Clinton v. Coyaleski

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 23, 2025
Docket4:25-cv-01363
StatusUnknown

This text of Clinton v. Coyaleski (Clinton v. Coyaleski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clinton v. Coyaleski, (N.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY KEITH CLINTON, ) CASE NO. 4:25-cv-1363 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING ) v. ) ) FSL ADMINISTRATOR ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND COYALESKI, et al., ) ORDER ) Defendants. )

Pro se Plaintiff Gregory Keith Clinton, a federal prisoner at FCI Elkton, filed this Bivens action against FSL Administrator Sara Coyaleski and FSL Notary Kayla Miller. (ECF No. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the instant complaint is DISMISSED. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On March 21, 2017, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of West Virginia issued a superseding indictment charging Clinton with one count of felon in possession of a firearm and four counts of drug trafficking. Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 40, United States v. Clinton, No. 3:17-cr-5 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 21, 2017). After proceeding to trial, the jury found Clinton guilty of possession of a firearm convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), possession of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844, and possession of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844. Verdict, ECF No. 182, United States v. Clinton, No. 3:17-cr-5 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 19, 2018). On August 27, 2018, Clinton was sentenced to a 264-month term of imprisonment to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Judgment, ECF No. 205, United States v. Clinton, No. 3:17-cr-5 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 29, 2018). Clinton is currently serving his sentence at FCI Elkton. (ECF No. 1, PageID #3). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at

471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the

nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Federal courts are also courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to police the boundaries of their jurisdiction in every case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A “district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of [the] complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). III. DISCUSSION Upon review, the Court finds that this action warrants dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with Apple v. Glenn. Clinton’s complaint is largely incomprehensible, difficult to decipher, and does not set forth cogent allegations with respect to either of the defendants. The complaint appears to

assert violations of the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms, Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable search and seizure, and Fifth Amendment’s right against the taking of private property without just compensation. (ECF No. 1, PageID #3). However, these claims appear related to Clinton’s underlying arrest, trial, and conviction, there are no allegations of any conduct or actions taken by the defendants, and there is no indication or logical inference that the defendants have any connection to the asserted claims. To the extent the complaint can be deciphered, it is largely premised on theories that Clinton’s federal rights were allegedly violated in connection with his federal criminal conviction or incarceration because he is a “sovereign citizen.” (Id. at PageID #5, 12–13). In the section of the complaint setting forth the facts

underlying his claims, Clinton states that “[t]hose who join a conspiracy take it as found it. Mr. Gregory K. Clinton is a sovereign citizen.” (Id. at PageID #5). He further states that he seeks “relief of rights of the sovereign” in the amount of “49 million 500 thousand dollars.” (Id.). Clinton’s claims are premised on the proposition that he is a sovereign citizen and thus the district court that presided over this trial and conviction lacked jurisdiction over him and his conviction and incarceration violate his constitutional rights. This argument lacks any merit. See United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases where circuit courts have dismissed complaints based on sovereign citizenship). Courts have routinely rejected arguments based on the theory of sovereign citizenship as frivolous and without extended discussion. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Courts have been confronted repeatedly by [sovereign citizens’] attempts to delay judicial proceedings and have summarily rejected their legal theories as frivolous.”); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly rejected [the defendants’] theories of individual sovereignty, immunity from prosecution, and their ilk.”); Charlotte v. Hansen, 433 F. App’x 660,

661 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the sovereign citizen theory as having no conceivable validity in American law); Bey v. McCandless, No. 1:22-cv-554, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56663, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2023) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55598 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2023); Payne v. Klida, No. 15-cv-14127, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14968, at *12–14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016) (citing cases), report and recommendation adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14649 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2016); Davis v. McClain, No. 2:19-cv-3466, 2019 U.S. Dist.

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Charlotte v. Hansen
433 F. App'x 660 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Benabe
654 F.3d 753 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Torrance Pilgrim v. John Littlefield
92 F.3d 413 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)
Thomas L. Apple v. John Glenn, U.S. Senator
183 F.3d 477 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Ronn Darnell Sterling
738 F.3d 228 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Airiz Coleman
871 F.3d 470 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)
Wells v. Brown
891 F.2d 591 (Sixth Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
Clinton v. Coyaleski, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clinton-v-coyaleski-ohnd-2025.