Clovis Carl Green, Jr. v. Joe Quintana, U.S. Probation Officer Richard Miklic, Named as Chief U.S. Probation Officer United States Parole Commission

992 F.2d 1222, 1993 WL 141124
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 28, 1993
Docket92-1207
StatusPublished

This text of 992 F.2d 1222 (Clovis Carl Green, Jr. v. Joe Quintana, U.S. Probation Officer Richard Miklic, Named as Chief U.S. Probation Officer United States Parole Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clovis Carl Green, Jr. v. Joe Quintana, U.S. Probation Officer Richard Miklic, Named as Chief U.S. Probation Officer United States Parole Commission, 992 F.2d 1222, 1993 WL 141124 (10th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

992 F.2d 1222

NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.

Clovis Carl GREEN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Joe QUINTANA, U.S. Probation Officer; Richard Miklic, named
as Chief U.S. Probation Officer; United States
Parole Commission, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 92-1207.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 28, 1993.

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This matter is before us on appeal from the district court's dismissal of Mr. Green's petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to challenge certain conditions attached to his mandatory release supervision. Petitioner is no longer on release, having been subsequently convicted on state charges of sexual assault, criminal extortion, and being an habitual offender.

We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of the petition for substantially the reasons set forth in the recommendation of the magistrate judge, a copy of which is attached to this order and judgment.

The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ATTACHMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CLOVIS CARL GREEN, Petitioner,

v.

JOE QUINTANA, U.S. Probation Officer, CHIEF U.S. PROBATION

OFFICER and U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondents.

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RICHARD M. BORCHERS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner Clovis Carl Green, while on mandatory release supervision for a federal sentence, initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner asserts that the terms and conditions of his mandatory release violate his rights under the United States Constitution.

Pursuant to Rule 605 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court of the District of Colorado, this matter has been referred to Magistrate Judge Richard M. Borchers. Upon a review of the petition and the applicable law, a recommendation is made that the petition be dismissed.

As Petitioner is representing himself, his petition will be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979). A petition must be dismissed if, accepting the allegations as true, it appears beyond doubt that Petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir.1988).

Since Petitioner filed this petition, he was arrested in Denver on new state criminal charges, and the Parole Commission issued a violator warrant. The petition challenges the specific conditions that had been placed on Petitioner's mandatory release and requests this Court to remove those restrictions. Because Petitioner has now been reincarcerated, there does not appear to be a live case or controversy at this time. A favorable determination on this petition would not entitle Petitioner to any benefits at this point, and Petitioner no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of this case. Thus, the petition should be dismissed as moot. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); United States ex rel. Graham v. U.S. Parole Commission, 732 F.2d 849 (11th Cir.1984).

In any event, the terms and conditions placed on Petitioner's mandatory release did not violate Petitioner's constitutional rights. Parole conditions must be sustained if there is a rational basis in the record for them. Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir.1983). Because parole is an extension of confinement, limitations resulting in diminished income or restricted living or travel arrangements during the time of parole or mandatory release supervision do not result in a constitutional violation. Bricker v. Michigan Parole Board, 405 F.Supp. 1340, 1343-44 (E.D.Mich.1975). The purpose of parole or mandatory release supervision is to assist an individual in an effort to re-integrate himself into society. Therefore, legitimate state interests warrant placing some conditions on the individual's behavior. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-80 (1972). Such restrictions do not rise to the level of violating Petitioner's rights under the First Amendment.

[W]hen a convict is conditionally released on parole, the government retains a substantial interest in ensuring that its rehabilitative goal is not frustrated and that the public is protected by further criminal acts by the parolee.

Birson v. King, 469 F.2d 1242, 1243 (2d Cir.1972).

The U.S. Parole Commission has spent substantial time evaluating Petitioner. He has received three parole hearings prior to being mandatorily released. Numerous assessments and evaluations have been prepared regarding Petitioner. (See Exhibits B, C, D, I and M to Government's Response). The conditions attached to Petitioner's mandatory release were not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Rather, the conditions were carefully considered decisions on how best to facilitate Petitioner's rehabilitation.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Clovis Carl Green's petition be dismissed.

FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that under Rule 605 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the parties shall have ten days after service hereof to file any written objections with the assigned District Judge.

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