Clyde L. Grimm v. Jerome C. Cates, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as President Ofsouthwest Texas State University

532 F.2d 1034, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8679
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided June 7, 1976·No. 75-1309·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Clyde L. Grimm, Jr., brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging that his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments were abridged when he was issued a terminal contract by Southwest Texas State University (SWTSU) on June 28, 1971 for the 1971-1972 academic year. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held that Dr. Grimm did not have a property interest within the meaning of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), which was entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he was therefore not entitled to a hearing or statement of reasons for his dismissal. The district court also held that Dr. Grimm failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged for exercising First Amendment rights. In view of the previous two rulings, the district court declined to address Dr. Grimm’s claim that the hearings granted to him by SWTSU were constitutionally deficient.

After securing his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1963, appellant Grimm taught for one year at the University of Illinois, three years at Texas Tech Universi *1036 ty, and one year at Sam Houston State University. Dr. Grimm was hired as an associate professor by Southwest Texas State University for the academic year of 1968-1969. He completed three nine-month teaching contracts at SWTSU for the academic years 1968-1969, prior to receiving terminal notice in May of 1971 and being issued a terminal contract in June of 1971.

Dr. Grimm contends (1) that the district court incorrectly held that he did not have de facto tenure under the practice and policy prevailing at SWTSU at that time; (2) that he was denied due process of law by the termination of his employment without showing cause; and (3) that even if he did not have tenure at the time that he was dismissed, he was still entitled to a hearing before a faculty committee to determine whether the issuance of a terminal contract to him constituted a violation of his academic freedom.

I.

As the district court noted in its memorandum opinion and order, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra, “. . . held that a non-tenured teacher had no ‘property’ interest in his reemployment and thus was not entitled to a due process hearing prior to his termination. To have a ‘property’ interest in a benefit, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it and not a mere unilateral expectation of it.” District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, Record at 227, citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 560. The property interest claimed by Dr. Grimm is tenure. In a decision rendered on the same day that Roth was handed down, the Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann, supra, acknowledged that it is possible for a teacher to obtain de facto tenure even though tenure has never been formally conferred upon him by the administration. Since the administration at SWTSU never formally conferred tenure upon Dr. Grimm, the question that this court must answer is whether some action by the State gave rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment with SWTSU. Dr. Grimm contends that such a claim of entitlement exists by virtue of a policy statement set forth in a Coordinating Board Statement of October, 1967, which was adopted by the Board of Regents in 1968 and included in the 1970 edition of SWTSU’s Faculty Handbook. 1 In essence, the relevant portion of the Coordinating Board Statement relied upon by Dr. Grimm states that the probationary period for a faculty member shall not exceed seven years, including “appropriate” full-time service in other institutions of higher education. 2 Dr. Grimm believes that since he *1037 had four years teaching experience at Texas Institutions and one year teaching experience at the University of Illinois prior to his employment by SWTSU, the fourth contract at SWTSU conferred de facto tenure upon him. Dr. Grimm contends that (1) the three year local probationary period expired with the conclusion of the 1970-1971 academic year; and (2) the seven year total probationary period expired with the conclusion of the 1969-1970 academic year. After examining the facts and circumstances surrounding Dr. Grimm’s employment at SWTSU, the district court concluded that he had no legitimate claim to tenure, and that he therefore had no right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to a statement of reasons and a hearing before college officials to review their decision not to retain him. The basis for the district court’s decision appears to be (1) that the Coordinating Board’s statement, which was included in the 1970 edition of the Faculty Handbook, was ignored until 1971; and (2) the practice at SWTSU when Dr. Grimm was hired in 1968 was to exclude all years of prior service at other universities. 3

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Clyde L. Grimm v. Jerome C. Cates, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as President Ofsouthwest Texas State University, 532 F.2d 1034, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8679 (5th Cir. 1976).

532 F.2d 1034 (Clyde L. Grimm v. Jerome C. Cates, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as President Ofsouthwest Texas State University) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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