Clonch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedJanuary 9, 2009
DocketI.C. NO. 835987.
StatusPublished

This text of Clonch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Clonch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clonch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2009).

Opinion

*********** *Page 2
Upon review of the competent evidence of record, with reference to the errors assigned, and finding no good grounds to receive further evidence, or to rehear the parties or their representatives, the Full Commission, upon reconsideration of the evidence, affirms the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner, with modifications, and enters the following Opinion and Award.

***********
The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which the parties entered into in their Pre-trial Agreement and at the hearing as:

STIPULATIONS
1. The North Carolina Industrial Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of these proceedings. The parties are properly before the North Carolina Industrial Commission.

2. The parties are correctly designated, and there is no question as to the mis-joinder or the non-joinder of any party.

3. An employment relationship existed between the parties at all times relevant to these proceedings.

4. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant-Carrier") provided workers' compensation insurance coverage at all times relevant to these proceedings, with Claims Management, Inc. acting as the administrator.

5. The parties were subject to and bound by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act at all times relevant to these proceedings, with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant-Employer") employing the requisite number of employees to be bound under the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. *Page 3

6. Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and in the scope of her employment with Defendant-Employer on June 14, 1997.

7. Plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time of the June 14, 1997 work injury was $204.61, yielding a compensation rate of $136.41.

8. The parties stipulated to the following documents being admitted into evidence as stipulated exhibits:

a. Stipulated Exhibit one (1) — Pre-trial Agreement;

b. Stipulated Exhibit two (2) — Plaintiff's medical records;

c. Stipulated Exhibit three (3) — North Carolina Industrial Commission forms and filings;

d. Stipulated Exhibit four (4) — Plaintiff's written discovery responses;

e. Stipulated Exhibit five (5) — Plaintiff's personnel file.

***********
ISSUES
The issues for determination are:

1. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to any additional temporary total disability compensation and medical care, and if so, whether Plaintiff's current symptoms and disability, if any, are causally related to her June 14, 1997 work injury?

***********
Based upon the competent and the credible evidence of record, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT *Page 4
1. Plaintiff is 64 years old, with her date of birth being October 1, 1944. Plaintiff began working for Defendant-Employer in June 1996 as a sales clerk. This position required Plaintiff to work with a cash register and to work on the sales floor.

2. On June 14, 1997, Plaintiff was working for Defendant-Employer when a package containing two (2) 24 ounce cans of rug cleaner fell onto her left foot, with the major point of impact being behind her left great toe. Plaintiff testified that the cans fell from a height of approximately eight (8) feet. However, Defendant-Employer's personnel manager, Ms. Natalie Wilmark Clonch (no relation to Plaintiff) testified that it was not possible that the cans fell eight (8) feet, and that the cans may have fallen from a height of four and one-half (4 ½) to five (5) feet. Defendants accepted compensability only for Plaintiff's medical expenses related to her June 14, 1997 work injury.

3. Plaintiff first received medical treatment for her June 14, 1997 work injury on June 16, 1997 from Dr. Charles Phillip Essex, a family practitioner. Dr. Essex, who routinely examines Defendant-Employer's employees, diagnosed Plaintiff as having sustained a left foot contusion, for which he gave her an injection and took her out of work for a few days. However, Plaintiff had an allergic reaction to the injection, requiring her to remain out of work for approximately six (6) weeks, according to other medical records.

4. While Dr. Essex treated Plaintiff, he found that her reports of pain did not reconcile with the objective data. At his deposition, Dr. Essex initially testified that he did not observe symptoms in Plaintiff of reflex sympathetic dystrophy, also known a complex regional pain syndrome (hereinafter referred to as "RSD/CRPS"). However, Dr. Essex later clarified that he did not actually discuss RSD/CRPS with Plaintiff, as he had no results of any nerve conduction *Page 5 studies. Dr. Essex further explained that he was only vaguely familiar with RSD/CRPS and its associated symptoms.

5. On July 9, 1997, at the direction of Defendants, Dr. Byron Edward Dunaway, an orthopaedic surgeon, examined Plaintiff, obtained x-rays, and ultimately found that Plaintiff's reports of symptoms did not correspond to the objective evidence. Dr. Dunaway diagnosed Plaintiff as having sustained a bruise of her left great toe. Subsequent to this initial examination, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Dunaway on several dates, and consistently reported experiencing ongoing, severe pain. Dr. Dunaway ordered additional x-rays, and opined that Plaintiff's reports of pain were out of proportion for the extent of her injury. However, Dr. Dunaway did not conduct a bone scan, a diagnostic test often used to assist in detecting RSD/CRPS. On September 30, 1997, Dr. Dunaway released Plaintiff from his care to full, unrestricted work duty, opining that she reached maximum medical improvement, and assigning a zero (0) percent permanent partial disability rating.

6. Plaintiff testified that because Dr. Dunaway did not treat her in any manner that alleviated her symptoms, she sought treatment on her own from Dr. Walter J. Falardeau, III, a podiatrist. Plaintiff further testified that she attempted to contact a representative of Defendants in an effort to obtain additional medical treatment prior to seeking it on her own, but was unsuccessful. Dr. Falardeau first examined Plaintiff on January 22, 1998, and found that she was displaying persistent pain symptoms that were out of proportion with the magnitude of her June 14, 1997 work injury. Dr. Falardeau opined that this subjective-objective discrepancy was highly suggestive of RSD/CRPS. With this possible diagnosis, Dr. Falardeau referred Plaintiff for a bone scan and a vascular consultation. Although Plaintiff contends that Dr. Falardeau informed her *Page 6 that she should not be working in any capacity, Dr. Falareau's medical records indicate that he recommended light-duty work.

7. On March 10, 1998, Plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination, scheduled by Defendants and performed by Dr. Steven Samuel Hughes, an orthopaedic surgeon. Plaintiff testified that Dr. Hughes informed her that she had RSD/CRPS. Although Dr. Hughes's medical records do not reflect what Plaintiff contends, the records do indicate that Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Terry v. PPG Industries, Inc.
577 S.E.2d 326 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2003)
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution
425 S.E.2d 454 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Clonch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clonch-v-wal-mart-stores-inc-ncworkcompcom-2009.