CM Ex Rel. JM v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HENDERSON CTY.

85 F. Supp. 2d 574, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21334, 1999 WL 1508987
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedOctober 12, 1999
DocketCIV. 1:98CV66
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 85 F. Supp. 2d 574 (CM Ex Rel. JM v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HENDERSON CTY.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CM Ex Rel. JM v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HENDERSON CTY., 85 F. Supp. 2d 574, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21334, 1999 WL 1508987 (W.D.N.C. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THORNBURG, District Judge.

THIS MATTER came on for trial before the undersigned on August 19, 1999. Having considered the arguments of counsel, pleadings submitted and the administrative record, the Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

JM and EM on behalf of CM, their autistic child, initiated this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. 1 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l)(A)(i). Plaintiffs claim that the Henderson County Board of Education (County) denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to their child, as required by the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18). 2 On December 11, 1997, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Meg Scott Phipps found that the County had offered to provide the child with a FAPE as required by federal and state law. Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal and State Review Officer (SRO) Joe Walters affirmed the ALJ’s decision on March 4, 1998. Having exhausted their administrative remedies, the parents *577 brought this action pursuant to the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).

By Order filed June 16, 1999, the undersigned disposed of several matters in this action. Chief ALJ Julian Mann granted partial summary judgment to the County as to Plaintiffs’ claim for reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation above the sum of $1,200. He also ruled that all claims prior to the 1996-1997 school year were time-barred. The undersigned affirmed those rulings, finding that Judge Mann’s conclusions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution as well as all claims asserted against the individual Defendants were dismissed. Plaintiffs’ claims for the school years 1997-98 and 1998-99 and for punitive damages were also dismissed. Thus, the only claims remaining relate to the 1996-97 school year: the IDEA claim for declaratory relief and a cause of action pursuant to N.C. GemStat. § 115C-106. 3 See Memorandum and Order, filed June 16, 1999, at 35-37.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 1415(e)(2) of Title 20, United States Code, provides in pertinent part that in “any action brought under this [statute] the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” The Fourth Circuit has instructed district courts to bear in mind that “the touchstone of IDEA is the actual provision of a free appropriate public education.” Sellers by Sellers v. School Bd. of City of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871, 119 S.Ct. 168, 142 L.Ed.2d 137 (1998).

The Supreme Court has held that a proper review of the state’s determination requires a twofold inquiry. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The district court must decide: (1) whether the State complied with the IDEA’S procedural requirements in developing and implementing the Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the child at issue, and (2) whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated” to enable that child to receive educational benefits. Id., at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The Court also instructed reviewing courts to make “independent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. The Fourth Circuit refined this standard in Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1991), where it held that findings of fact by ALJ’s and hearing officers in IDEA eases “are entitled to be considered prima facie correct, akin to the traditional sense of permitting a result to be based on such fact-finding, but not requiring it.” Id., at 105. In essence, district courts must “ ‘make an independent decision based on a preponderance of the evidence, giving due weight to state administrative proceedings.’ ” Board Educ. of Montgomery County v. Brett Y, 155 F.3d 557 (table), 1998 WL 390553 at *5 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034).

Moreover, the district court may not “substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities.” Hartmann by Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. Of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 999 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1046, 118 S.Ct. 688, 139 L.Ed.2d 634 (1998). Indeed, the district court must defer to the State reviewing officer’s (SRO) credibility determinations. Doyle, supra. And, the SRO must defer to the *578 credibility determinations made by the hearing officer because he or she had the opportunity to hear the testimony. Id., at 104. Finally, the burden of proof of establishing a violation of the IDEA falls on the party challenging the administrative findings. Barnett by Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir.1991).

As to the standard of review applicable to the state law claim, “[n]o distinction is made between federal and pendent state claims if the claims are brought in federal court. Although the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act limits a state court reviewing an agency decision to substantial evidence review, ... ‘pertinent federal law ... specifies otherwise.’ The district court properly followed federal procedural law in reviewing independently both the federal and state law claims.” Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The IEP for the 1996-97 school year.

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85 F. Supp. 2d 574, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21334, 1999 WL 1508987, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cm-ex-rel-jm-v-board-of-educ-of-henderson-cty-ncwd-1999.