Clyde O. Carter, Sr. and Linda Darnell Bowie Carter vs. Clyde O. Carter, Jr.

CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 16, 2025
DocketWD87124 consolidated with WD87125
StatusPublished

This text of Clyde O. Carter, Sr. and Linda Darnell Bowie Carter vs. Clyde O. Carter, Jr. (Clyde O. Carter, Sr. and Linda Darnell Bowie Carter vs. Clyde O. Carter, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clyde O. Carter, Sr. and Linda Darnell Bowie Carter vs. Clyde O. Carter, Jr., (Mo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT

CLYDE O. CARTER, SR. AND ) LINDA DARNELL BOWIE CARTER, ) ) Appellants, ) WD87124 consolidated with WD87125 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) CLYDE O. CARTER, JR., ) September 16, 2025 ) Respondent. ) )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri Honorable Bryan E. Round, Judge

Before Division Three: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge, and Janet Sutton, Judge

This case involves a dispute over title to a residence (the Property) in Kansas City,

Missouri, that Clyde O. Carter, Sr., (Carter) transferred by quitclaim deed to his son, Clyde O.

Carter, Jr. (Son). Approximately three years later, Carter and his wife, Linda Carter, (Wife) filed

a petition to set aside the quitclaim deed alleging, inter alia, that Carter could not solely transfer

the property without Wife, and, further, that Carter lacked the mental capacity to transfer the

Property. Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Jackson County (trial court) entered a

judgment concluding that Wife did not acquire any interest in the Property during her second

marriage to Carter, that Carter could solely transfer title to the Property, and that Carter was

competent to convey the Property’s title to Son. Carter and Wife appeal, but we dismiss their appeal for briefing and analytical deficiencies and for failure to file a record that complies with

Rule 81.16. 1

Factual and Procedural Background

After Carter and Wife filed their petition to set aside the quitclaim deed and to quiet title

related to the Property, 2 Son then filed his own petition to quiet title and for ejectment. 3 The

cases were consolidated and a bench trial was held. The evidence at trial, which we have

gleaned from the transcript, established the following:

Carter and Wife’s first marriage was dissolved in 1984. Following the dissolution of the

marriage, Wife transferred, by quitclaim deed, the Property to Carter. The quitclaim deed was

recorded in the Jackson County Recorder of Deeds Office. In 1994, Carter took out an

approximate $31,000 loan, and a deed of release was issued in December 1996.

Carter and Wife remarried in 1995 and separated in 2007. They remain married as of the

date of the trial court’s judgment.

Carter and Wife took out a mortgage on the Property in the amount of $55,200 in

November 1996. The deed of trust listed them as husband and wife, and a deed of release was

issued in late January 2012.

1 Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025). 2 The original action involved Carter’s conveyance of three separate property titles to Son. At trial, however, Son agreed to rescind his interest in two of the properties, leaving only title to one property at issue for trial and in this appeal. 3 Son’s petition also alleged unjust enrichment and requested over $10,000 plus post-judgment interest, which was not addressed in the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s judgment was final and appealable, despite the fact that it did not address this count. Son abandoned this claim by failing to request relief on it at either trial or in a post-trial motion, and for failing to provide the trial court with any factual basis for relief. See Ruby v. Troupe, 580 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). See also Dougherty v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 585 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (stating “A judgment does not have to address abandoned claims.”).

2 Around December 2017 or January 2018, Carter contacted an attorney (Attorney) and

asked that Attorney prepare a quitclaim deed transferring Carter’s interest in the Property to Son.

Attorney prepared the quitclaim deed and met with Carter at Attorney’s office on January 4,

2018. During that meeting, at which Son and Son’s wife were present, Attorney asked Carter

questions to determine Carter’s capacity to execute the quitclaim deed. A notary was

unavailable at Attorney’s office, so Son and Son’s wife took Carter to a bank in Leavenworth,

Kansas, to execute the deed. The quitclaim deed, dated January 4, 2018, transferred Carter’s

interest in the Property to Son and was recorded in the Jackson County Recorder of Deeds

Office. Wife was in Hawaii when the quitclaim deed was executed and she testified that it was

done without her knowledge or consent.

Son testified that in late 2017, Carter had conversations with Son and that Carter was able

to communicate his wishes to Son. Son also testified that when he was with Carter at Attorney’s

office, he observed Carter and Attorney talking, that Carter was responding to Attorney’s

questions, and that Carter asked Attorney to transfer the Property’s title to Son.

Carter did not testify, but his medical records were admitted at trial as Exhibit 7.

Attorney was called to testify, but, upon advice from legal ethics counsel, he invoked the

attorney-client privilege and would not answer questions related to his representation of Carter.

Before trial, however, Attorney authored a letter in which he discussed his representation of

Carter, and Attorney gave the letter to Son. Attorney’s letter was admitted into evidence as

Exhibit 101. As discussed in more detail infra, the Carters have not provided Exhibits 7 and 101

in the record on appeal so it is unclear what exactly Attorney’s letter stated or what Carter’s

medical records established. 4

4 The judgment states that Attorney “indicated that [Carter] was in a wheelchair and following their conversation about their history and experiences together and how he was doing, it was

3 The trial court concluded that the Property was, and remained, Carter’s pre-marital

property, that he was free to transfer it to Son, and that there was a lack of evidence to support

Carter and Wife’s claim that Carter lacked the capacity to sign the quitclaim deed. The trial

court declared Son as the legal and equitable owner of the Property and ordered that Son was

entitled to immediate possession of the Property. It also concluded that the Property did not

“transmute” back into marital property simply because Carter and Wife remarried. Finally, the

trial court found that there was no evidence, except for Wife’s testimony, that marital funds or

Wife’s individual funds were the “source of funds” used to make payments on the Property’s

1996 mortgage.

Carter and Wife (hereinafter, the Carters) appeal.

Discussion

In their first point on appeal, the Carters contend that the trial court misapplied the law

when it declared that they had no legal or equitable interest in the Property and by classifying the

Property as non-marital property. 5 The Carters contend that the Property transmuted to marital

property when marital funds were used to pay off a refinanced mortgage. In their second point,

[Attorney’s] opinion that [Carter] appeared to him to be of sound mind and understood what he was doing, deeding his interests in the real estate to [Son] via Quitclaim Deed.” 5 The Carters also attempted to include an against-the-weight-of-the evidence challenge under point one’s argument by simply stating, “The judgment in this cause action erroneously applied the law and is against the weight of the evidence, in that (1) the home should have been classified as marital property, and (2) the trial court did not properly apply the source of funds rule[.]” First, we note that an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge is not alleged in the point relied on and, therefore, cannot be brought in the argument portion alone.

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Clyde O. Carter, Sr. and Linda Darnell Bowie Carter vs. Clyde O. Carter, Jr., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clyde-o-carter-sr-and-linda-darnell-bowie-carter-vs-clyde-o-carter-moctapp-2025.