Cmj Management v. Doris Rodensky.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0107
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-107

CMJ MANAGEMENT1

vs.

DORIS RODENSKY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a summary process bench trial in the Housing Court,

judgment entered awarding possession to CMJ Management (landlord

or plaintiff). Doris Rodensky (tenant or defendant) appeals

from the judgment and an order denying her subsequent motion to

alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the notice to quit

mischaracterized her son as a "guest," that the son's alleged

assault of the landlord's employee therefore cannot be a basis

for termination of the tenancy, and that any other reasons for

termination were not included in the notice to quit and

accordingly were improperly considered by the judge. We affirm.

1 As agent for the Village at Fawcett's Pond. On April 21, 2024, the tenant's son, who does not live in

the apartment, struck the "maintenance supervisor," who lives in

an adjacent apartment, in the face, knocking him to the ground,

and then hit him again during the ensuing struggle.2 The

supervisor suffered a concussion, went to the hospital in an

ambulance, reported the incident to the police, and obtained a

G. L. c. 258E harassment prevention order. Immediately after

the incident, the son entered the tenant's apartment, where he

was subsequently arrested.

Four days later, on April 25, 2024, the landlord served the

tenant with a notice to quit, terminating the tenancy effective

June 1, 2024. The lease requires that any notice of termination

delivered to the tenant "state the grounds for termination with

enough detail for the Tenant to prepare a defense." The

detailed notice based termination on the physical assault and

the harassment prevention order, then specifically cited

paragraph 23(c)(6) of the lease. Paragraph 23(c)(6) permits

termination of the lease because of "criminal activity by a

tenant, any member of the tenant's household, a guest or another

person under the tenant's control" that "threatens the health,

safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other

2 The incident occurred while the tenant's son was at the plaintiff's property.

2 residents (including property management staff residing on the

premises)."

Following a summary process bench trial, final judgment

issued "for the [p]laintiff for possession" of the premises.

The tenant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment

and the same judge denied that motion.

"When reviewing the decision of a trial judge in a summary

process action, we accept [the judge's] findings of fact as true

unless they are clearly erroneous, but we scrutinize without

deference the legal standard which the judge applied to the

facts" (quotations and citation omitted). Cambridge St. Realty,

LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 123 (2018).

The notice to quit provided to the tenant was "legally

adequate." Cambridge St. Realty, LLC, 481 Mass. at 130. For a

notice to be defective, it "must involve a material error or

omission, i.e., a defect that has some meaningful practical

effect." Id. Additionally, where (as here) a lease provides a

requirement that a notice provide specificity for the grounds

for termination, the notice must comply with that requirement to

be effective. See id. at 131. Here, the notice informed the

tenant that her lease would terminate more than thirty days

later, described the incident causing termination as an

"unprovoked attack" by the son on the landlord's employee while

3 on the property, referenced that there was a tenant-guest

relationship between the tenant and the son, and recited the

language from the lease authorizing termination under these

circumstances. Thus, the notice's recitation of the relevant

conduct, identification of the parties, and connection of those

to the appropriate lease provision satisfied the lease's

requirement that the landlord "state the grounds for termination

with enough detail for the Tenant to prepare a defense." The

notice was more than adequate. See id. at 132 (holding notice

to terminate United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development-mandated lease addendum effective where notice

"detailed conduct that violated certain accurately referenced

lease provisions").

Furthermore, the judge's finding that the son's conduct as

alleged in the notice violated "Paragraph 23(c)(6) of the

[tenant]'s lease" and that the landlord had therefore

"established its case for possession of the premises" was

correct, based on subsidiary findings of fact which were not

clearly erroneous. The notice to quit and the judge's decision

based termination on lease paragraph 23(c)(6), which authorizes

termination for "criminal activity by . . . a guest or another

person under the tenant's control" that "threatens the health,

safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other

4 residents (including property management staff residing on the

premises)."3

The judge credited the witnesses' testimony that the son

would "go[] to the [tenant]'s apartment almost every day," that

the son hit the maintenance supervisor twice, and that the

maintenance supervisor resides in an apartment on the premises.

Accepting these facts as true, see Cambridge St. Realty, LLC,

481 Mass. at 123, the judge correctly concluded that the lease

permitted termination pursuant to paragraph 23(c)(6). We are

unconvinced by the tenant's argument that her son was not a

guest, but regardless, the judge's decision clearly and

accurately rested on the relationship between the tenant and her

son, the son's conduct, and the provisions of the lease

authorizing termination under those circumstances. Thus, the

3 The lease, as a "Model Lease For Subsidized Programs," derives its termination provisions from 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l), under which a "person under the tenant's control" refers to a person to whom "the tenant has permitted access to the premises" (citation omitted). Department of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002).

5 judgment awarding possession to the landlord was correct.4

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion to alter or amend affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, D'Angelo & Allen, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: January 13, 2026.

4 Because we hold the judge's order was proper on the grounds stated above, we need not and do not address the application of the community rules and regulations to the lease termination.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.