenic, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 WL 2706393, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 27 2009). 28 . . . 1 While courts have awarded a range of damages in similar cases, they rarely impose the 2 maximum statutory amount. See Digby Adler Grp. LLC v. Image Rent a Car, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 3 1095, 1108 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases). Here, defendant’s cybersquatting was both 4 willful and highly egregious. Defendant registered domains using plaintiff’s registered trademark 5 and listed plaintiff’s former address and Business ID/Entity Number as its own, apparently to 6 deceive consumers. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Moreover, at least two potential consumers were misled by 7 defendant’s infringing activity—one of whom nearly invested $5,000,000 in defendant’s 8 fraudulent enterprise before the scheme was uncovered. (Id. at 7–8). These facts weigh strongly 9 in favor of a substantial statutory damages award. 10 Nevertheless, the remaining factors do not support the maximum award. The defendant 11 did not employ multiple false identities to conceal its domain registrations, did not engage in 12 “kitting” which is the practice of repeatedly registering and canceling domain names to avoid fees 13 and evade detection by trademark owners, and engaged in no comparable conduct. Cf. Verizon 14 Cal. Inc., 2009 WL 2706393 at 4–5. There is likewise no evidence of a broader pattern of 15 infringing conduct or of any behavior reflecting contempt for the court or its proceedings. 16 Accordingly, the court concludes that the maximum statutory damages are not warranted. 17 Instead, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to $25,000 per violation, for a total award of 18 $50,000. 19 B. Attorneys’ fees 20 The Lanham Act provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 21 attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). A case is exceptional if the defendant 22 disseminated the false advertisements in a “fraudulent, deliberate, or willful” manner. Horphag 23 Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1039 (9th Cir.2007). In other words, if defendant acted 24 with the deliberate intent to confuse consumers, attorneys’ fees are warranted. See id. 25 Because the court has determined defendant acted with deliberate intent to confuse 26 consumers, attorneys’ fees are warranted. Upon review of plaintiff’s determination of fees, the 27 court finds that $24,060.40 to be reasonable. The court also awards costs in the amount of $405.00. 28 . . . 1 V. Conclusion 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff’s motion for 4 default judgment (ECF No. 17) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 6 1) Defendant must immediately and permanently cease any and all use of the CN Mark in 7 connection with the offering, sale, promotion, marketing, or publicity of the CN Services 8 in the United States, its territories, and possessions (collectively, “United States”), 9 including, but not limited to, use: (i) in the trade names and entity names of any legal 10 entities owned or controlled in whole or in part by defendant; ii) in text, image, sound, or 11 video on any social media or online post published by defendant; and (iii) in the name of 12 any social media account or in the URL, post domain path, or domain name of any 13 website or webpage accessible by residents of the United States; 14 2) Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 117(d), defendant shall pay plaintiff $50,000 for registering and 15 using and domain names with a bad faith 16 intendent to profit from the CN Mark in violation of 15 U.S.C.; 17 3) VeriSign Inc. (the .com registry) and/or the NameSilo (the domain name registrar) shall 18 transfer ownership of the domain name registration to plaintiff and release the serverHold 19 and serverTransferProhibited previously imposed by this court, including requiring the 20 registrar to change the registrar of record for the domain name from the current domain 21 name registrar to plaintiff’s registrar of choice; 22 4) VeriSign Inc. (the .com registry) and/or the NameCheap (the domain name registrar) 23 shall transfer ownership of the domain name registration to plaintiff and release the 24 serverHold and serverTransferProhibited previously imposed by this court, including 25 requiring the registrar to change the registrar of record for the domain name from the 26 current domain name registrar to plaintiff’s registrar of choice; 27 5) Plaintiff shall recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,060.40 and 28 costs in the amount of $405; and 1 6) Post judgment interest shall be allowed as authorized by law until judgement is satisfied. 2 DATED May 5, 2026. 3 _________________________________________ 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28