Clinton v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.

10 Tenn. App. 311, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMay 20, 1929
StatusPublished

This text of 10 Tenn. App. 311 (Clinton v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clinton v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 10 Tenn. App. 311, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

Opinion

SENTER, J.

The parties will be referred to as in the court below. Mrs. Paul Clinton and Paul Clinton, filed respective suits against the defendants, Tennessee Electric Power Co., and the City of Chattanooga. The suit of Mrs. Paul Clinton was for alleged personal in *312 juries resulting- from a defective bridge adjacent to the right of way of the street car tracks of the defendant Electric Power Company, and the suit of her husband was for the loss of services and expenses resulting from the alleged injuries of his wife. The suit was .voluntarily dismissed by the respective plaintiffs against the City of Chattanooga. The two cases were consolidated for the purposes of the trial, and tried before the same jury. At the conclusion of all the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict in the respective suits, and which motion was sustained, and the trial judge directed the jury to return verdicts in favor of the defendant in the respective suits, and dismissed the suits, at the cost of the plaintiffs.

A motion for a new trial by the respective plaintiffs was overruled. From the action of the trial judge in granting the motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, and in overruling the motion for a new trial, both plaintiffs haAre appealed to this court in the nature of a writ of error, and have assigned errors.

It appears that Mrs. Paul Clinton resided on Milne street, in East Chattanooga, and had lived there for several months prior to the alleged injuries. She was a passenger on the street car of the defendant on September 30/ 1927. The street car line runs practically north and south, and Milne street runs east and west. On the west- side of the street car line where the same crosses Milne street, Milne street is an improved street up to the car line, but on the east side of the street car line Milne street has never been improved and never used as a street. Tt would appear that Milne street, so far as the same is used as a street, ends at the west side of the car line, and on the east side it is not used for vehicles, and is rough and unimproved. At the point where Mrs. Paul Clinton alighted from the street car, the defendant maintains a place for passengers to get off and on its cars. The plaintiff, Mrs. Paul Clinton, had gotten on the street ear as a passenger, and when the car reached Milne street, she got off of the car at the usual and regular place where passengers are accustomed to get off. After getting off of the street car safely, she started east on the unfinished and unimproved Milne street. There was a small ditch running parallel with the street car line which also crossed Milne street, and across which there was a small bridge that was frequently used by persons traveling on Milne street east of the car line, and there was also a path that led down-into and across the ditch, and this path was frequently used by persons traveling on Milne street east of the car line. The small bridge which crossed this ditch was not on the right of way of the street car line but appears to be a ditch which runs parallel with the car line and adjacent thereto. The defendant did not build the small bridge and had never kept it in *313 repair. It was not built for the purpose of enabling passengers to reach the car line, although it seemed to have been frequently used for that purpose. After plaintiff, Mrs. Paul Clinton, had gotten off of the street car and had started to her home on Milne street, she vtfas crossing the little bridge when a plank in the bridge broke and she received ’her injuries by the fall resulting from the breaking of the plank in the bridge. It is unnecessary to refer to the nature and extent of her injuries, since the only question presented on the appeal is, -the action of the court in directing verdicts in behalf of the defendant in the respective suits, and in dismissing the suits.

The assignments of error in behalf of the respective plaintiffs allege, that the trial judge Avas in error in directing Arerdicts in favor of the defendant, and under the assignments of error contend that under1 the undisputed facts the defendant, Electric Power Company, was liable for the damages resulting on account of the defective condition of the bridge. It being the contention of appellants that the defendant Avas under the legal obligation and duty of seeing that this little bridge, generally used by those going to and from the street car from the east side of thej car line on Milne street, was kept in a safe condition for the use of persons patronizing the street car company and Avho had to use this bridge in going to the street car .and in leaving the street car at that point. Numerous cases are cited and relied upon in support of the contention that the defendant owes a duty to its passengers of seeing that approaches to its stations are maintained in a safe condition. (East Tenn. R. Co. v. Watson, 94 Ala., 634; Watson v. Ocanna, 92 Ala., 320; Ga. Northern R. Co. v. Harwich, 12 Ga. App., 268; Cotant v. Boone, Sub. R. Co., 125 Iowa, 46; Carleton v. Rockland St. R. Co., 110 Me., 397; Collins v. Toledo Ry. Co., 80 Mich., 390, 10 C. J., 912-913.)

• The plaintiffs invoke the principle and rule that it is the duty of a railroad company to provide safe means of access to and exit from its stations for the use of its passengers, and when it has set aside and established an approach to its depot for the use of the public having business with it, it assumes the duty of keeping the same reasonably safe for the use to AAdiieh it Avas dedicated. The authorities above cited, and other authorities, announce the rule and principle as aboAre stated, and we may add that it is a sound statement of the law when the facts justify the application of the •rule as stated. HoAvever, this duty is generally applied to steam or commercial railroads where passenger stations and depots are maintained, and where such railroads provide the approaches to the station or depots. The duty of a railroad company as a carrier of passengers does not end when the passenger is carried safely to its destination, or more properly the passenger depot, but the car *314 rier must also provide reasonably safe means of access to and from its passenger station so that passengers may have safe means of reaching and leaving the station. (Hassellton v. Portsmouth St. R. Co., 71 N. H., 589; Dela. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. Law, 169.)

In the instant case the street car company provided a safe place for passengers to alight at the particular point. Milne street was practically a blind street insofar as travel and traffic was concerned, ending at the west side of the street car line. It was an improved and travelled street west of the street car line. East oE the street car line the street was not improved and was not used for vehicular travel. No sidewalks had ever been built on. the street east of the car line. It was in a suburban portion of the City of Chattanooga. The street car company had never built any bridge or other approach on Milne street. It had never maintained .the little bridge. It was under no legal obligation to build a bridge or to provide means for persons crossing the ditch to reach its cars at that point. It does not appear just who built the bridge, but it does appear that the defendant did not build it. It was not on the right., of way or property of the defendant.

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Georgia Northern Railway Co. v. Hardwick
77 S.E. 102 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1913)
Watson v. Oxanna Land Co.
92 Ala. 320 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1890)
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Cotant v. Boone Suburban Railway Co.
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Bluebook (online)
10 Tenn. App. 311, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clinton-v-tennessee-electric-power-co-tennctapp-1929.